# 3. THE FUNCTIONS OF *pu*

## 3.0. Overview

In this chapter, the various functions *pu* is associated with are explored in a well-attested and well-known variant of Greek—CSMG. This is necessary before embarking on an account of how *pu* came to acquire those functions, or a diatopic account relying on more fragmentarily attested local variants: one moves from the known to the unknown.

My account of the distribution of *pu* is based on Mackridge (1985) and Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963]). Tzartzanos' *Syntax* remains the authoritative description of Modern Greek syntax, although it is written in a traditional framework, which lacks the benefit of recent syntactic analysis or cross-linguistic insights; Mackridge provides a special study of *pu* within his descriptivist overview of Modern Greek. These two sources are supplemented by Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987), a formal grammar of Modern Greek, and Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton (1997), a descriptive reference grammar.

Apart from trivial invented examples and the constructed sentences in Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton, all these works' examples are taken from real text: Tzartzanos', from folk song and fables, and contemporary vernacular literature; Mackridge's, from contemporary literature, the Greek press, and spoken discourse. I occasionally supplement these with spoken discourse I have recorded. As there are subtle distinctions involved in the usage of *pu,* it is safer to rely on found data than constructed examples, which may only reflect the author's idiolect.

The taxonomy outlined by Mackridge is the basis of the taxonomy I use in this chapter, with some elaboration and further subdivision, and supplemented by Tzartzanos' taxonomy and discussion. My taxonomy can be summarised as follows:

I. Relative locative adverb
    1. Indefinite
    2. Definite
II. Relativiser
    1. Pseudo-relativiser
    2. Cleft
    3. Pseudo-Cleft
III. Complementiser
    1. Emotive complements
    2. Cognitive-Physical factive complements
    3. Non-factive complements
    4. Subject complements

IV. Adjunct connective
    1. Cause or reason clauses
    2. Circumstance clauses
    3. Result clauses
    4. Contrast clauses
    5. Realis concessive clauses
    6. Temporal clauses
V. Discourse connective
VI. Collocations
    1. With preposition/subordinator
    2. 'Redundant'
    3. Discourse connectives
    4. Other
VIa. Subjunctive marker
VII. Combined with *na*
    1. Generalising relative clauses
    2. Purposive relative clauses
    3. Potential result clauses
    4. Irrealis concessive clauses
    5. Optative clauses
    6. Exclamatory clauses
      a. Cleft exclamatory
      b. Bare exclamatory
VIII. Irrealis expressions
    1. *pu θa*-exclamatory adjuncts
    2. Bare *pu*-exclamatory adjuncts
IX. Combined with definite article

Of the classes identified here, all have been identified by Mackridge but for II.4 and III.4 (Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton), II.2, IV.5, V and IX (Tzartzanos), IV.2, VII.6b and VIII (Nicholas). The last three taxa are the only original elements I contribute to the taxonomy; however, this entire chapter is a resynthesis of the previous attempts at a taxonomy, and there is some reorganisation involved.[1] The discussion here is also rather more detailed than that of either Mackridge or Tzarztanos; it includes a wider range of examples, and incorporates more recent research into the semantics of particular functions (particularly causals and concessives.)

My taxonomy is based on exhaustive corpus research of Makriyannis and Tahtsis—texts at the temporal and stylistic endpoints of CSMG (1830s–1960s), as well as findings from the informal texts by Tsiforos and in *Hellas-L* (see discussion in §1.1); it thus represents an exhaustive listing of functions of *pu*.

The original meaning of *pu,* retained in the phonologically unreduced allomorph ˈ*opu,* is a relative locative adverb ('where, wherever') (I). The most widespread use of *pu* in Modern Greek is as a relativiser (II); thus, in the text *The Third Wedding,* the generic relativiser function accounts for 74% of all instances of *pu,* while in Makriyannis' *Memoirs,* it accounts for 65%. The grammaticalisation of *hópou* from function I to II proceeded throughout Middle Greek, and had reached its completion by 500 AD (see §5 for discussion). The

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[1]While I have completed an analysis of collocations (VI) (Nicholas 1998a), this analysis has been excluded from the scope of this work.

relativiser rubric includes headless relatives (a function obsolete in CSMG), and pseudo-relatives—relativisations of adverbs, which can be seen as a stepping stone between relativiser and conjunction usages of *pu* (*eki pu* 'just when', *tora pu* 'now that').[2]

The development studied here is the spread of *pu* beyond relativiser functions, to complement and adjunct functions (III–IV). In any discussion of these, Mackridge's caveat should be borne in mind:

> While grammarians class these uses of *pu* as different from its relative functions, there is often a noun or pronoun in the main clause which might be construed as an antecedent: indeed, it may be that most speakers would consider *pu* to be no different from a relative pronoun in such circumstances. (Mackridge 1985:254)

It is often difficult to distinguish between the various semantic functions attributable to *pu:* a causal adjunct can just as easily be temporal, and a resultative can also be analysed as a predicate complement. This ambiguity is remarked upon explicitly by Tzartzanos:

> Since the particle *pu* has many uses and meanings, it appears in many instances with two or three meanings in the same sentence; and in many contexts, it is difficult to determine its exact meaning, or it seems to be redundant. (Tzartzanos 1991 [1946, 1963] §282 LXXXIV v)

The kind of polysemy involved in *pu,* where one function fades into another, is characteristic of grammaticalisation, and inevitably frustrates any attempts at a well-defined taxonomy: there are always instances of *pu,* or for that matter of any polysemous particle, which do not fall within the prototypical semantic range of one or the other meanings of the particle, but which instead fall in some fuzzy semantic cline intermediate between the two. This is crucial for an appreciation of the synchronic semantics of *pu;* but as I contend in subsequent chapters, this fuzziness is a synchronic rather than diachronic fact. And although these clines explain the current semantic range of functions of *pu,* they do not explain how those functions were originally acquired.

Where the semantic category is relevant, *pu*-complements and *pu*-adjuncts are typically factive. What **factive** means precisely, and to what extent factivity fits the actual distribution of *pu,* is a topic of some complexity, which I study in more detail in §4.[3] In general terms, *pu*-clauses being factive means that they are presupposed to be true; for adjuncts, this is in itself an adequate description

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[2]The definition of 'relative clause' I use is rather broad—even broader, in fact, than Mackridge's. Thus, I vary from Mackridge in considering some constructions under his 'Other collocations' rubric to be temporal relative clauses; for instance:

(1)      Ἔχετε        *ὥρα    που*   ἤρθατε;
         exete        *ora     pu*    irθate?
         you have     time    REL    you came
         Have you been here long? ('Has it been for you a [long] time *since when* you came?') (Mack 257)

[3]Even as a separate chapter, §4 is far from exhausting the topic of the semantics of the Greek complementation paradigm.

of the distribution of *pu*. In complementation, *pu* is in complementary distribution with unmarked realis complementisers *oti* and *pos,* and with the irrealis connective *na;* the semantic differentiation involved is that the *pu*-clauses are factive. In other cases, however, *pu* is in seemingly free variation with these connectives.

As a complementiser, *pu* is obligatory after predicates of emotion in CSMG (III.1) and marked for factivity after predicates of perception and knowledge (III.2). In some Greek dialects (although not CSMG), it also appears as a nonfactive complementiser, after predicates of saying and thinking, and has become the unmarked realis complementiser (III.3).

As a connective, *pu* is also factive, as already mentioned (IV). The types of adjunct it can introduce include causes/circumstances, results, contrasts, concessions, and temporal adjuncts. The distinctions between these various meanings are vague, and judgements on which rubric a *pu*-adjunct belongs to can be problematic; quite often an instance of *pu* is ambiguous between two such functions. Again, this type of fuzzy polysemy is characteristic of grammaticalisation.

*pu* is sporadically used as a textual connective (V). Such a development would be interesting as a broadening of syntactic scope; yet there is evidence to suggest that the majority of cases (using *opu* rather than *pu*) constitute a separate development from the remainder of functions considered, and originate directly in the locative ʹ*opu*.

Collocations of *pu* with various prepositions and subordinators form a separate class (VI), as the pathway through which they originated is the same for most of them. This class also includes collocations of *pu* with adverbs, and discourse marker usages of collocations of *pu* (VI.3). Collocations are not included in this research (see Nicholas 1998a); they are most significant for showing the productive use of *pu* as a nominaliser, following on from its complementiser function, and for engendering several more idiosyncratic usages.

The spread of *pu* into the irrealis domain is considered in three categories. First, *pu* enters into the class of Greek 'subjunctive markers' (VIa), which can be followed by subjunctive clauses (§3.0.1); in CSMG, this occurs mostly with indefinite rather than irrealis denotation, so that the factivity of *pu* is challenged, but not severely so.

Second, *pu* enters into the collocation *pu na* (VII) (considered separately by both Tzartzanos and Mackridge in their taxonomies under their articles on *na*.) In Greek, *na* is an irrealis particle, traditionally associated with the subjunctive mood; so *pu na* clauses are not factive, and unlike VIa there is an explicit modal marker indicating this. The types of clause considered here include potential results, concessions, optative phrases, exclamatory phrases, and purposive and generalising relative clauses.

Third is the collocation of *pu* and *θa,* the future marker, used to introduce irrealis adjuncts to exclamatory sentences (VIII); I also consider analogous irrealis adjuncts in which *θa* is absent. This category is significant in that it violates

the factivity constraint on *pu*-clauses, without an overt marker of irrealis modality in the sentence (VII), and without the violation being restricted to referentiality (VIa).

The final class involves collocations of *pu* and the definite article *to* (IX), which are quite rare in Modern Greek; the reason for this relates to the factivity of *pu*.

Though this is a disparate grouping of senses, there are certain cohesive factors at work:

1   None of these usages are distant from the relativiser usage of *pu*—either syntactically, in terms of native speaker intuition, or semantically: the functions are bound together in a polysemic whole.

2   Wherever applicable, and whenever irrealis *na* is not juxtaposed, *pu*-clauses are factive (with the exception of the clauses in VIII, and to a lesser extent VIa), and are frequently marked for factivity.

3   The classes of predicates after which *pu* appears obligatorily and optionally in CSMG as a complementiser broadly correspond to the the true-factive and semi-factive classes of predicates, respectively (Karttunen 1971):[4] there is thus an independent semantic motivation for the distribution of *pu* as a complementiser.

4   In its grammaticalisation *pu* has come to either overlap or contrast with *na* in a wide range of functions. In a real sense, many usages of *pu* can be unified as a figure against the ground of *na*. There are cases where *pu* and *na* co-occur or compete; it is as if the two great grammaticalisations of Modern Greek are waves spreading out from their own foci, and overlapping in some fields (such as temporal adjuncts, or complements of verbs of perception.) I argue in subsequent chapters that a good deal of the meaning of *pu* in the Modern Greek grammatical system has arisen by virtue of its paradigmatic relation with *na*.

My main concern in this work is to trace the semantic changes and diversification in the history of *pu*, rather than a detailed synchronic account of its semantics, which has not yet been settled. An outline of the semantic issues involved, however, is an essential preliminary to such an account.

In what follows, each of these functions is described in detail, along with examples drawn from Tzartzanos, Mackridge, and my own corpora, and notes on any complications arising.[5]

### 3.0.1. The Greek verb system

The discussion below occasionally refers to the verb tense used after *pu*; mostly, this is done to distinguish realis from irrealis and counterfactual clauses. In

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[4]These are explained in §4.

[5]Tzartzanos' examples are followed by an indication of his source; the most prominent of these are Passow's and Politis' collections of folk songs.

doing so, I use a structuralist rather than traditional framework of analysing Modern Greek tense.

There are in Modern Greek four morphologically primitive finite verb forms: that is, tense forms which vary for person, and which are realised as inflections as opposed to clitics or auxiliaries. Following traditional usage, these distinct verb forms are called tenses. The distinction between them, however, involves not only time, but aspect and modality as well.

In traditional Greek grammar, the primary distinctions were those of tense and mood; verb forms were thus referred to as Present Indicative, Aorist Subjunctive, and so forth. Following a structuralist taxonomy, first used by Mirambel (1978 [1959]), and here expressed in Hesse's (1980) formulation, verb forms are distinguished according to aspect and tense; while there are also modality distinctions between verb forms, these are considered secondary in the taxonomy.

In this taxonomy, aspect is distinguished between **Perfective** and **Imperfective**, and tense between **Simplex**[6] and **Past**. Amongst non-finite verb forms, the Imperative is also subject to aspect distinctions, although not tense distinctions. One may illustrate the taxonomy with the active verbs ˈðeno 'bind' and aɣaˈpo 'love', representing the two conjugations of Greek verbs, which are distinguished by stress placement on the citation form:

### Active

|  | Imperfective | | Perfective | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simplex | ˈðen-o | aɣaˈp-o | ˈðes-o | aɣaˈpis-o |
| Past | ˈeðen-a | aɣaˈp-usa | ˈeðes-a | aˈɣapis-a |
| Imperative | ˈðen-e | aˈɣap-a | ˈðes-e | aˈɣapis-e |

Perfective aspect is associated with a stem change, and Past tense (mostly) with stress moving leftwards.

The passive counterparts of these verb forms are as follows:

### Passive

|  | Imperfective | | Perfective | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simplex | ˈðen-ome | aɣap-iˈeme | ðeˈθ-o | aɣapiˈθ-o |
| Past | ðeˈn-omun | aɣap-iˈomun | ˈðeθ-ika | aɣaˈpiθ-ika |
| Imperative | (ˈðen-u) | — | ˈðes-u | aɣaˈpis-u |

The mood of these verb forms is not uniform. The litmus test for mood in Modern Greek is the use of the irrealis modal particle *na*. In complements, *na* introduces irrealis- or action-complements: *θelo na pao* 'I want to go', *arxizo na piɣeno* 'I start going'. When used with a matrix verb, it indicates a subjunctive mood, such as optativity or hortativity: *na fiɣo* 'may I leave!', *na pame* 'let's go'. More generally, irrealis modality in Greek is associated with a small number of

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[6]After Hesse (1980), *Simplex* is used instead of *Present,* since the Simplex forms are used to form the future tenses of Greek. Simplex by itself can be used to refer to the future, so that the time distinction is properly Past versus Non-Past. (The term *Simplex* is preferred here as more compact than *Non-Past.*)

subordinators—the most prominent of these being *na*. Since in traditional grammar those subordinators are associated with subjunctive mood, they are termed *subjunctive subordinators:* they include *as* 'hortative', *an* 'if', *prin* 'before', and indefinite relativisers—*opios* 'whoever', ˈ*opu* 'wherever', *otan* 'when'.

A verb without a subjunctive subordinator, on the other hand, has indicative mood: *fevɣo* 'I am leaving', *pame* 'we are going'. The correlation between mood and modality in Greek is close; however, in complementation the distinction between *na*- and non–*na*-complements is more one of state vs. event than realis vs. irrealis (*arxizo na piɣeno* 'I start going' introduces a real event, *elpizo oti piɣeni* 'I hope that she is going' introduces a hypothetical state).[7] Furthermore, subjunctive mood in Greek includes not only irrealis, but also indefinite denotation—as with the indefinite relativisers.

Imperfective verb forms are unmarked as to mood:

- The **Imperfective Simplex** can be used in either realis or irrealis contexts: *ðeno* 'I am binding', *na ðeno* 'let me keep binding; may I keep binding!', *θelo na ðeno* 'I want to keep binding'. IMPFS is the traditional citation form of Modern Greek verbs, and is the unmarked verb form in realis contexts, having non-past rather than past reference.

- The irrealis distribution of the **Imperfective Past** is more restricted. While it can be used normally as a matrix verb in realis contexts (*eðena* 'I was binding'), in irrealis contexts, IMPFS is marked as an unrealised optative: compare *iθela na eðena* 'I would have wanted to bind' with *iθela na ðeso* 'I wanted to bind', and *na eðena* 'would that I had bound!'. IMPFP thus cannot be used in all the irrealis contexts other tenses can.

With perfective verb forms, on the other hand, there is a clear mood distinction:

- **Perfective Simplex** (PERFS) is an irrealis tense, which can appear only after subjunctive subordinators. Thus, *na ðeso* 'let me bind; may I bind!', *as ðeso* 'let me bind', *an ðeso* 'if I bind', *prin ðeso* 'before I bind', *opios ðesi* 'whoever binds', ˈ*opu ðeso* 'wherever I bind'. In realis matrix contexts, on the other hand, PERFS is not used: **ðeso* 'I bind'.[8] PERFS is the unmarked verb form in subjunctive contexts: cf. *θelo na ðeso* 'I want to bind' with *θelo na ðeno* 'I want to keep binding'.

- Just as PERFS is overwhelmingly used in irrealis contexts, so the irrealis distribution of the **Imperfective Past** is severely restricted. While it can be used normally as a matrix verb in realis contexts (*eðesa* 'I bound'), it cannot be used in CSMG in irrealis matrix verbs at all (**na eðesa*).[9] As an irrealis, it is restricted to counterfactual conditional and concessive adjuncts, and to

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[7]For more discussion of the semantics of Greek complementation, see §4.

[8]There is only one construction in which PERFS can appear without a subjunctive subordinator: *ðesi ðe ðesi* 'whether he binds or not'. This is analogous both semantically and formally to English *willy-nilly*—and is of course semantically still subjunctive.

[9]*na eðesa* was acceptable in EMG, with the unrealised optative meaning now conveyed by IMPFP *na eðena*.

complements of epistemic predicates: *an to eðesa* 'if I had bound it (which I did not)', *ke na to eðesa* 'even if I had bound it (which I did not)', *pistevo na to eðese* 'I believe he has bound it'.

To summarise the association of mood and verb form in Greek:

|          | *Perfective* | *Imperfective* |
|----------|------------|----------------|
| *Simplex* | Irrealis   | Realis or Irrealis (complementary distribution) |
| *Past*   | Realis     | Realis or Counterfactual ( » » ) |

Compound tenses are formed by the auxiliary verbs *exo* 'have', *ime* 'be', and the future particle *θa*. They include a **Perfect** (*exo* 'have' + Infinitive),[10] a **Pluperfect** (*ixa* 'had' + Infinitive),[11] three **futures** (**Simplex**: *θa* + PERFS; **Continuous**: *θa* + IMPFS; **Perfect**: *θa* + Perfect), and two **conditionals** (*θa*+ IMPFP or Pluperfect). The future/conditional differentiation between Past and Simplex tenses mirrors the irrealis/counterfactual distinction for those tenses after *na*.

   PERFS, as seen, is strongly associated with irrealis modality, so that clauses in PERFS are not presupposed as being true in the world. On the other hand, the most salient characteristic of *pu*-clauses (in the absence of a subjunctive subordinator) is that they are presupposed. So instances where *pu* can be followed directly by PERFS, without an interceding *na,* are infrequent and noteworthy, demonstrating a shift in the modality of *pu* away from presupposition and towards indefinite or irrealis denotation (§3.6).

## 3.1. Relative locative adverb

### 3.1.1. Indefinite locative

The original meaning of *(o)pu* (Classical *hópou)* is the indefinite locative relative adverb 'wherever'. In this meaning, it still appears in its phonologically unreduced form ˈ*opu*. It is thus a distinct lexeme from *pu,* having undergone phonological divergence, but is included in this account for completeness:

(2a)      ´*Οπου* γύριζες, απάνταινες άντρες, γυναίκες, παιδιά
          ˈ*opu* ɣirizes (IMPP), apadenes adres, ɣinekes, peðia.
          **Wherever** you went, you'd meet men, women, children. (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 1: Passow)

There are rare instances in folk song where it is phonologically reduced to *pu* in this function; this is not possible in CSMG, nor is it characteristic of the prose discourse of most Greek dialects (§7.1.1):

(2b)      Από τα ξένα, *που* βρεθώ, μηνύματα σού στέλνω.
          apo ta ksena, *pu* vreθo (PERFS), minimata su stelno.
          From exile, **wherever** I end up, I send you messages. (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 1; Passow)

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[10]The 'infinitive' survives in CSMG only as a compound tense formant.

Since 'opu can have indefinite denotation—unlike *pu*—it can take both 'indicative' and 'subjunctive' tenses. The two simplex tenses PERFS (subjunctive) and IMPFS (indicative) are not in complementary distribution: PERFS can be used wherever IMPFS can, but PERFS clauses allow for unrealised matrix clauses, which IMPFS do not (3a, 3b). This suggests that IMPFS is here marked for realis modality—characteristic of the PERFS/IMPFS opposition in Greek.

(3a)　　Ὅπου βρίσκω Ρεπουμπλικάνο, (??θα) τον προσβάλλω.
　　　　'*opu* vrisko (IMPFS) republikano, (??θa) ton prosvalo.
　　　　***Wherever*** I find a Republican, I (??will) insult him.

(3b)　　Ὅπου βρω Ρεπουμπλικάνο, (θα) τον προσβάλλω.
　　　　'*opu* vro (PERFS) republikano, (θa) ton prosvalo.
　　　　***Wherever*** I may find a Republican, I (will) insult him.

### 3.1.2. Definite locative

'*opu/pu* is also used as the definite locative relative adverb 'where'. In this usage it is difficult to distinguish from the generic relativiser, if there is a noun in the matrix clause which could be considered a head. Thus, in (4a) '*opu* is clearly an adverb, since there is no head it could be referring to in the clause; and it is definite, since '*opu* can only refer to a single place (people are not normally buried in more than one location).

(4a)　　Ὅπου ιδής δυο κυπαρρίσια και στη μέση δυο σμυρτιές, εκεί μέσα είμαι θαμμένος.
　　　　'*opu* iðis ðio kiparisia ke sti mesi ðio smirties, eki mesa ime θammenos.
　　　　***Where*** you see two cypress trees and two myrtles between them, that's where I
　　　　am buried. (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 2; unattributed folk song)

Example (4b), however, could be interpreted as either an adverb or a locative relativiser, depending on whether the '*opu*-clause is considered dependent on the noun *sofita* 'attic':

(4b)　　Πεθαίνει η κόρη στη σοφίτα του σπιτιού, ***όπου*** εκείνος την είχε φυλακίσει.
　　　　peθeni i kori sti sofita tu spitiu, '***opu*** ekinos tin ixe filakisi.
　　　　The girl dies in the house attic, ***where*** he had imprisoned her. (Tz §282
　　　　LXXXIV i 2; Kambanis)

As a headed relativiser of place or (less frequently) time, both '*opu* and *pu* can occur. According to Mackridge (1985:250), '*opu* is more frequent in higher registers and is encouraged by prescriptivists as more distinctive (e.g. Papazafiri 1994 [1987]:68); it is more frequent in non-restrictive relative clauses; and it requires an inanimate antecedent. Furthermore, it is possible for '*opu* to be marked explicitly for motion from (*ap* '*opu* 'from where, whence'), but not for motion to (*\*s* '*opu* 'to where, whither').

In all meanings other than locative, '*opu* has been phonologically reduced to *pu*, although the reduction seems to be characteristic of the koineisation of

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[11]In the passive, the Perfect and Pluperfect can be realised by either 'have/had' and the passive infinitive, or *ime/imun* 'am/was' and the past passive participle.

Modern Greek, and is absent from most texts written before this century. This confirms that *pu,* in all remaining functions considered below, has undergone divergence, and is a distinct lexeme from ˈopu.

## *3.2. Relativiser*

### 3.2.1. Simple relativiser

In Modern Greek, the primary function of *pu* is as a relativiser. The head noun in a *pu*-relative clause can have any case role whatsoever with respect to the relative clause verb—as illustrated by the following examples:

(5a)      subject:
Ο άνθρωπος ***που*** ήρθε είναι ο θείος μου.
o anθropos ***pu*** irθe ine o θios mu.
The man ***who*** came is my uncle. (Mack 249)

(5b)      direct object:
Ο άνθρωπος ***που*** είδες είναι ο θείος μου.
o anθropos ***pu*** iðes ine o θios mu.
The man ***whom*** you saw is my uncle. (Mack 249)

(5c)      indirect object:
Ο άνθρωπος ***που του*** δάνεισα τα λεφτά είναι ο θείος μου.
o anθropos ***pu tu*** ðanisa ta lefta ine o θios mu.
The man ***to whom*** I lent the money to is my uncle. (Mack 249)

(5d)      oblique *(with):*
Οι δράστες χρειάστηκε να κόψουν τις αλυσίδες ***που*** ήσαν δεμένα τα κιβώτια.
i ðrastes xriastike na kopsun tis alisiðes ***pu*** isan ðemena ta kivotia.
The culprits had to cut the chains ***with which*** the boxes were tied. (Mack 249; *Tahidromos* magazine, 1979–3–29)

(5e)      oblique *(for):*
Για εκείνες ***που*** υπήρξε θαυμάσιος εραστής, θα ήταν οπωσδήποτε απαίσιος σύζυγος.
γia ekines ***pu*** ipirkse θavmasios erastis, θa itan oposðipote apesios siziγos.
For those women ***for whom*** he was a marvellous lover he would certainly have been an awful husband. (Mack 249; Karagatsis)

(5f)      oblique *(through):*
Εκεί είναι η πόρτα ***που*** μπήκε ο κλέφτης.
eki ine i porta ***pu*** bike o kleftis.
There's the door ***through which*** the thief entered. (Mack 249)

(5g)      oblique (punctual locative):
Φτάσαμε στο σπίτι ***που*** καθόταν ο ποιητής.
ftasame sto spiti ***pu*** kaθotan o piitis.
We reached the house ***in which/where*** the poet stayed. (Mack 249)

(5h)      oblique (proximal locative):
Το σχολείο ***που*** κοντά ***του*** ήταν ένας πλάτανος.
to sxolio ***pu*** koda ***tu*** (CLIT) itan enas platanos.
The school ***near which*** ['that near it'] there was a plane-tree. (Mack 249)

(5i)      oblique (temporal):
Δε ζούμε πια στην εποχή ***που*** δεν μπορούσες να κάνεις μπάνιο γυμνός.

ðe zume pia stin epoxi ***pu*** ðen boruses na kanis banio ɣimnos.
We no longer live in the age ***when*** one couldn't go swimming in the nude.
(Mack 249)

(5j)     oblique (manner):
Ο τρόπος, ***που*** θα τη φορούσα την εσάρπα, θα συμπλήρωνε τη σημασία του χρώματος.
o tropos, ***pu*** θa ti forusa tin esarpa, θa siblirone ti simasia tu xromatos.
The way ***that*** I'd wear the shawl would complete the colour's meaning. (Tz
§282 LXXXIV i 3 b: Drosinis)

(5k)     oblique (causal):
Θα μου πεις την αιτία, ***που*** εγελούσες.
θa mu pis tin etia, ***pu*** eɣeluses.
You will tell me the reason ***why/for which*** you were laughing. (MinB 481)

(5l)     oblique (topic):
Είναι η δόξα, ***που*** του είχαν πει.
ine i ðoksa, ***pu*** tu ixan pi.
That is the glory ***which*** they had told him ***about***. (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 3 b:
Papantoniou)

(5m)     possessive:
Ένα νεαρό χανουμάκι ***που*** οι χούφτες ***του*** ήταν βαμμένες με κινά.
ena nearo xanumaki ***pu*** i xuftes ***tu*** (POSS ADJ) itan vamenes me kina.
A young harem girl ***whose*** palms were dyed with henna ['that her hands were
dyed']. (Iordanidou, cited in Haberland & van der Auwera 1990:130)

(5n)     object of comparison:
Ο μαθητής ***που*** ο Κώστας είναι ψηλότερός ***του***.
o maθitis ***pu*** o kostas ine psiloteros ***tu*** (CLIT).
The student ***that*** Con is taller than.

Relative clauses in Modern Greek may contain resumptive clitic pronouns.
*Grosso modo,* the use of resumptives follows the Keenan & Comrie (1977) rela-
tivisation hierarchy (although see Joseph 1983a), with resumptives usual for in-
direct objects (5c), obligatory for possessors and objects of comparison (5m,
5n), disallowed for subjects, and optional for direct objects. There is an exten-
sive recent literature on the conditions for the latter (Asselman 1991; Bakker
1974; Haberland & van der Auwera 1987; Haberland & van der Auwera 1990;
Stavrou 1984); conditioning factors invoked have included restrictiveness of the
relative clause, syntactic ambiguity with subjects, topicality, focus, and textual
coherence. Interesting as this topic is, it does not impinge directly on the devel-
opment of *pu* in Greek to other functions, and is not discussed here further.

  The vagueness of the head noun role results from the fact that Greek deletes
prepositions which might have preceded the head, when it is relativised
(Haberland & van der Auwera 1987:147): for example, (5f) corresponds to *o
kleftis bike **apo** tin porta eki* 'the thief went ***through*** the door there', but no
trace of the preposition survives in the relativisation (cf. English *There's the
door **through** which the thief entered; there's the door the thief entered
**through***). (In this regard, Greek oblique relatives do not fall within the
Keenan & Comrie hierarchy.)

Faced with this, traditional grammarians like Tzartzanos and Triandafyllidis characterised *pu* as polysemous: in their view, *pu* by itself meant 'when', 'where', 'through which' etc., as well as functioning as a simple relativiser. In that way, the meaning of the preposition is not lost on deletion; it is incorporated in the meaning of *pu*. According to Haberland & van der Auwera (1990:149),

> this way the problem of the 'nonrecoverable deletion' is solved, but the cost is polysemy. We think that the cost is bearable: that *pu* is polysemous must be accepted in any case.

However, this ultimately leads to having to postulate a distinct *pu* for each deleted preposition, which is unworkable. And even with a polysemous *pu,* the sense of the prepositions remains 'non-recoverable': the only means a Greek-speaker has of disambiguating the semantic role of the head in examples like (5d) or (5e) is lexical and real-world knowledge (Joseph 1980; Theophano-poulou-Kontou 1982). From the viewpoint of a semantic analysis of the functionality of *pu,* at any rate, introducing such a new and diffuse polysemy would not be helpful, and I do not follow such a route in my account.

A relative *pu*-clause can even have a clausal antecedent (contrary to Mackridge 1985:253, who restricts this capacity to the relativiser *o opios*):

(6)    Ας τα χαράξουμε [τα λόγια σου] στο νου μας, **που** δεν κοστίζει και παρά.
       as ta xaraksume sto nu mas, **pu** ðen kostizi ke para.
       Let us inscribe them [your words] onto our minds—**which** doesn't cost any
       money, either. (PsichV[1] 120)

*Rival relativisers*

There is one competitor to *pu* as a relativiser in CSMG: the declinable pronoun *o opios* (Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1997:441–443). Originally, it seems to have been a loan from Old French, first turning up in French-influenced Greek texts dating from *xiv* AD (Bakker 1974; Nicholas 1998b). Eventually, it was taken up by Puristic Greek, and thence transferred into the vernacular. While frowned upon by prescriptive demoticists (Tzartzanos 1991 [1946, 1963] §114), it is freely used in CSMG; the fact that it has explicit marking of the syntactic relation between head and matrix through declension makes it less ambiguous, and thus preferred in formal contexts.

*Syntactic behaviour of relativiser-*pu

There is frequently no formal marker of the relation between head and relative clause in *pu*-clauses. As a result, the relation between relative clause and head can become tenuous (unlike *o opios*). For example, in (7) the head *epomeni* 'next day' is not the temporal locus of the relative clause; rather, the relative clause is the deictic centre of *epomeni*. Yet the interpretation 'the day after...', rather than 'the day after, when...', is only retrievable through world-knowledge:

(7)    την    επομένη    ***που***    ᾽διωξες    την Κατερίνα.
       tin    epomeni    ***pu***    ðiokses    tin katerina.
       the    next day    REL    you dismissed    the C.
       The day after you dismissed Catherine (literally 'the next day that you dismissed Catherine') (Mack 251; Karagatsis)

It is possible for the head noun to become separated from its relative clause through the interpolation of other sentential elements, without any stylistic markedness (Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:24).[12]

(8a)    Μια κοπέλα    μπήκε    ***που***    φορούσε    κόκκινη φούστα
        mia kopela    bike    ***pu***    foruse    kokini fusta
        a girl    came in    REL    wore    red skirt
        A girl came in ***who*** was wearing a red skirt

The major motivation for this phenomenon is heavy shift, giving rise to extraposition (Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:114): a relativised nominal followed by other arguments of the matrix predicate would be hard to parse, so the relative clause head stays in place, while the relative clause is shifted to the end of the clause. Thus, (8b) can be recast as (8c):

(8b)    Σύστησα    *μια γυναίκα που τη γνώρησα στο Παρίσι*
        sistisa    *mia yineka pu ti ynorisa sto parisi*
        I introduced    a woman REL her I.met in.the Paris
        στο Γιάννη χθες
        sto ɣiani xtes
        to.the John yesterday
        I introduced a woman I met in Paris to John yesterday

(8c)    Σύστησα    *μια γυναίκα*    στο Γιάννη χθες    *που τη γνώρησα*
        sistisa    *mia yineka*    sto ɣiani xtes    *pu ti ynorisa*
        I.introduced    a woman    to.the John yesterday    REL her I.met
        *στο Παρίσι*
        *sto parisi*
        in.the Paris
        I introduced a woman to John yesterday that I met in Paris

### 3.2.2. Pseudo-relativiser

In the examples given so far, *pu*-clauses have modified head nouns. However, Greek adverbs of place or time are often followed by an adverbial *pu*-clause, further specifying the place or time. While Tzartzanos treated such clauses in a very disparate manner, Mackridge (1985:253) consistently considers these *pu*-clauses to be relativising their preceding adverbs. Mackridge calls this class of *pu* **pseudo-relativisers** (as proper relativisers qualify nominals). For instance:

(9a)    *Εκεί που* βρισκόταν η παλιά ταβέρνα τώρα υψώνεται μια θεόρατη πολυκατοικία.
        *eki pu* vriskotan i palia taverna tora ipsonete mia θeorati polikatikia.
        ***Where*** ('there that') the old tavern used to be, now a huge block of flats rises up. (Mack 253)

_____

[12]According to Sakellariadou (1972:62), such utterances are more acceptable when the head is animate.

(9b)     Πέρασαν είκοσι χρόνια ***από τότε που*** πρωτοπήγα στην Ελλάδα.
         perasan ikosi xronia ***apo tote pu*** protopiɣa stin elaða.
         Twenty years have passed ***since*** ('since then that') I first went to Greece. (Mack
         253)

(9c)     ***Τώρα που*** τέλειωσες τη διατριβή σου, τι θα κάνεις;
         ***tora pu*** telioses ti ðiatrivi su, ti θa kanis?
         ***Now that*** you've finished your thesis, what are you going to do? (Mack 253)

In effect, pseudo-relative *pu* forms compound subordinators: thus, *apo tote pu*
corresponds to 'since'; *tora pu* to 'now that'; and *eki pu* to 'while', both as a tem-
poral and contrast marker.

   While pseudo-relativised adverbs are equivalent in function to subordinators,
the collocation of adverb and *pu* is compositional in its meaning. Pseudo-rela-
tivised adverbs are also semantically distinct from subordinators with respect to
definiteness. The adverbs are demonstrative, or have a specific referent: *tora*
'now', *eki* 'there', *tote* 'then', *etsi* 'in that manner'. They thus give rise to subordi-
nators which themselves are definite—whereas their equivalent simple subordi-
nators are unmarked as to definiteness. So *eki pu* must always have a definite
referent, and can never mean 'wherever'; whereas its simple equivalent ˈ*opu* can
be either definite or indefinite. The same holds for *tote pu,* which must refer to a
past, realis event, as against *otan* 'when', which can introduce an irrealis event.

   This property also extends to the expression *aftos pu* 'he who'. This expression
formally corresponds to the Modern Greek headless relative *opios* 'whoever'. But
*opios* is indefinite, while *aftos pu,* incorporating a personal pronoun, is usually
definite in reference. The distinction is pervasive in Greek, as illustrated by the
following song lyric:

(10)     ***Αυτός που*** σπέρνει δάκρυα και τρόμο θερίζει την αυγή θανατικό.
         ***aftos pu*** sperni ðakria ke tromo θerizi tin avɣi θanatiko.
         ***He who*** sows tears and terror harvests death at dawn. *(Τα Λόγια τα Χαμμένα)*

As it stands, the lyric refers to a specific person; with *opios,* the lyric would be a
gnomic statement ('whosoever sows tears and terror…')

   I also include under the rubric of pseudo-relatives the construction *etsi pu* 'the
way that' (*etsi* = 'thus, in that manner'), exemplified by (11a) and (11b):

(11a)    Έτσι που πάνε τα πράγματα, δε θα τελειώσουμε πριν απ' τα Χριστούγεννα.
         ***etsi pu*** pane ta praɣmata, ðe θa teliosume prin ap ta xristuɣena.
         ***The way*** ('in that manner that') things are going, we won't finish before
         Christmas. (Mack 257)

(11b)    Ποιος άντρας θα γυρίσει, σας παρακαλώ, να την κοιτάξει ερωτικά ***έτσι που*** ντύνεται,
         ***έτσι που*** φέρεται, ***έτσι που*** μιλάει;
         pios adras θa ɣirisi, sas parakalo, na tin kitaksi erotika ***etsi pu*** dinete, ***etsi pu*** ferete,
         ***etsi pu*** milai?
         *I'd like to know what man would turn round in the street to give her a second
         glance,* ***the way*** *she dresses,* ***the way*** *she behaves,* ***the way*** *she talks.*
         (Tah 9)

In this construction, the *pu*-clause modifies *etsi,* an adverb of manner. This may be obscured by the English gloss; but *pu*-clauses can be deleted from all the pseudo-relative clauses, leaving their head adverb in place while still making sense: *eki [pu vriskotan i palia taverna] tora ipsonete mia θeorati polikatikia* **'there** now a huge block of flats rises up', *etsi [pu pane ta praγmata], ðe θa teliosume prin ap ta xristuγena* **'that way** we won't be finished before Christmas'. So semantically the *pu*-clauses behave as relativisations, in *etsi pu* as well as the other pseudo-relatives.

However, Mackridge classes the *etsi pu*-construction as a distinct non-compositional collocation, rather than a pseudo-relative. Although he provides no justification for this, there is a semantic distinction between *etsi pu* and other pseudo-relatives: *etsi pu* has a more complex semantics than merely further qualifying manner. This connective introduces circumstance clauses: **'the way** things are going, we won't be finished before Christmas' is equivalent to **'given that** things are going in such a way, we won't be finished before Christmas'. In fact, *etsi pu* is more restricted than English *the way that:* it cannot be used to indicate manner *instead* of circumstance, as the following indicates:

(12)  Ενώ οι δυο εκφράσεις είναι τυπικώς πανομοιότυπες, το *έτσι που* φέρει σημασιολογία πιο περίπλοκη από το να προσδιορίζει απλώς τον τρόπο, *{\*έτσι που/όπως/καθώς/κατά τον τρόπο που}* και η φράση με το *που* προσδιορίζει το *εκεί*.
eno i ðio ekfrasis ine tipikos panomiotipes, to *etsi pu* feri simasioloγia pio periploki apo to na prosðiorizi aplos ton tropo, *{\*etsi pu/opos/kaθos/kata ton tropo pu}* ke i frasi me to *pu* prosðiorizi to *eki*.
While formally the two formations are identical, *etsi pu* has a more complex semantics than merely further qualifying manner, **the way that** the *pu*-clause further qualifies *eki*.

So while syntactically *etsi pu* is still a pseudo-relative, the semantics of *etsi pu* is enriched compared to other pseudo-relatives; its meaning is no longer strictly compositional. This is also the case for *eki pu:* from its original locative meaning of 'there, where', it has developed into a temporal—'when, just as' (13b, 13a), and a contrastive—'whereas' (13c), 'rather than' (13d).

(13a)  Ευκαιρία μοναδική, τη στήσανε οι μουσουλμάνοι στο Εσκή Σεχίρ και περιμένανε το στρατό του Βοημούνδου. Κι' *εκεί που* πηγαίνανε ωραία και καλά οι λεβέντες τους κάνουνε ένα γιουρούσι που τους ζάλησε.
efkeria monaðiki, ti stisane i musulmani sto eski sexir ke perimenane to strato tu voimunðu. ki *eki pu* piγenane orea ke kala i levedes tus kanune ena γiurusi pu tus zalise.
It was a unique opportunity; so the Muslims set themselves at Eski Şehir and waited for Bohemund's army. And **just as/just where** the braves were advancing nice and proud, they raided them so as to set their heads spinning. (TsifC 30)

(13b)  Κι' *εκεί που* κόντευε να γεννήση, μηνάνε του βασιλιά να πάη να πολεμήση.
ki *eki pu* kodeve na γenisi, minane tu vasilia na pai na polemisi.
And **just when**/*where she was about to give birth, they send word to the king to go to war. (MinB 428; Pisinonda, Zante, Heptanesa)

(13c)   Αλλά κανένας δεν ξέρει τι έγινε μέσα στην «Καταλανική εταιρεία» και τον πετάξανε
        [τον Φαντρίγ] από αρχηγό. ***Κει δα που*** ήτανε γενικός κουμανταδόρος στον καιρό του
        Βάλτερ, είχε μόνο τον τίτλο αφέντης Μάλτας και Γαύδου.
        ala kanenas ðen kseri ti eɣine mesa stin 'katalaniki eteria' ke ton petaksane apo
        arxiɣo. ***ki ða pu*** itane ɣenikos kumadaðoros ston kero tu valter, ixe mono ton titlo
        afeðis maltas ke ɣavðu.
        No-one knows what happened in the Catalan Company, but they threw him
        [Fadrille] out from his leadership. **Whereas** (*'**there** indeed **that**'*) he was gen-
        eral comander in Walter's time, he [now] had only the title of Lord of Malta and
        Cauda. (TsifFU 210)

(13d)   ΄Αντε να περνάτε [στην Ασία] να με ξεφορτωνόσαστε και να τα 'χουμε και καλά, γιατί
        ***εκεί που*** θα ταλαιπωρηθώ εγώ, καλύτερα να ταλαιπωρηθήτε εσείς. Γκέγκε;
        ade na pernate na me ksefortonosaste ke na ta xume ke kala, ɣiati ***eki pu*** θa
        taleporiθo eɣo, kalitera na taleporiθite esis. gege?
        Go on, go across [to Asia], so as you can be rid of me and we can maintain
        friendly relations, because ***rather than*** me get in trouble [*'**there that** I will
        get in trouble'*], it's better that you get in trouble. Understood? (TsifC 20)

The connection between space and time is obvious in (13a): the Crusaders are
attacked at the spot through which they are 'advancing nice and proud'. As
(13b), (13c) and (13d) show, however, there is no longer any necessary sense of
spatial identity between the *pu*-clause and its matrix.

So pseudo-relatives are a class of relativisations which, because their heads
are syntactically peripheral to their matrices, end up filling a subordinator role
in their sentences. As incipient distinct linguistic signs, they are subject to auto-
nomous semantic development, which can be described as novel grammaticali-
sations.

### 3.2.3. Cleft
It is usual cross-linguistically for relative and cleft formations to use the same
morpheme; Greek is no exception. Thus, Greek has cleft sentences of the type il-
lustrated below:

(14a)   Ο Γιάννης       είναι   ***που***   συνάντησες
        o ɣianis        ine     ***pu***    sinadises
        John            is      REL     you met
        It's John ***that*** you met

In such utterances, a nominal is extracted from a matrix clause, which in turn is
converted into a *pu*-clause connected to the nominal by a copula. This construc-
tion is not far removed from those constructions where the relative clause is
extraposed from its head (8a); so (14a) could also be read as *It's John, whom
you met*—where *pu sinadises* is a relative clause describing *o ɣianis,* the subject
of *ine*. The difference between the two interpretations is marked in speech by a
clear final intonation break before the *pu*-clause for the relativiser interpreta-
tion. Context almost always suffices to determine whether the sentence is exis-
tential (with the copula as the main verb) or cleft, and whether the first nominal
has the strong focus characteristic of clefting or not.

The copula in clefts agrees in person and number with the nominal preceding it, so that grammatically the clefted nominal is fully the subject of the nominal (as distinct from English clefting, where the subject is dummy *it*):

(14b)    Ωστόσο, το γιατρό και το δικηγόρο,   *εγώ*  *είμαι*  πάλε *που*  τους

ostoso, to γiatro ke to ðikiγoro,     *eyo*   *ime*    pale *pu*   tus

                                            I     I.am    yet   REL  them

σπουδάζω.

spuðazo.

I instruct

But the doctors and the lawyers—***it's me that*** ends up instructing them (PsichV[1] 119)

There is little constraint on which nominal in a sentence can be clefted. As (14a) and (14b) show, subjects can be clefted; direct objects can be as well (14c) (note that the clefted object appears in the nominative, as the subject of the copula)—

(14c)    Ο Γιάννης     είναι *που*  θα δεις

o γianis        ine    *pu*   θa ðis

John (NOM)   is    REL  you will see

It's John ***that*** you will see.

as can prepositional phrases.[13]

(14d)    Το *έθνος των Ελλήνων* είναι έξυπνο έθνος·   μόνο  *στο ζήτημα της γλώσσης*

to 'eθnos ton elinon' ine eksipno eθnos     mono  *sto* 'zitima tis γlosis'

                                                    only   in the language question

είναι *που*  τα           μπερδέβει.

ine   *pu*   ta          berðevi

is    REL  them (NEUT)  mixes up

The 'Hellenic Nation' is a smart nation; it's just ***in the*** 'Language Question' ***that*** it gets things mixed up. (PsichV[1] 192)

(14e)    `Nai, kai akribws` ***se*** `ekeino to shmeio` ***einai pou*** `h Paideia leei ston`
          `Loukiano, oriste edw ki o Aisxinhs pou h mana tou htane kamparetzou`
          `(tumpanistria leei) xarh se mena (thn Paideia) egine megas kai tranos.`
    Ναι, και ακριβώς *σε* εκείνο το σημείο *είναι που* η Παιδεία λέει στον Λουκιανό, ορίστε εδώ κι ο Αισχήνης που η μάνα του ήτανε καμπαρετζού (τυμπανίστρια λέει) χάρη σε μένα (την Παιδεία) έγινε μέγας και τρανός.
    ne, ke akrivos se ekino to simio ine pu i peðia lei ston lukiano, oriste eðo ki o esxinis pu i mana tu itane kabaredzu (tibanistria lei) xari se mena (tin peðia) eγine meγas ke tranos.
    Yes, and ***it's at*** that point precisely ***that*** Education says to Lucian, 'look here, even Aeschines whose mother was a cabaret girl (a drummer, he calls it) became high and mighty thanks to me (Education).' (Nikos Sarantakos, `Arxaies mamades (Re: H mama tou Loukiavou)`; Hellas-L, 1997–04–10)

In such instances, since the entire prepositional phrase precedes the copula, the nominal cannot become the subject of the copula. Indeed, reminiscent of pseudo-relatives, clefting in Greek can even extract adverbials from their matrix clause:

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[13]Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987:99) find such usage 'marginal', but it does not offend my linguistic intuition.

(14f)    *Τότες* είναι *που* μπήκαμε στο ξενοδοχείο του σταθμού.
         ***totes*** ine ***pu*** bikame sto ksenoðoxio tu staθmu.
         then   is   REL  we entered in the hotel of the station
         It was ***then that*** we entered the station hotel. (PsichV[1] 49)

## 3.2.4. Inverse cleft and pseudo-cleft

There are two other constructions akin to clefting in Greek. In the first (called here **inverse cleft**), the subject of the copula in the cleft construction is simply placed after the copula, so that the nominal is adjacent to the *pu*-clause:

(15a)    Δεν   είμουν   ***εγώ***   ***που***   την   έκαμνα   κάπου κάπου να ξεχνά τις πολλές
         ðen   imun   ***eyo***   ***pu***   tin   ekamna
         not   I.was   I   REL   her   made
         πίκρες της ζωής της.
         pikres tis zois tus.
         It wasn't ***me that*** made her occasionally forget the many sorrows of her life.
         (PsichV[1] 44)

This construction is harder still to distinguish from a straightforward relative clause than the direct cleft. The nominal is now in a syntactically marked position (assuming SV word order), not with respect to the putative relative clause, but with respect to the putative copula matrix. So a relative reading is the least marked option syntactically. In this case, the cleft reading is established by pragmatics: a relativising interpretation would make the main assertion of the sentence existential ('it was not me—and incidentally I made her forget'), which can be ruled out by context as infelicitous.

On the other hand, it is impossible to settle on the cleft reading (15b) against the relativising reading (15c) in the following sentence:

(15b)    Μ' όλα της τα χρόνια   είταν   εκείνη   που   μ'   έσπρωχνε.
         m ola tis ta xtonis   itan   ekini   pu   m   esproxne
                               she was   that one   REL   me   was pushing
         Despite her age, it was she who kept pushing me. (PsichV[1] 44)

(15c)    Μ' όλα της τα χρόνια   ∅   είταν   εκείνη   που   μ'   έσπρωχνε.
         m ola tis ta xtonis   ∅   itan   ekini   pu   m   esproxne
                               she   was   that one   REL   me   was pushing
         Despite her age, she was the one who kept pushing me. (PsichV[1] 44)[14]

The gloss of (15c) points to the second strategy Greek uses as an alternative to clefting. This is what Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987:100) term **pseudo-clefting**, and it is syntactically as well as semantically indistinguishable from relativisation.[15] In this strategy, the extracted nominal is equated by copula not

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[14]The difference lies only in the syntactic analysis of *ekini:* in (15b), it is the dislocated subject of the copula *itan,* while in (15c), it is the complement of the copula. (In spoken form, however, the syntactic dislocation in (15b) would be accompanied by prominent sentential stress on *ekini.*) Of course, the ambiguity of this construction is parallel to that of English cleft sentences: *It's the woman that I saw* is equally ambiguous between the cleft reading and the relativising existential reading *There is the woman whom I saw.*

[15]What makes pseudo-clefting distinctive is its close analogy to other clefts; it is used in the same contexts, with the same thematic meaning; the matrix assertion, involving an anaphor and

with a *pu*-clause, but with a pronoun modified by the *pu*-clause containing the erstwhile matrix:

(16)  *Αυτό  που*   χρειάζεται στη ζωή του   είναι  πειθαρχία.
      **afto  pu**   xriazete sti zoi tu   ine   piθarxia.
      that   REL   he needs in his life   is   discipline
      **What** he needs in his life is discipline.
      *A bit of discipline is good for people.* (Tah 198)

As already seen, there is nothing unusual about pronouns being qualified by *pu*-clauses in Greek: this is how Greek forms the equivalent of definite headless relatives. And just as there is nothing distinctive about *What he needs is discipline* in English, where *what* is a definite headless relative, so too there is nothing distinctive about *afto pu xriazete ine piθarxia* in Greek. This is in contrast with clefting, which is syntactically marked—more so in English (with its use of a dummy subject) than in Greek. So there is a continuum of clefting in Greek. Direct cleft constructions are syntactically distinct, but are not very far from relative clauses; inverse clefts like (15b) are even closer formally to relative clauses; and pseudo-relatives exploit what are formally and unambiguously relative clauses.

## 3.3. Complementiser

### 3.3.1. Syntactic issues involving *pu*-complements

As a complementiser, *pu* introduces realis complements. It is semantically marked for factivity with respect to the unmarked realis complements introduced by *oti* or *pos* (§4). However, *pu*-complements differ syntactically from *oti*- and *pos*-complements; *pu* behaves much more like irrealis *na,* the grammaticalisation with which it competes so frequently, than like its realis counterparts. In addition, the sundry functions of *pu*—relativiser, complementiser, and adjunct connective—are frequently identical in surface syntactic structure. Properly, one should speak of the categories in fuzzy terms; they are discussed as discrete entities for convenience of exposition, but instances in text are often ambiguous in such a way that disambiguation is not crucial.

    One salient syntactic characteristic of *pu*-complements is that perception *pu*-complements obligatorily raise their subjects. Raising is a usual characteristic of *na*-complements (17c) (although unraised complements as in (17d) are acceptable), but atypical and marked for *pos/oti*-complements (17e) and unacceptable for emotive *pu*-complements (17f, 17g):[16]

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a copula, is still thematically subordinate to the relative clause assertion—something not normal for relativisation.

[16]The tense change between (17a) and (17c) is required by the interplay of mood and tense in Greek.

(17a)     ῎Ακουσα   τον Πέτρο      *που/\*ότι/\*πως*   έφευγε
          akusa     ton petro      *pu/\*oti/\*pos*    efevγe
          I heard   the P. (ACC)   *pu/\*oti/\*pos*    he was leaving (IMPFP)
          I heard Peter leaving

(17b)     ῎Ακουσα   *\*που/ότι/πως*   έφευγε                     ο Πέτρος
          akusa     *\*pu/oti/pos*    efevγe                     o petros
          I heard   *\*pu/oti/pos*    he was leaving (IMPFP)     the P. (NOM)
          I heard that Peter was leaving

(17c)     ῎Ακουσα   τον Πέτρο      *να*   φεύγει
          akusa     ton petro      *na*   fevγi
          I heard   the P. (ACC)   *na*   he is leaving (IMPFS)
          I heard Peter leaving

(17d)     ῎Ακουσα   *να*   φεύγει                      ο Πέτρος
          akusa     *na*   fevγi                       o petros
          I heard   *na*   he is leaving (IMPFS)       the P. (NOM)
          I heard Peter leaving

(17e)     Βλέπω     την αρκούδα      *ότι*   χορεύει
          vlepo     tin arkuða       *oti*   xorevi
          I see     the bear (ACC)   *oti*   it is dancing (IMPFS)
          I see that the bear is dancing

(17f)     *Χάρηκα      τον Πέτρο      *που*   έφευγε
          xarika       ton petro      *pu*    efevγe
          I was happy  the P. (ACC)   *pu*    he was leaving (IMPFP)
          *I was happy that Peter was leaving

(17g)     Χάρηκα       *που*   έφευγε                     ο Πέτρος
          xarika       *pu*    efevγe                     o petros
          I was happy  *pu*    he was leaving (IMPFP)     the P. (NOM)
          I was happy that Peter was leaving

In raised sentences like (17a), the raised subject preceding the *pu*-clause is formally identical to a head preceding a *pu*-relative clause: (17a) can be glossed as 'I heard Peter who was leaving' just as easily as 'I heard Peter leaving'. There is a good semantic motivation for raising of perception complements: *I heard Peter leaving* entails *I heard Peter,* so it is natural to take *Peter* as the object of *heard*. This leaves *I heard Peter leaving* construed as *I heard Peter, who was leaving,* since *leaving* is now supplementary information about *Peter*. And in turn, *I heard Peter, who was leaving* can be reanalysed as *I heard Peter leaving*—which is likely what also happened with *akusa ton petro pu efevγe*.[17]

Greek is Pro-Drop: the reduced form of an object is a clitic, while the reduced form of a subject is zero. As a result, when nominal reduction occurs with *pu*-complements, perception verbs retain an explicit anaphor to which the *pu*-

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[17]As I postulate in §8, raised perception complements result from the reanalysis of relative clauses.

For a more detailed discussion on raising in Greek, see Kakouriotis (1980), Joseph (1976). Note that unlike English, Greek raises out of finite rather than infinitival complements: the *pu*-, *oti*- and *na*-clauses are fully tensed and conjugated.

complement is anchored, as in (18a)—although it would be difficult to interpret a clitic as head of a relative clause. Other verbs taking *pu*-complements do not retain such an anaphor, as in (18b):

(18a)  *{Τον/*∅}*   άκουσα    που    έφευγε
       ***ton*/*∅**   akusa     pu     efevɣe
       him/*∅      I heard   *pu*   he was leaving
       I heard **him** leaving.

(18b)  Χάρηκα           που     έφευγε            ∅
       xarika           pu      efevɣe            ∅
       I was happy     *pu*    he was leaving   (he)
       I was happy that **he** was leaving.

This means that, with other *pu*-complements, there is no 'head' for the complement to be anchored to: the complement is not syntactically ambiguous with a relative clause. For perception *pu*-complements, however, such a head is always present.

Another characteristic of *pu*-complements is that *pu*-complements cannot be preposed, whereas *oti*-complements can be preposed if topicalised (by a coreferential clitic) and preceded by a definite article:

(19a)  *Που σε βλέπω χαίρομαι
       ***pu** se vlepo xerome
       I'm happy to see you[18]

(19b)  *Το ότι*    σε βλέπω    *το* ξέρω
       ***to oti**    se vlepo    **to** ksero
       the that   I see you   it  I know
       I know it, that I can see you

This seems to indicate that *pu*-complements are syntactically more tightly bound to their matrix predicates than *oti*-complements.

### 3.3.2. Emotive complements

Following predicates of emotion, *pu* and *na* are in complementary distribution, and (in most people's CSMG) *oti* and *pos* are disallowed. *pu* is factive (§4): it presupposes the truth of its complements, and as a result, the truth of the complement is preserved when the matrix verb is negated. (E.g. *I am not happy that you left* still implies *you left*.) On the other hand, *na* is not factive, but makes a general, time-independent claim about the complement:

(20a)  Χαίρομαι *που* σε βλέπω
       xerome *pu* se vlepo
       I'm happy to see you (I am seeing you right now, and I am happy for it)

(20b)  Χαίρομαι *να* σε βλέπω
       xerome *na* se vlepo

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[18]The sentence is only admissible in CSMG with the meaning 'I am happy **when** I see you'.

> I'm happy to see you (I am happy whenever I see you—although I am not necessarily seeing you right now)

In referring to a specific versus a generic event, *pu* is realis, and *na* is irrealis. So after emotive predicates, *pu* is obligatory for realis complements—which is not the case for other predicate classes.

The class of emotive predicates should be taken in a broad sense to refer to any subjective judgement on the complement; it thus includes such predicates as the verb *fteo* 'be responsible, be someone's fault' and the adverb *kala* '[it's just as] well'. Whether a *pu*-clause is a complement or a causal adjunct (with which emotive complements are traditionally conflated—e.g. by Tzartzanos) is primarily a semantic judgement. It is definitional to the predicate BE SOMEONE'S FAULT, for example, that there is something one is responsible for (21a), whereas it is not part of the definition of GIVE that there be a reason for giving (21b); so *pu* introduces a complement for the former, but an adjunct for the latter.

(21a)   Δε       φταίω        εγώ    **που**   χάλασε   το αυτοκίνητο
        ðe       fteo         eγo    **pu**    xalase   to aftokinito
        not      I.am.at.fault  I      *pu*     broke    the car
        It's not my fault the car broke down.

(21b)   Δώσε μου   ένα σύκο,   **που**   διψάω
        ðose mu    ena siko,   **pu**    ðipsao
        give me    a fig       *pu*      I.thirst
        Give me a fig, I'm thirsty. (MinB 466; Lykoudi, Zante, Heptanesa)

*oti/pos* do not seem to be in common use after emotive predicates; they are certainly disallowed in my idiolect, and I have no recollection of hearing or reading them in extant use. However, occasional counterexamples can be found (22a, 22b):

(22a)   Λυπούμαι **πως** εταπεινώθηκα τόσο
        lipume **pos** etapinoθika toso
        I'm sad **to** have been so humiliated. (Tz §241; Drosinis)

(22b)   Αισθανόταν ντροπή **πως** η Ασήμω θα 'φευγε απ' το σπίτι του
        esθanotan dropi **pos** i asimo θa fevγe ap to spiti tu.
        He felt ashamed **that** Asimo would be leaving his house. (Tz §282 CII 2 b;
        Papantoniou)

The insistence of Puristic on *oti*-complements after emotive predicates (22c) may have been a contributing factor here:

(22c)                                                                          (1888)
        Ἄς μᾶς συγχωρήση ὁ κ. Ψυχάρης **ὅτι** μεταχειριζόμεθα τὴν βέβηλον γλῶσσαν τῶν
        ἐφημερίδων
        as mas siŋxorisi o kirios psixaris **oti** metaxirizomeθa tin vevilon γlosan ton
        efimeriðon
        Let Mr. Psichari forgive us **for** using the unholy language of the press [Puristic]
        (Palamas: book review; PsichV[1] 214)

But it seems likelier that this represents variation within the vernacular, and Christidis (1981) reports the acceptability to some speakers of *oti* introducing imperfective emotive *pu*-complements. To those speakers, (22d) would be acceptable, but (22e) would not.[19]

(22d)　Λυπάμαι *ότι* ο αρχηγός της αξιωματικής αντιπολίτευσης δεν προσέρχεται στις συνεδριάσεις
lipame *oti* o arxiɣos tis aksiomatikis adipolitefsis ðen proserxete (IMPFS) stis sineðriasis
I am sorry ***that*** the Leader of the Opposition is not attending the meetings

(22e)　Λυπήθηκα **ότι* δεν ήρθε να με δει
lipiθika **oti* ðen irθe (PERFP) na me ði
I was sorry ∅ he didn't come to see me[20]

A problematic instance of *pu* usage is brought up by Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963] §117) with regard to the interjections *anaθema* 'damn!' and *alimono* 'woe!' These interjections can be followed by *pu*-clauses, as shown below:

(24a)　Αχ! ανάθεμα *που* ακούει γυναίκας λόγια!
ax! anaθema *pu* akui ɣinekas loɣia!
Oh, damn ***him who*** hears a woman's words! (Tz §117; Passow)

(24b)　Αλλοίμονό του, *που* ακούει γυναίκας λόγια.
alimono tu, *pu* akui ɣinekas loɣia.
Woe to him ***who*** hears a woman's words (Tz §117; Passow)

Tzartzanos considers these to be headless relatives, and this is how the phrases have been glossed. But it is also possible to consider these interjections as emotive predicates; both take animate objects—*anaθema* in the accusative, *alimono* in the genitive/dative; so a clausal complement would not be inconsistent with the interjections. This case is strengthened by the fact that Tzartzanos adds a third interjection to his list—*krima* '[it's a] pity', treated here as an emotive predicate, and for which a headless relative interpretation is much less attractive.[21]

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[19]To both Christidis and myself, (22d) is not acceptable.

[20]*to oti* (with the definite article preceding the complementiser) can also introduce emotive complements in the general case. As (23) shows, however, when this explicitly nominal complement is used, the complement is an oblique argument of the predicate, and not a direct object.

(23)　Λυπάμαι *για*　*το ότι*　　　　　άργησα
lipame *ɣia*　*to oti*　　　arɣisa
I regret for the fact that I was late
I regret ***the fact that*** I'm late

This is true for all emotive predicates of which the complement is not a subject, and implies that the *pu*-complements of these predicates are likewise obliques rather than direct objects.

[21]In a clause like *krima pu piɣes* 'it's a pity that you went', it would be nonsensical to treat *pu piɣes* as a headless relative (*"it's a pity [for?] you, who went').

### 3.3.3. Cognitive-Physical factive complements

The group of complements considered here is heterogeneous; the defining factor is that these are predicates which, in CSMG, can take either *pu*-complements or *oti/pos*-complements. All these *pu*-complements are factive. Furthermore, they all belong to the semantic class identified by Ransom (1986—see discussion in §4) as **Cognitive-Physical**. They include two major subclasses: **perception** predicates, such as *akuo* 'hear' and *vlepo* 'see'; and **cognitive** predicates, such as *ksero* 'know' and *θimame* 'remember'.

The syntax of perception verbs has already been discussed. A clear-cut semantic differentiation exists between *pu*-complements and *oti*-complements after such verbs: *pu* denotes immediate perception (25a), whereas *oti* makes an indirect evidential claim (25b):

(25a)     Τον άκουσα ***που*** ερχόταν
          ton akusa ***pu*** erxotan (IMPFP)
          I heard him coming

(25b)     ΄Ακουσα ***óτι*** ερχόταν
          akusa ***oti*** erxotan
          I heard that he was coming.

Furthermore, *pu* is factive, whereas *oti* (and *na*) are not:

(26a)     Δεν τον άκουσα ***που*** ερχόταν
          ðen ton akusa ***pu*** erxotan (IMPFP)
          I didn't hear him coming (Implication: He did come).

(26b)     Δεν τον άκουσα ***να*** έρχεται
          ðen ton akusa ***na*** erxete (IMPFS)
          I didn't hear him coming (No implication: He did come.)

(26c)     Δεν άκουσα ***óτι*** ερχόταν
          ðen akusa ***oti*** erxete (IMPFP)
          I didn't hear that he was coming (No implication: He did come.)

After cognitive predicates, *pu* contrasts with *oti*. In broad terms, when such a predicate is used with a *pu*-complement, the normally non-factive complement becomes factive; furthermore, it is no longer explicitly asserted, but becomes presupposed. Thus, while (27a) is a yes-no question, (27b) is a rhetorical question, since the proposition 'we went to Paris' is never questioned:

(27a)     Θυμάσαι ***óτι*** πήγαμε στο Παρίσι;
          θimase ***oti*** piɣame sto parisi?
          Do you remember us going to Paris?

(27b)  Θυμάσαι **που** πήγαμε στο Παρίσι;
θimase **pu** piɣame sto parisi?
Remember when we went to Paris?[22]

And whereas (28a) is a straightforward negation, (28b) strongly hints that the person in question *should* remember the trip, since it is known to have taken place.[23]

(28a)  Δε θυμάται **ότι** πήγαμε στο Παρίσι
ðe θimate **oti** piɣame sto parisi
He does not remember that we went to Paris

(28b)  Δε θυμάται **που** πήγαμε στο Παρίσι
ðe θimate **pu** piɣame sto parisi
He does not remember that we went to Paris ("oh *sure* he doesn't")

With perception predicates, *pu*-complements are fairly frequent in text (7% in Tahtsis' *The Third Wedding*); they are much less plentiful for cognitive predicates (1.6% in *The Third Wedding*), and the semantic content of cognitive *pu*-complements is more difficult to capture (§4.3.2, §4.4).

There are two uncharacteristic cognitive predicates which always take *pu*-complements: the imperatives *ase* (or *afise*) and *vale,* which literally mean 'let!; leave out!' and 'put!; add!', but with *pu*-complements mean 'never mind that; leave alone that' and 'add to that the fact that; moreover':

(29a)  Μα τώρα έχω χρόνια να παίξω [μαντολίνο]. Δε μου 'χει μείνει πια μυαλό κι όρεξη για τέτοια πράματα. **Άσε που** δεν έχω και μαντολίνο.
ma tora exo xronia na pekso. ðe mu xi mini pia mialo ki oreksi ɣia tetia pramata. **ase pu** ðen exo ke madolino.
*But it's years since I held a mandoline in my hands. I don't have the concentration or the mood for such things nowadays.* **Come to that**, *I don't even have the mandoline.* (Tah 138)

(29b)  `Giati ka0e fora pou lew oti erxomai, dhmiourghtai kykloforiakh`
`symforhsh sto Anatoliko apo tis 0aymastries mou pou tsalapatiountai na`
`me gnwrisoun!!!` **`Ase pou`** `ka0esthroun oles oi pthseis gia Skandinayia,`
`mia oles erxontai na me gnwrisoun (diabases TI eipe o Aggelos!!!)`
Γιατί κάθε φορά που λέω ότι έρχομαι, δημιουργήται κυκλοφοριακή συμφόρηση στο Ανατολικό από τις θαυμάστριές μου που τσαλαπατιούνται να με γνωρίσουν!!! *Άσε που* καθεστηρούν [sic] όλες οι πτήσεις για Σκανδιναυία, μια όλες έρχονται να με γνωρίσουν (διάβασες Π είπε ο Άγγελος!!!)
ɣiati kaθe fora pu leo oti erxome, ðimiurɣite kikloforiaki simforisi sto anatoliko apo tis θavmastries mu pu tsalapatiude na me ɣnorisun!!! *ase pu* kaθisterun oles i ptisis ɣia skanðinavia, mia oles erxode na me ɣnorisun (ðiavases *ti* ipe o agelos!!!)
Because every time I say I'm coming over, there's a traffic jam at Athens International Airport from my admirers thronging to meet me!!! **Never mind that** all the flights to Scandinavia are delayed since they all come to get to know me (you read exactly what Angelos said!!!) (Sotirios Skevoulis, `O Bobolis`
`...wrimazei...`; Hellas-L, 1996–11–08)

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[22]The *pu*-clause is not interpreted as an adjunct since it situates the time of what is remembered, not the time at which the matrix proposition takes place. The affinity between the temporal and complement readings is nonetheless obvious.
[23]Fuller discussion on this topic is given in §4.3.2.

(29c)   Να ξέρῃ κανείς τέλεια την αρχαία τη γλώσσα, λέει ο *συμβιβασμός*, ή να θέλῃ να μάθῃ
        όλους τους κανόνες της νέας, είναι *υπερβολή*. ***Βάλε που*** έχει το πράμα και τη
        δυσκολία του.
        na kseri kanis telia tin arxea ti ɣlosa, lei o 'simvivasmos', i na θeli na maθi olus tus
        kanones tis neas, ine 'iperboli'. ***vale pu*** exi to prama ke ti ðiskolia tu.
        Knowing the ancient language perfectly, says Compromise, or wishing to learn
        all the rules of the modern, is an 'excess'. ***Add to this*** that it is a task not with-
        out difficulty. (PsichV[1] 144)

Although these are odd predicates to act as complement-taking verbs, they are
still arguably compositional in meaning, with a metaphorical transfer from the
domain of objects to propositions: 'leave alone the proposition that...'; 'consider
also the proposition that...'

   One could argue that *ase* is in fact Emotive: one highlights a fact, but makes a
value judgement that it is not worth further discussion, because its contribution
to the point being made is self-explanatory. Similarly, *vale* introduces a new fact
into the discussion as further confirming the speaker's argument; but the value
judgement is not as obvious here, and it is more straightforward to consider *pu*
in *vale pu* a cognitive nominaliser, as done above.

### 3.3.4. Non-factive complements

In CSMG, predicates of saying (linguistic predicates) and non-factive predicates
do not as a rule allow *pu*. There are several dialects where this is not the case,
and *pu* has become the generic realis complementiser, displacing *pos* to a
marked role; this is discussed more extensively in §6.

   There are some indications that the barrier between cognitive factive and lin-
guistic factive use of *pu* is not absolute in CSMG. For example, (30a) is an utter-
ance that was addressed to me while I was in Athens, November 1995:

(30a)   Δε σου είπα ***που*** ο Τάσος έχει έναν ξάδερφο στην Αυστραλία;
        ðe su ipa ***pu*** o tasos exi enan ksaðerfo stin afstralia?
        Didn't I tell you ***how*** Tasos has a cousin in Australia?

The speaker (my neighbour in Athens) is of Greek Macedonian descent; but
rather than attribute this utterance to a dialect substratum, it is more plausible
to explain *pu* as a marker of presupposition—and in this case, givenness: I
*should* have known that Tasos had a cousin in Australia, since the speaker had
earlier spoken to me of this, in the same way as (28b) implies the addressee
*should* remember the trip to Paris. Similarly, (30b) stresses that the comple-
ment of *leo* is given, and makes a point of it by topicalising the complement with
a clitic:[24]

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[24]The clitic *ta* in (30b) appears in the neuter plural normally reserved for a generic object (cf.
idioms like ***ta*** *vrikame* 'we have found ***them*** = we have reconciled'), and is thus not strictly
speaking coreferential with the clausal complement. A more literal gloss would be 'we have said,
that she filled his bedroom...' Making the object of the speech verb generic, however, underlines
that the clausal complement is given.

(30b)    Κι' άλλους έχει φάει [η Άρτεμις] αλλά τον μικρό τον Άδμητο που ντράπηκε γιατί
βγήκε Αδμητού και «απασχολούσε τον αδερφό της», τον λαχτάρησε... *Τα* 'παμε *που*
του γέμισε το βράδυ του γάμου του την καμάρα με φίδια.

ki alus exi fai ala ton mikro ton aðmito pu drapike γiati vγike aðmitu ke
'apasxoluse ton aðerfo tis' ton laxtarise... *ta* pame *pu* tu γemise to vraði tu γamu tu
tin kamara me fiðia.

Artemis has killed other people too, but she came down with a vengeance on
young Admetus, who embarrassed her because he turned out to be an
'Admetess' and 'preoccupied her brother' [i.e. they had a homosexual relation-
ship.] We've already talked about **how** she filled his bedroom with snakes on
his wedding night. (TsifM 187; the story of Admetus has been recounted on pp.
145–147)

Compare also the fixed expression *ðe les pu* 'why don't you say (admit) that...',
which uses *pu* after a verb of saying (Nicholas 1998a).

### 3.3.5. Subject complements

The *pu*-complements considered until now have all been the direct objects of
their matrix predicates, which constitute a closed class. But *pu*-complements
can also constitute the subjects of their predicates. The class of predicates al-
lowing clausal subjects is much more open, and in this role *pu* is in competition
with *to oti* (*oti* preceded by a definite article); *pu* is associated with low register
and *oti* with high register. Thus, subject-*pu* is particularly common in the slangy
prose of Tsiforos (31a, 31b), whereas a *to oti*-expression would be preferred in
higher registers (31c, 31d):

(31a)    Σ' αυτόν [τον Κλοβίκ]   οφείλεται   σήμερα  *που*  η Γαλλία είναι καθολικιά.

s afton              ofilete      simera   ***pu***   i γalia ine kaθolikia.

to him           it is owed   today    that   France is Catholic

It is thanks to him (Clovis) ***that*** France is today Catholic. (TsifHF 29)

(31b)    Έτσι  εξηγείται     *που*   οι αυτοκράτορες   μένανε      πολύ λίγο καιρό

etsi   eksiγite        ***pu***   i aftokratores    menane    poli liγo kero

thus  it is explained  that  the emperors    remained   very briefly

και μετά χανόντουσαν αδόξως και από λεπίδι.

ke meta xanodusan aðoksos ke apo lepiði.

That is the explanation ***why*** the emperors remained briefly, and afterwards
perished ingloriously by the blade. (TsifHF 25)

(31c)    Η κυρα-Εκάβη επέμενε ότι αυτό που 'κανε τον πατέρα της ν' αποφασίσει να την πάρει,
ήταν *τ' ότι* είχε φαρδιά λεκάνη.

i kira ekavi epemene oti afto pu kane ton patera tis n apofasisi na tin pari, itan ***t oti***
ixe farðia lekani.

Mrs Hecuba insisted that what made her father marry her (her mother) was ***the
fact that*** she had a wide pelvis.

*Hecuba insisted that her father married her mother only because she had wide
hips.* (Tah 63)

(31d)    ***To oti*** htav ce 8ech va boh8hcei evav Ellhva filo 8a mnopouce va
ofeiletai kai ce anlh cugkupia

*Το ότι* ήταν σε θέση να βοηθήσει έναν Έλληνα φίλο θα μπορούσε να οφείλεται και σε
απλή συγκυρία

***to oti*** itan se θesi na voiθisi enan elina filo θa boruse na ofilete ke se apli siŋgiria

***The fact that*** he was in a position to help a Greek friend might be due to a

mere coincidence (George Baloglou, `Re: Gia tov Kara0eodwrn`; Hellas-L, 1996–11–10)

Subject complements are always factive, whether they involve *pu* or *oti;* non-factive complements use *na* or *to na* instead. There is a syntactic difference between *pu* and *to oti: p u*-subjects follow the predicate, and are thus indistinguishable from *pu*-objects and *pu*-adjuncts, whereas *to oti*-subjects may precede their predicate, just like normal subject NP's in SVO utterances (compare 31a, 31d.)

For some sentences the clausal subject can be dropped without anomaly. As a result, in utterances such as (32), *pu* is ambiguous between marking a subject complement and marking an adjunct.

(32)      Γυναίκα, είπε κείνος· ***που*** έφυγα, με βγήκε σε καλό.
          γineka, ipe kinos; ***pu*** efiγa, me vγike se kalo.
          Wife, he said, ***the fact that*** I left turned out to my advantage/***when*** I left, it
          turned out to my advantage. (Tz §282 LXXXIV v note iv; *Λαογραφία* **5**. 453)

## *3.4. Adjuncts*

The semantic distinctions between different types of *pu*-adjunct are hazy. However, one factor unites them semantically: they are all realis. The causes, circumstances, results, contrasts, realis concessives, and temporal loci marked by *pu* are all true in the world. This contrasts *pu*-adjuncts with those adjuncts introduced by *pu na* (optatives, potential results, irrealis concessives) or *na* by itself (conditionals and irrealis concessives.)[25]

The ambiguity between the types of adjunct-*pu* inheres (at least synchronically) not in polysemy, but in underspecification of definition.[26] It is useful for exposition and diachronic explanation to isolate distinct meanings for *pu,* such as cause, result, and temporal. But synchronically, the only information *pu* supplies in introducing adjuncts is this: two propositions are involved; the *pu*-clause is semantically subordinate to the other; both clauses are true of the world. This rules out conditionals as a potential function of *pu;* but it can only be world knowledge, and occasional textual signals (collocation with *tetios/tosos* for resultatives, *ke* for concessives) that determines whether a particular *pu*-clause is say, temporal or causal.[27] More often than not such ambiguity does not

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[25]*na* also introduces temporals in South-Eastern dialects, which need not be irrealis.

[26]Support for an underspecification analysis comes from Ingria's (in prep.) analysis of *ke,* which turns up in a similar range of adjunct functions. As Ingria concludes,

> και *[ke]* has an underspecified semantics, compared to that of overt subordinating conjunctions such as μα [*ma* 'but'], τότε [*tote* 'then'], γιαυτό [*γiafto* 'therefore'], etc. This allows it to be used in situations where these conjunctions can appear, since its semantics is non-distinct from theirs in the appropriate respects. One way of characterizing the situation is to view each of the various subordinating conjunctions in Modern Greek as indicating a particular rhetorical relation (in the sense of Mann [(Mann & Thompson 1988)] etc.), while και can mark any one of a range of rhetorical relations.

[27]Since *post hoc ergo propter hoc* is a common assumption, moreover, *pu* can easily be ambiguous between those two meanings.

matter—namely, it does not impede communication. Yet when the ambiguity does matter, Greek has alternative connectives one can resort to, for virtually all adjunct functions in question.

Another possible ambiguity is that between adjuncts and relative clauses. This is a phenomenon hardly specific to Modern Greek: the grammars of many languages, from Classical Greek to Modern English, point to the existence of resultative relative clauses, concessive relative clauses, and so forth. This highlights a natural tendency for relative clauses to be enriched with added semantics, as hearers imbue relative clauses with more specific relations to the main clause; e.g. a relative clause which also conveys a result of the matrix, a cause for the matrix, and so on.

Faithful to the discussion of such ambiguity in traditional grammar, Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963] §266 2) spends some time discussing 'impure' relative clauses—including causal, purposive, resultative, conditional, and concessive clauses. But since *pu* already introduces purely causal, resultative or concessive clauses, without acting as a relative clause, the distinction between causal relative clause and causal adjunct becomes a matter of finding a candidate head, and deciding how tightly the clause is bound to that head. The decision can only be made case-by-case; given the paradigmatic expansion of *pu,* this synchronic arbitrariness is inevitable.

### 3.4.1. Introducing cause or reason clauses

Traditional grammarians regard the use of *pu* with emotive predicates (§3.3.2) as causal. However, *pu* is used as a causal with other predicates, where it clearly has an adjunct role. In (33), for example, the *pu*-clause could not be considered a complement of the predicate TAKE:

(33)     Μια χελωνούλα βρήκα και την πήρα, ***που*** τη θέλει η Ξεφτέραινα στο σπίτι, γιανά τρώη τους ψύλλους.
         mia xelonula vrika ke tin pira, ***pu*** ti θeli i ksefterena sto spiti, γia na troi tus psilus.
         I found a small turtle and took it, ***because*** Xefteris' wife wanted it for her house, to eat the fleas. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 2; Drosinis)

Greek also has explicitly causal connectives: low register *γiati,* and high register *epiði* and *ðioti* (from Puristic).

A difference in syntactic scope can be determined between *pu* and *epiði,* in (34a) and (34b): the *epiði*-clause has a clear intonation break before it (marked here by a comma), which is not possible before *pu*. Furthermore, the negation of the matrix clause obligatorily includes the *pu*-clause, whereas the *epiði*-clause may be excluded from the negation if the intonation break intervenes. And the *pu*-clause cannot be preposed, unlike the *epiði*-clause (34c).[28]

(34a)    Δεν τον πρόδωσε κανένας ***που*** δεν πείραζε άνθρωπο
         ðen ton proðose kanenas ***pu*** ðen piraze anθropo

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[28]Example (34d), where the *pu*-clause is preposed, is not acceptable in CSMG:

It is not the case that {someone betrayed him **because** he did no harm to any-
one}→ It's not **because** he did no harm to anyone that someone betrayed him.

(34b)  Δεν τον πρόδωσε κανένας, *επειδή/γιατί/\*που* δεν πείραζε άνθρωπο
       ðen ton proðose kanenas, *epiði/yiati/\*pu* ðen piraze anθropo
       It is not the case that {someone betrayed him}, **because** he did no harm to
       anyone→ Noone betrayed him, **because** he did no harm to anyone.

(34c)  *Επειδή/\*που/\*γιατί* δεν πείραζεν άνθρωπο, δεν τον πρόδωσε κανένας.
       *epiði/\*pu/\*yiati* ðen pirazen anθropo, ðen ton proðose kanenas
       **Because** he did no harm to anyone, noone betrayed him. (Tz §242 1 a:
       Papantoniou)

So *pu*-causals behave like *pu*-complements: they preserve their truth under
negation (factive), and cannot be preposed.

   Work has been done by Sidiropoulou (1989) on distinguishing two major
causals of Greek, *epiði* 'because' and *afu* 'since'. Sidiropoulou finds that *afu* in-
sists on the antecedent being the unique cause for the consequent, whereas *epiði*
makes no such requirement. (This is consistent with the temporal etymology of
*afu*.) Since *afu*-causes are the only possible cause, no alternative cause can be
hypothesised in their sentences. Thus, *afu*-clauses cannot be metalinguistically
negated (35a) or contrastively focussed—either by isolating adverbs (*akrivos*
'precisely') (35b), clefting (35c), or sentential stress (35d).[29] *pu* patterns with *afu*
in all these tests:

(35a)  Δε σώπασε *επειδή/αφού/που* του μίλησες, αλλά *επειδή/\*αφού/\*που* βαρέθηκε να σου
       τσακώνεται
       ðe sopase *epiði/afu/pu* tu milises, ala *epiði/\*afu/\*pu* vareθike na su tsakonete
       He fell silent not **because** you talked to him, but **because/\*since** he was tired
       of arguing with you

(35b)  Σώπασε ακριβώς *επειδή/\*αφού/\*που* του μίλησες
       sopase akrivos *epiði/\*afu/\*pu* tu milises
       He fell silent precisely **because/\*since** you spoke to him

(35c)  Είναι *επειδή/\*αφού/\*που* του μίλησες που σώπασε
       ine *epiði/\*afu/\*pu* tu milises pu sopase
       It's **because/\*since** you spoke to him that he fell silent

(35d)  Σώπασε *επειδή/\*αφού/\*που* του ΜΙΛΗΣΕΣ
       sopase *epiði/\*afu/\*pu* tu **milises**
       He fell silent **because/\*since** you SPOKE to him

Indeed, as Sidiropoulou points out for the equivalent of (35a), the *consequent* of
a *pu*-cause may have an alternative under metalinguistic negation—but the *pu*-
cause itself may not: it is not encompassed by the negation at all (35e).

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(34d)  Παιδιά μου, *που* είμαι φτωχή, κάμετε ευσπλαχνία.
       peðia mu, *pu* ime ftoxi, kamete efsplaxnia
       My children, **because** I am poor, give alms. (MinB 434; Pisinonda, Zante)
[29]In this regard, *epiði* and *afu* correspond to their English counterparts *because* and *since*.

(35e)    Δεν σήκωσε ΚΥΜΑ, *που* έχει αέρα! (= άλλο ήταν το αποτέλεσμα:) ΚΡΥΩΝΑΜΕ με τον
         αέρα!
         ðen sikose *kima, pu* exi aera! *krioname* me ton area!
         The SURF didn't rise ***because*** it was windy! (= There was a different result:)
         We were COLD because it was windy! (Sidiropoulou 1989:292)

These two facts, the closer binding of *pu*-causes to their matrix, and the equivalence of *pu* and *afu*, point to a contamination between temporal and causal *pu*.[30]

A distinct class of causals is formed by the collocation *ine pu* 'it's because'. The phrase *ine pu* introduces main clauses:

(36)    Ακούς το θρήνο τον πολύ, οπού βογγούν τα δάση,/και το δαρμό που γίνεται, τα μαύρα
        μοιρολόγια;/*Είναι π'* αποχωρίζονται τη δόλια την πατρίδα.
        akus to θrino ton poli, opu vogun ta ðasi,/ke to ðarmo pu ɣinete, ta mavra
        miroloɣia?/***ine p*** apoxorizode ti ðolia tin patriða.
        Hear you the laments, so great that the forests moan, and the chest-beating
        taking place, and the dark laments? ***It's because*** they're parting from their
        unfortunate country. (Pol 9)

The *ine pu* construction has an affinity with the subject-*pu* construction discussed in §3.3.5: if the *pu*-clause is analysed as the subject of an existential *ine*-copula, then *ine pu X* corresponds to *X is the case,* which would lead naturally to the inference *X is the reason why.* Whether the implicature is based on causal-*pu* or complementiser-*pu,* in any case, it is now thoroughly conventionalised; *ine pu* has only causal denotation, and cannot be used with the other meanings of *pu* ('it's when…', 'it's so that…', 'it's even though…', etc.)

### 3.4.2. Introducing circumstance clauses

Some instances of *pu* classified by Tzartzanos as causal or manner[31] display a rather attenuated sense of causality. In those cases, I have had recourse to a more general meaning of adjunct-*pu:* the *pu*-clause is related to and semantically subordinate to the main clause, in some semantically unspecified manner. The best way of describing *pu* in such a context is as giving a circumstance under which the main clause takes place, or a background against which it is to be understood.[32] This is illustrated by the following sentences, where it makes

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[30]Sidiropoulou relies on her own linguistic intuitions; I believe not all Sidiropoulou's judgements would be accepted by all Greek speakers (for example, in my idiolect *pu*-adjuncts can be metalinguistically negated), and the test sentences seem to me strained. A corpus-based study might unearth interesting results.
Koutoupi-Kiti (1996) is another discussion of Greek causals, formulating distinctions between *ɣiati* and *epiði*. Her conclusion is that *epiði* is higher on the clines of direct causality, subordination, and ideational meaning, whereas *ɣiati* is more prone to express indirect causation, parataxis, and subjective/interpersonal meaning. In addition, *epiði* tends to introduce more topical causes, and is factive. Clearly causal-*pu* patterns with *epiði;* indeed, since *epiði* is a Puristic loan and *ɣiati* isn't, it may be that *epiði* displaced *pu* in CSMG. This is not a subject I have investigated in this research.
[31]Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963]) refers to *pu* as being equivalent to *me to na* 'by -ing'; but circumstance is overall a better description of such clauses than manner.
[32]Although my use of *circumstance* is novel with respect to Tzartzanos' and Mackridge's taxonomies, it is anticipated by Thumb (1964 [1910] §282.2): "ποῦ *[pu]* 'while, since, in that,' to de-

no sense to substitute *pu* with an explicitly causal expression (*epiði, γiati,* or *because* in English), although one can substitute the less explicit expression *afu:*

(37a)     Και    τι     κέρδος   έχει    **που**   σωπαίνει;
          ke     ti     kerðos   exi     **pu**    sopeni?
          and    what   profit   she has *pu*     she is silent
          So what's the use **in** her keeping silent? (Tz §282 LXXXIV I 4 a; Drosinis)

(37b)     Τι       κατάλαβες          **που**    το 'σπασες;
          ti       katalaves          **pu**     to spases?
          What     you understood     *pu*       you broke it
          What did you gain **by** breaking it?/ What did you get **out of** breaking it? (Tz §282 LXXXIV I 4 a)

(37c)                                                                         (1833)
          Να δώσετε εις τους απλούς [...] από πεντακόσια ως χίλια γρόσια, **οπού** 'ναι το
          τάλαρον είκοσι και μισό γρόσι.
          na ðosete is tus aplus [...] apo pendakosia os xilia γrosia, **opu** ne to talaron ikosi ke
          miso γrosi.
          Give the simple people [...] from five hundred to a thousand groschen—**where**
          a talaron is worth twenty and a half groschen. (MakM 302) [Background information]

(37d)                                                                         (1832–1840)
          Εις την ώρα εκείνη πήγα κ' εγώ εις τ' Άργος, **οπού** ήμουνε εις Κόρθο, μου λένε το
          κίνημά τους.
          is tin ora ekini piγa k eγo is t arγos, **opu** imune is korθo, mu lene to kinima tus.
          At that time I, too went to Argos—I'd been in Corinth ('I too went to Argos,
          **where** I was in Corinth')—and they told me of their revolt. (MakM 290)

A special case is constituted by *pu*-clauses displaying a causal link not at the real-world, but at the illocutionary level. In terms of Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson 1988; Nicholas 1994), the adjunct does not state why the matrix event occurred, but why the matrix proposition was uttered—or, from the hearer's point of view, why the hearer should accept the matrix proposition. This kind of relation is called JUSTIFY (Justification), and is particularly prevalent after imperative (21b, 38a), and exclamatory sentences—both affirmatives (38b) and exclamatory rhetorical questions (39a, 39b).[33]

(21b)     Δώσε μου    ένα σύκο,    **που**    διψάω
          ðose mu     ena siko,    **pu**     ðipsao
          give me     a fig        *pu*       I thirst
          Give me a fig, I'm thirsty. (MinB 466; Lykoudi, Zante, Heptanesa)

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termine more precisely the circumstances or the concurrence (identity) of different actions." Householder, Kazazis & Koutsoudas (1964:173) consider this a "slightly specialized type" of resultative, associated with an expression of surprise.

[33]Sidiropoulou (1989:286) identifies these two levels of causation, naming them *metalinguistic* (μεταγλωσσική) and *positive* (τακτική), by analogy with the two types of negation. Although she does not discuss *pu,* she does mention that *epiði* can only convey positive causation, while *afu* can also convey metalinguistic causation—what I would call 'circumstance' or 'justification'; this explains why *pu* in such clauses is intersubstitutable with *afu,* but not with *epiði* (*ela ðo **afu** se θelo, ðose mu ena siko **afu** ðipsao,* etc.)

(38a)  Ἔλα       δω    ***που***   σε    θέλω
       ela       ðo    ***pu***    se    θelo
       come      here  *pu*        you   I want
       Come here, I want you. (Mack 255)

(38b)  —Ἅγιε Πελάγιε! Με τους αφορισμούς οι στόλοι δεν καταστρέφονται. Θέλουνε και
       μάχη.
       —Να χαθήτε ***που*** δεν πιστεύετε στην παντοδυναμία του Κυρίου ημών.
       —aɣie pelaɣie! me tus aforismus i stoli ðen katastrefode. θelune ke maxi.
       —na xaθite ***pu*** ðen pistevete stin padoðinamia tu kiriu imon.
       "Saint Pelagius! Fleets are not destroyed by excommunication. They need
       battle, too."
       "Get lost, ***for*** not believing in the omnipotence of Our Lord!" ('May you become
       lost ***that*** you don't believe in the omnipotence of Our Lord') (TsifC 275)

(39a)  Τι να μην κάνω έτσι, Χριστιανή μου,' της λέω, 'Τι να μην κάνω έτσι ***που*** σέρνεται
       δάγκειος και μπορεί να το χάσω το κορίτσι μου μέσα σ' εικοστέσερεις ώρες;'
       'ti na min kano etsi, xristiani mu,' tis leo, 'ti na min kano etsi ***pu*** sernete ðagios ke
       bori na to xaso to koritsi mu mesa s ikosteresis ores?'
       *"It's all very well saying don't carry on like that, my good woman," I told her,*
       *"what do you expect me to do? ∅ There's typhoid about* ['What I should not act
       like that, ***when*** dengue fever is about...'] *and in twenty-four hours my baby*
       *may be gone for good!"* (Tah 76)

(39b)  Γιατί μου έκαμες αυτό το κακό; Τι κακό και ξεκακό, λέει, ***που*** εσείς ηθέλατε να με
       φάτε!
       ɣiati mu ekanes afto to kako? ti kako ke ksekako, lei, ***pu*** esis iθelate na me fate!
       "Why did you do me this ill?" "What do you mean, 'ill'?" he says. "It was you lot
       who wanted to eat me!" ("What ill and un-ill," he says, *"**when** you wanted to*
       *eat me!"*) (MinB 470; Lagopodo, Zante, Heptanesa)

An exclamatory rhetorical question is used to deny the question proposition;
thus, RHETORICAL-QUESTION(*p*) means *Not-p!* So in a rhetorical question, the
*pu*-clause provides the justification for denying *p*. Frequently, *p* is an utterance
the addressee has made; so the rhetorical question is also quotative, with *ti*
'what; why' preceding the quotation, adjusted to make ego the deictic center.[34]

   This use of *ti* and rhetorical questioning occurs in both (39a) and (39b). In
(39a), the effective force of the utterance is: *I reject your advice not to carry on*
*like that. The reason I do so is that there is dengue fever about.* In (39b), on the
other hand, the rhetorical questioning of the single word *kako* 'ill' has the effect
of dismissing the interlocutor's claim; so the utterance means: *I reject your*
*characterisation of what I did as 'ill'. The reason I do so is that you lot wanted*
*to eat me.*

   Greek makes a distinction between justifications that already hold, and irre-
alis justifications which may yet come to pass. In the examples seen so far, the
justification clause is factive: it is already true of the world that Pelagius' inter-
locutors do not believe in the omnipotence of the Lord, that there is dengue
fever about, that the mob wanted to eat the speaker. With such exclamatory
justifications, *pu* is the expected connective. It is also possible, however, for the

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[34]i.e. *ti na min kano etsi* 'what I should not act like that', rather than *ti "na min kanis etsi"* 'what
"You should not act like that"'.

justification clause to describe a state the speaker wishes to avoid, when the matrix expresses a warning. In that case, the situation does not yet hold of the world, and it is only possible to use *γiati,* instead of the factive *pu;* such an adjunct is characterised here as an irrealis justification, and *γiati* here corresponds to English *or else* rather than *because:*[35]

(40)    Σε προειδοποιώ για τελευταία φορά: μη μου ξανακάνεις σύγχυση σαν τη σημερινή,
        και μάλιστα μπροστά στο Θόδωρο, *γιατί* φόνισσα Κάστρω θα γίνω και θα σε κάνω
        κομματάκια!
        se proiδopio γia teleftea fora: mi mu ksanakanis siŋxisi san ti simerini, ke malista
        brosta sto θoδoro, *yiati* fonisa kastro θa γino ke θa se kano komatakia!
        I'm warning you for the last time: don't you ever again make a scene like you
        did today, and in front of Theodore, **or else** I'll become the Murderess Kastro
        and chop you to pieces!
        *I'm warning you for the last time. Don't make another scene like today's, es-*
        *pecially in front of Theodore,* **or** *there'll be murder in this house. I'll chop you*
        *into little pieces like mincemeat!* (Tah 13)

Since circumstance *pu*-clauses make little explicit semantic claim about the connection between main and adjunct clause, they are prone to ambiguity. In particular, they are often ambiguous with relative clauses. For example:

(41a)   Πότε      θα     πας     για     ρύζι    *που*    σου     'πα;
        pote      θa     pas     γia     rizi    *pu*     su      pa?
        When      FUT    you go  for     rice    *pu*     to you  I told
        When will you go get some rice **like** I told you? (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 4)

I analyse this *pu*-clause as an adjunct, giving the justification for the matrix utterance. But this could readily be analysed as a relative clause modifying the the clause 'go for rice [**which** is what I told you]'; or, as Tzartzanos does, we could consider 'rice' the head, reading the phrase as 'when will you go get some rice, **about which** I told you'. The same problem is present in (41b):

(41b)   Πήγες στην Αγγελική, *που* έλεγες;
        piγes stin ageliki, *pu* eleγes?
        Did you go to Angelica, **like** you said you were going to? ('which is what you
        were saying'/'where you were saying') (Tz §282 LXXXIV i 4)

A final salient sub-class of circumstance clauses is that involving the demonstratives *tetios* 'such a', *tosos* 'so much', and *etsi* 'in such a way'. At first sight, these clauses appear just to be relative or pseudo-relative *pu*-clauses (usually copular), with the demonstrative preceding a nominal head:

(42a)   *Τέτοια*   κοιμισμένη κι ανυπρόκοπη          *που*    ήταν,     αν θα 'μενε μόνη της,
        *tetia*    kimismeni ki aniprokopi          *pu*     itan      an θa mene moni tis,
        such       sleepy and good-for-nothing      *pu*     she was
        χωρίς έστω κι αυτό το σπίτι, θα καταντούσε ζητιάνα στους δρόμους.
        xoris esto ki afto to spiti, θa kataduse zitiana stus δromus

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[35]This class of utterances is explicitly identified by Fiedler (1987:61) as a Balkanism; he calls them *sonst-Satzen* 'or else–clauses'.

> ***Being such*** a sleepy-head and a good-for-nothing, if she'd stayed on her own,
> without even that roof over her head, she'd have ended up a beggar on the
> streets.
> *With her stupidity and her lazy good-for-nothing ways, she'd soon end up*
> *begging on the streets if she was left alone, without so much as the house to*
> *depend on.* (Tah 304)

Formally in (42a), *tetia kimismeni ki aniprokopi* 'such a sleepy-head and good-for-nothing' is a noun phrase, and the *pu*-clause following it a simple relative clause. But as a relative clause, 'that she was' does not contribute much to the sentence meaning; and the gloss makes it obvious that the whole *pu*-clause, including its 'head', is in fact a circumstance adjunct: ***'Given that*** she was such a sleepy-head and good-for-nothing'. Indeed, when the adverbial *etsi* is used instead of the adjectival *tetios,* as in (42b), the English counterpart *spoilt as she is* behaves in exactly the same way:[36]

(42b)    Θ' αντέξει άραγε ***έτσι καλομαθημένη που είναι****,* με το καθαρό της το δωμάτιο, με το
         μπάνιο της και το καλό της το φαΐ;
         θ adeksi araγe ***etsi kalomaθimeni pu ine****,* me to kaθaro tis ðomatio, me to banio tis
         ke to kalo tis to fai?
         Will she even cope, ***spoilt as she is****,* with her clean room, her bath and her
         good food?
         *Would she able to stand it, I wondered, after the soft life she'd been living with*
         *us, with her nice clean room, her bath, her two square meals a day?* (Tah 203)

This can even occur without a preceding demonstrative (as is also the case in English):

(42c)    Χηρούλα ***που*** είμαι το γλεντάω καλύτερα, άει στο διάλο που θα βάλω γω ξανά
         καπίστρι στο σβέρκο μου.
         xirula ***pu*** ime to γledao kalitera, ai sto ðiaolo pu θa valo γo ksana kapistri sto
         sverko mu.
         Widow ***that*** I am [='Being a widow'], I'm having a much better time of it. Hell,
         I'm not putting a yoke on my neck again. (TsifC 161)

Such circumstance clauses are the clearest instances of a hybrid form intermediate between relativisations and clausal *pu*-adjuncts; they are the only *pu*-adjuncts which have a fully-fledged nominal head.

### 3.4.3. Introducing result clauses

In Modern Greek, *pu* is the native resultative connective; CSMG has imported the Puristic *oste* alongside it, so the resultative use of *pu* has become curtailed. In CSMG, *pu* is used as a correlative to the demonstratives *tetios* ('such a [quality]') (43a), *tosos* ('so (much) [adjective]') (43b), or *toso* ('so much [adverb]') (43c), or in contexts where such a demonstrative is implicit in an emphatic indefinite article (43d).

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[36]The case where *etsi pu* introduces a circumstance without an interceding nominal head has already been looked at in §3.2.2.

(43a)     Κελαδεί με *τέτοιον* πόνον, *που* τα δέντρα μαραίνονται αμέσως.
          kelaδi me **tetion** ponon, **pu** ta δeδra marenoδe amesos.
          It sings with **such** sorrow, **that** the trees wither at once. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii
          3; Karkavitsas)

(43b)     Ο Στέφανος κέρδισε *τόσα* λεφτά στο Προ-πό *που* δε χρειάζεται πια να δουλεύει.
          o stefanos kerδise **tosa** lefta sto propo **pu** δe xriazete pia na δulevi.
          Stephen won **so much** money on the soccer pools **that** he doesn't need to
          work any more. (Mack 256)

(43c)     Πάλι σε λιγάκι το φίδι τον έσφιξε [τον κάβουρα] *τόσο, που* απελπίστηκε.
          pali se liɣaki to fiδi ton esfikse [ton kavura] **toso, pu** apelpistike.
          Again after a little while the snake squeezed him [the crab] **so much, that** he
          despaired. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 3; fairy tale collected by Megas)

(43d)     Ένοιωσα *μια* λαχτάρα *που* κόντεψα να πεθάνω
          eniosa **mia** laxtara **pu** kodepsa na peθano.
          I got **such** a fright **that** I almost died. (Mack 256)[37]

The use of resultative-*pu* without a correlative demonstrative is unacceptable in
CSMG, but is widespread in pre-literary Greek (44a). And *oste* in CSMG is not
subject to the correlative constraint (44b):

(44a)     Μεγάλη αρρώστεια μ' εύρηκε, μ' έρριξε του θανάτου, *που* πέσαν τα ξανθά μαλλιά
          meɣali arostia m evrike, m erikse tu θanatu, **pu** pesan ta ksanθa malia.
          A great disease befell me, it cast me onto my death-bed, **so that** my blond hair
          fell out (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 3; Passow)

(44b)     Η ιστορική μνήμη δεν είναι από τις αρετές της φυλής μας […] *ώστε* είναι κέρδος πάντα
          να την τονίσουμε.
          i istoriki mnimi δen ine apo tis aretes tis filis mas […] **oste** ine kerδos pada na tin
          tonisume.
          A historical memory is not one of the virtues of our race […], **so that** it is al-
          ways profitable to stress it. (Mack 272; L. Politis)

Resultative clauses involving the combination *pu* + *na* are also widespread, and
are discussed in §3.7.3.

### 3.4.4. Introducing contrast clauses

As seen, *pu* is semantically underspecified as an adjunct marker; in the most
general case, it provides nothing more specific than a circumstance, or back-
ground information, to the main clause. When this information comes in con-
trast to the main clause, the *pu*-clause can be considered a contrast clause:

(45a)     Απόψε κοιμήθηκε πολύ, *που* άλλες βραδιές ξυπνάει συνέχεια.
          apopse kimiθike poli, **pu** ales vraδies ksipnai sinexia.
          Last night she slept a lot, **whereas** other nights she's continually waking up.
          (Mack 256; unattributed)[38]

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[37]*mia* here is interpreted as 'such a', rather than 'a'. In speech, this instance of *mia* would have
sentential stress, unlike the indefinite article *mia;* so it should not be considered as the same
lexeme.

[38]I do not find (45a) acceptable in my idiolect. The reason for this is that a contrast clause,
marked by a connective like *eno,* is usually a distinct intonation unit, with a clear intonation

(45b)     Τι καυχιέσαι πως έχεις την τιμιότερη γυναίκα τση χώρας, ***που*** *εγώ έχω το δαχτυλίδι τση*
*και τη χρυσή τρίχα, που είχε στην αμασχάλη.*
ti kafxiese pos exis tin timioteri ɣineka tsi xoras, ***pu*** eɣo exo to ðaxtiliði tsi ke ti
xrisi trixa, pu ixe stin amasxali.
How can you boast that you have the most honest wife in the land, ***when*** I have
her ring and the golden hair she had in her armpit? (MinA 392; Volimes, Zante,
Heptanesa)

### 3.4.5. Introducing realis concessive clauses

Following from the contrastive meaning, *pu*-adjuncts can also be employed to
express concessives.[39]

(46a)     Να ιδούμε όμως, θα θελήση να σε κρατήση, ***που*** *δεν έχεις πιστοποιητικό;*
na iðume omos, θa θelisi na se kratisi, ***pu*** ðen exis pistopiitiko?
But let's see, will he want to keep you, ***even though*** you have no certificate?
(Tz §253,1; Xenopoulos)

(46b)     Δεν ξαναγυρίζω σπίτι του, ***που να*** *τον ιδώ κρεμασμένο.*
ðen ksanaɣirizo sto spiti tu, ***pu na*** ton iðo kremasmeno.
I'm not going back to his house, ***even if*** I see him hang. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 5;
Xenopoulos)

Concession is not strongly marked by *pu,* and there is a continuum ranging from
the unspecified (circumstance) to the specific (concession). Circumstance con-
stitutes the unmarked reading. For instance, it is more natural to read (46a) as
'will he want to keep you, ***given that*** you have no certificate?' Similarly,
Tzartzanos gives (46c) as a 'contradictory' instance of *pu;* but it is less forced to
read it as 'How can you get me to marry her, ***given that*** *(when)* I'm poor and
she's rich?' than as *'**although** I'm poor and she's rich'.*

(46c)     Πώς θα με κάμεις να την πάρω [τη βασίλισσα], ***που*** *είμαι φτωχός και κείνη πλούσια;*
pos θa me kamis na tin paro, ***pu*** ime ftoxos ke kini plusia?
How can you get me to marry her [the queen], ***when*** I'm poor and she's rich?
(MinB 471; Maherado, Zante, Heptanesa)

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break between the contrast and matrix clauses. (In fact, the CONTRAST relation is considered in
the Rhetorical Structure Theory framework to be multi-nuclear—that is, paratactic.) As dis-
cussed for causal-*pu,* adjunct-*pu* tends not to form a distinct intonation unit, but to bind tightly
to its matrix. To me, a contrast reading of (45a) would force a greater break before *pu* than I
would find acceptable.
[39]There is some terminological confusion in Tzartzanos' exposition of the functions of *pu*. In
§282 LXXXIV, he distinguishes between a *contradictory* (εναντιωματικός) usage of *pu* (iii 4) and
a *concessive* (παραχωρητικός) usage (iii 5); the former uses *pu* by itself, while the latter uses *pu
na*. However, in referring back to §253,1 and §253,2 respectively for definitions, he makes it
clear that *contradictory* does not mean *contrast* (αντιθετικός), but is merely a special case of
*concessive.* The difference between 'contradictory' and 'concessive' *pu* is that the former intro-
duces a clause known to be true (corresponding to English *even though),* as in (46a), while the
latter (discussed more fully in §3.7.4) introduces an irrealis clause (corresponding to English
*even if*), as in (46b).
As these examples show, we are not dealing with a contrast relation, in which neither clause is
semantically dominant. There is a clear sense of nuclearity, with the *pu*-clause semantically sub-
ordinate: the distinction is between realis and irrealis concession. This differentiation is not
clearly made by Tzartzanos; of the three examples he gives to illustrate 'contradictory' *pu,* two
subordinate, while the third is paratactic.

Most of the Greek concessive particles include the word *ke,* which acts as emphatic 'even' as well as 'and': *an ke* 'if even', *ke as* 'even let', *ke an* 'even if', *ke na* 'even *na';* so the concessive word contains an emphatic (cf. *even though, even if*). Alongside these, *molonoti* and *molon pu* 'with all that', *parolo pu* 'despite all that', *agala* 'if well', and *eno* 'while (Puristic)' are either high register or explicitly concessive.⁴⁰ Faced with this competition from alternative expressions, including a substantial factive subset (*molon pu, molonoti, agala, eno, an ke, parolo pu;* cf. English *although, even though*), *pu* is not an effective way of marking concession.

The best evidence that *pu* has concessive force is that Greek has employed the same strategy as with other concessives in strengthening the meaning of *pu* to make it unambiguously concessive: it has prefixed *pu* with *ke.* The collocation *ke pu* has exclusively concessive force, and (given compositionality) could not be concessive unless *pu* already bore such a meaning, since *ke* functions here only as an emphatic.

(46d)    *Και που* πήγα και τον παρακάλεσα, τίποτε δε θέλησε να μου κάμη.
         *ke pu* piɣa ke ton parakalesa, tipote ðe θelise na mu kami.
         ***Even though*** I went and asked him, he was unwilling to do anything for me.
         (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 4; unattributed)

However, *ke pu* belongs to a semantically distinct subclass of factive concessives: Nikiforidou (1991) distinguishes 'factual concessives'—i.e. factives such as *an ke, parolo pu, molonoti* and *akoma ke an,* and English *even though,* for which both the antecedent and consequent are true—from another class, 'speech-act concessives' (which I term here **illocutionary concessives**, for consistency with terminology I use elsewhere.) These concessives, which correspond to the English sentential adverbs *even so* and *nevertheless* are also factive; but while the factive consequent is contrary to expectation on the real-world level, illocutionary concession has its consequent contrary to expectation on the illocutionary level: "I will grant (you) (the truth of) what was just said; nevertheless I am still going to say/think/do what I was going to anyway" (Nikiforidou 1991:109). Concessives like *an ke* and *even if* are ambiguous between a real-world and illocutionary interpretation; Nikiforidou claims concessives involving *ke as* 'even allowing that' in Greek are only illocutionary. Compare the following:

(47a)    *Και να* φύγει ο Γιάννης εγώ θα μείνω
         *ke na* fiɣi o ɣianis eɣo θa mino
         ***Even if*** John leaves, I will stay (Irrealis concession)

(47b)    *Αν και* θα φύγει ο Γιάννης εγώ θα μείνω
         *an ke* θa fiɣi o ɣianis eɣo θa mino
         ***Even though*** John will leave, I will stay (Factive concession)

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⁴⁰Of these expressions, those involving *na, as, an* and *ke* are studied in some detail by Nikiforidou (1991).

(47c)   Εγώ θα μείνω *και ας* φύγει ο Γιάννης
        eγo θa mino *ke as* fiγi o γianis
        John may well leave; ***even so***, I will stay/ I will stay, ***no matter that*** John
        will leave (Illocutionary concessive)

The difference between factive and illocutionary concession—and for that
matter irrealis and illocutionary concession—is subtle; it lies in two features.
First, the antecedent of the illocutionary statement is given information and a
topic; the speaker concedes the truth of the antecedent, but goes on to the con-
sequent anyway. This contrasts with the irrealis concessive, where the specula-
tive antecedent is necessarily not given information; and the factive concessive
antecedent can also present novel information, even though its truth is presup-
posed.

Second, for illocutionary concession, the antecedent is explicitly claimed to be
irrelevant, rather than merely in contrast to the consequent (Nikiforidou
1991:111). This can be tested for, I propose, by inserting the present tense clause
*ðen exi simasia* 'it doesn't matter' into a past tense concessive. In a real-world
concessive, the relevance of the antecedent to the consequent is bound to the
time of the event; the present tense 'it doesn't matter' sounds odd, and the past
tense *ðen ixe simasia* 'it didn't matter, it wouldn't have mattered' is preferable.
In an illocutionary concessive, the antecedent is irrelevant to the consequent at
the time and for all time; so the present is acceptable:

(48a)   *Ακόμα και αν* έτρεξε, δεν ??*έχει*/είχε σημασία: δεν πρόλαβε το τραίνο
        *akoma ke an* etrekse, ðen ??exi/ixe simasia: ðen prolave to treno
        ***Even if*** he ran, it ??doesn't/wouldn't have mattered: he missed the train

(48b)   *Αν και* έτρεξε, δεν ??*έχει*/είχε σημασία: δεν πρόλαβε το τραίνο
        *an ke* etrekse, ðen ??exi/ixe simasia: ðen prolave to treno
        ***Even though*** he ran, it ??doesn't/wouldn't have mattered: he missed the train

(48c)   *Ας* έτρεξε, δεν έχει σημασία: δεν πρόλαβε το τραίνο
        *as* etrekse, ðen exi simasia: ðen prolave to treno
        ***I will grant you that*** he ran, ***yet*** it doesn't matter: he missed the train

The semantics of the concessive markers, Nikiforou argues, arises composi-
tionally. Leaving out *ke,* which is a focus marker, *an* and *na* are conditionals; so
*ke an/ke na* are focussed conditionals, making them irrealis concessives (cf. *if >
even if*). On the other hand, *as* is a hortative and permissive marker, corre-
sponding to English *let.* As a concessive, *as* allows the antecedent illocution ('I
will let you say that X'), though the consequent is declared anyway. (48c) is not
far from *Let him run; he'll still miss the train* or *He can run all he likes; he'll
still miss the train.* Furthermore, since granting permission presupposes that
permission has been asked for, it follows that a permissive-turned-concessive
presupposes its antecedent (what it grants) (Nikiforidou 1991:114).

  *ke pu* is an illocutionary concessive which Nikiforidou has not remarked on.
Illocutionary concessive antecedents are given; *pu*-clauses are also characteristi-
cally given in CSMG. *pu* is not a conditional marker; it ranges in function from

causal to temporal to circumstance; so compositionally, it does not make the strong claim of relevance between antecedent and consequent which a conditional does. And the irrelevance of the antecedent is time-independent:

(48d)    *Και που* έτρεξε, δεν έχει σημασία: δεν πρόλαβε το τραίνο
         ***ke pu*** etrekse, ðen exi simasia: ðen prolave to treno
         ***I will grant you that*** he ran, ***yet*** it doesn't matter: he missed the train

But in examples like the following, no causal link is possible between antecedent and consequent, and *ke as* is acceptable but *ke pu* is not. For example, running can cause you to catch a train on time (48d); yet claiming to have passed an exam cannot cause you to actually pass it (49d). So clearly *ke pu,* unlike *ke as,* claims some degree of relevance between antecedent and consequent.[41]

(49a)    Δεν έχει περάσει στις εξετάσεις *κι ας/\*αν και/\*ακόμα και αν* λέει ό,τι θέλει
         ðen exi perasi stis eksetasis ***ki as/\*an ke/akoma ke an*** lei ˈoti θeli
         He has not passed his exams ***no matter/\*although/even if*** what he says
         (***'and let*** him say what he wants')[42]

(49b)    *\*Και που /\*αν και/\*ακόμα και αν* λέει ό,τι θέλει δεν έχει περάσει στις εξετάσεις
         ***\*ke pu/\*an ke/akoma ke an*** lei oti θeli ðen exi perasi stis eksetasis
         He has not passed his exams ***\*what though/\*although/\*even if*** he says
         what he wants

(49c)    Δεν έχει περάσει στις εξετάσεις *κι ας/αν και* λέει πως τις πέρασε
         ðen exi perasi stis eksetasis ***ki as/an ke*** lei pos tis perase
         He has not passed his exams ***no matter that/although*** he says he did

(49d)    *\*Και που/αν και* λέει πως πέρασε στις εξετάσεις, δεν τις πέρασε
         ***\*ke pu/an ke*** lei pos perase stis eksetasis, ðen tis perase
         He has not passed his exams ***no matter that/although*** he says he did

(49e)    Η Σακοράφα πήγε πολύ καλά στους αγώνες *κι ας μην/αν και δεν* πήρε το χρυσό
         i sakorafa piɣe poli kala stus aɣones ***ki as min/an ke ðen*** pire to xriso
         Sakorafa went very well in the games ***no matter that/although*** she ***didn't***
         win gold

(49f)    *\*Και που* δεν πήρε το χρυσό, η Σακοράφα πήγε πολύ καλά στους αγώνες
         ***\*ke pu/an ke*** ðen pire to xriso, i sakorafa piɣe poli kala stus aɣones
         Sakorafa went very well in the games ***no matter that/although*** she didn't
         win gold

In fact, in requiring a causal link between antecedent and consequent, *ke pu* is more restrictive than a normal factive concessive like *an ke* (49d, 49f). This is corroborated by the fact that *ke as*-concessives are frequently independent sentences in Greek, and are punctuated as such—as is the case for *nevertheless* and

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[41]The examples are paired, because *ke pu*-concessions are preposed, whereas *ke as*-concessions are postposed. (So *ke pu* is impossible in (49a), and *ke as* is impossible in (49b).) Other concessions can be placed in either ordering.

[42]The factive concessive is unacceptable here because the antecedent, having indefinite denotation, is considered non-factive.

*even so* in English—showing that *ke as* is more paratactic than hypotactic; this is impossible for *ke pu*-concessives.

The restriction at work here seems to be that, for a connective *C*, the concession *ke C (X, Y)* is possible only if *C (X, not-Y)* is a meaningful claim.[43] The restriction on *pu* involves causality; though the putative cause may be irrelevant in the specific case, it must be relevant in a possible world. Not getting gold cannot *cause* one not to go well in the games—*ðen piγe kala i sakorafa stus aγones pu ðen pire xriso* is an odd claim. (49f) is similarly odd. Boasting that one did well in exams is evidence that they did well, but not a cause: *pu lei pos perase tis eksetasis, tis perase* is odd. So is (49d).

So *ke pu* holds a rather restricted niche amongst Greek concessives: it is an illocutionary concessive, which accepts an antecedent as given, like *ke as,* and which states it is irrelevant to the consequent, but which also presupposes that the antecedent is relevant in some possible world, presumably through causality.[44]

### 3.4.6. Introducing temporal clauses

In this function, *pu* refers to real events, in the past or present; this is consistent with the factivity of *pu*. Many *pu*-clauses with temporal purport are covered by the classes of pseudo-relativiser or temporal relativiser: they locate the time at which a non-clausal head occurred, and thus cannot be considered temporal adjuncts of an entire sentence. So of the fourteen examples of temporal-*pu* given by Tzartzanos (§282 LXXXIV iii 1), four are pseudo-relatives, one is ambiguous with an emotive complement, and seven have an identifiable head noun, from which the *pu*-clause is in some instances separated by a cleft relative, as in (50a).

(50a)  Δυο    χρόνια   είναι,   **που**   απολύθηκε
       ðio    xronia   ine,     **pu**    apoliθike
       two    years    it is    pu       he was fired
       It's been two years ***since*** he was fired. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 1; Drosinis)

Despite the gloss of *pu* as *since,* the *pu*-clause is semantically bound to *two years* rather than the entire predicate—even though it is the head which fixes

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[43]To illustrate: 'if he says what he wants, he has passed the exams' is not meaningful, so neither is *akoma ke an lei oti θeli ðen exi perasi stis eksetasis* 'even if he says what he wants, he hasn't passed the exams'. Likewise, 'if S didn't get gold, she didn't go well in the games' is a meaningful claim; so is *akoma ke an ðen pire i sakorafa xriso, piγe kala stus aγones* 'even if S didn't get gold, she did go well in the games'.

[44]Thumb (1964 [1910] §278.2) reports a variant on the *ke pu* concessive, involving a copula + adjective predicate in the concessive clause. The concessive is structured as *ke* or *etsi* 'in that way', adjective, *pu*, copula:

(49e)  Φοβούντανε,   **έτσι/και**   μεγάλος **που**   ήτανε
       fovutane,     **etsi/ke**    meγalos **pu**    itane
       he feared     *thus/and*     great    *pu*     he was
       He was afraid, great though he was

This construction survives in CSMG, although I consider the *etsi*-variant to be properly a circumstance—see (42b), and the *ke*-version an extraposed variant of the *ke pu*-concessive.

the time of the *pu*-clause.[45] In all, we are left with just two good examples of *pu* introducing a distinct temporal adjunct in Tzartzanos:

(50b)  Πού ήτον ο κυρ-Μοναχάκης, *που* κατέβηκες απ᾽ το σπίτι;
       pu iton o kir monaxakis, *pu* katevikes ap to spiti?
       Where was Mr Monahakis, *when* you came down from the house? (Tz §282
       LXXXIV iii 1; Papadiamantis)

(50c)  Τασούλα μ᾽, τι μας έφερες, *που* ᾽ρθες να προσκυνήσεις;
       tasula m, ti mas eferes, *pu* rθes na proskinisis?
       Tasoula dear, what have you brought us, *now that* you've come to do obei-
       sance? (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 1; Passow)

## *3.5. Discourse connective*

### 3.5.1. ˈopu

In his listing of functions, Tzartzanos gives instances of *pu* used as a textual connective (§282 LXXXIV iii 7). The transition of *pu* from a connective used within the sentence to a discourse connective connecting sentences, is a signifi-cant development: it represents an increase of syntactic scope to the discourse level, characteristic of discourse markers.

There are, however, some problems with this analysis. First, all Tzartzanos' examples come from a single source: the folk tales Marietta Minotou collected in Zante in 1929 and 1933 (MinA, MinB); while there are also CSMG instances, they are relatively infrequent. This makes the phenomenon suspect as regionally restricted. Second, the lexeme appears in this function almost always as *oˈpu* or *opu;* according to Tzartzanos it appears as *pu* "very rarely"—as in (51a): 1 out of 84 instances in MinA:

(51a)  Τση λέει. Κοίταξε μην πας και μεθύσης και με ντροπιάσης. *Που* αυτή λέει· «ʹΟχι».
       tsi lei. kitakse min pas ke meθisis ke me dropiasis. *pu* afti lei "oxi"
       He says to her "Look out you don't go and get drunk and embarrass me." *And*
       she says 'No.' (MinB 498; Gaitani, Zante, Heptanesa)

So one should look for the origin of this usage not in the relativiser *pu,* but in the locative *ˈopu;* this function is, after all, very similar to English *whereupon,* likewise locative in origin. If the origin of the connective was in *pu,* it would be difficult to explain why the connective reverted to the form *ˈopu.*

Finally, not all the usages encountered in Minotou and taxonomised by Tzartzanos appear to be acceptable in CSMG. Tzartzanos finds textual-*opu* used as an equivalent to the connectives 'and' *(ke)*—

(51b)  Θα πάω, λέει, να ιδώ. *Οπού* πραγματικώς χτυπάει τη πόρτα και του ανοίγει η ίδια η
       κυρία.
       θa pao, lei, na iðo. *opu* praɣmatikos xtipai ti porta ke tu aniɣi i iðia i kiria.
       I'll go and see, he said. *And* he actually does knock on the door, and the same
       lady opens it. (MinB 419; Kourmalidi, Zante, Heptanesa)

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[45]But see §7.3.2 for an alternate analysis.

'so' *(lipon)*—

(51c)   Την αυγή πάει ο ταβερνιάρης και βλέπει την καταστροφή. *Οπού* αρχίνησε να θυμώνη.
        tin avɣi pai o taverniaris ke vlepi tin katastrofi. **opu** arxinise na θimoni.
        At dawn, the innkeeper went and saw the damage. ***So*** he started getting angry.
        (MinA 403; Muzaki, Zante, Heptanesa)

(51d)   Να γένουμε, λέει, αδέρφια· πέντε εμείς και ένας εσύ έξι. ˈ*Οπου λοιπόν* τα
        συμφωνήσανε.
        na ɣenume, lei, aðerfia; pede emis ke enas su eksi. ˈ***opu lipon*** ta simfonisane.
        "Let's become brothers", he said. "There's five of us and one of you; that makes
        six." ***So*** they agreed. (*lipon* also means 'so'.) (MinA 396; Muzaki, Zante,
        Heptanesa)

'but' *(ala)*—

(51e)   Αρπάζει ένα μπουκούνι και κατέβηκε. Πάει στο καλύβι της. *Οπού* σε λίγο νά σου το
        βασιλόπουλο μέσα.
        arpazi ena bukuni ke katevike. pai sto kalivi tis. **opu** se liɣo ˈna su to vasilopulo.
        She grabbed some dough and got out. She went to her hut. ***But*** in a little while,
        up comes the prince. (MinA 428; Volimes, Zante, Heptanesa)

'but' in the sense of resuming a topic—

(51f)   ˊΟπου ας αφήσουμε τώρα την κακομοίρα αυτούνη κι' ας πιάσουμε τα παιδάκια.
        ˈ***opu*** as afisume tora tin kakomira aftuni ki as piasume ta peðakia.
        ***But*** let us leave that unfortunate for now and let's talk about the children.
        (MinB 430; Pisinonda, Zante, Heptanesa)

and 'until finally' *(ospu telos)*—

(51g)   Δώθες το 'χει [η θάλασσα το κιβώτιο], εκείθες το 'χει, *οπού* το βλέπουνε από ένα
        παλάτι.
        ðoθes to xi, ekiθes to xi, **opu** to vlepune apo ena palati.
        [The sea] pushed it [the chest] hither, [the sea] pushed it thither, ***until even-
        tually*** they saw it from a palace. (MinA 425; Volimes, Zante, Heptanesa)

So the primary function of *opu* is to indicate narrative sequence; but in
Minotou's text it branches out to more semantically enriched meanings: result,
contrast, rhetorical conclusion, and temporal conclusion. However, the distinc-
tion Tzartzanos makes between 'and' and 'so' is artificial, since both are used to
denote narrative sequence in context, and there is no necessary resultative con-
notation to distinguish the two. As far as I can tell, in CSMG ˈ*opu* can only be
used to denote narrative sequence. So (51f), which denotes narrative resump-
tion rather than sequence, and (51g), which denotes temporal conclusion, are
unacceptable in CSMG.

   Indeed, while discourse connective ˈ*opu* does occur in CSMG, it seems to be
significantly restricted compared with Minotou's texts, and is only found in an
informal story-telling register. Even in as chatty a racounteur as Tsiforos' texts,
instances are few and far between:

(52a)     Η Ιζαμπώ καθότανε στο Καστέλλο ντελ Όρο, αιχμάλωτος του κράτους και γκρίνιαζε
          γιατί της είχε τρυπήσει το μπιντέ και δεν έγραφε ο προϋπολογισμός περί «αλλαγής ή
          καλαφατίσεως μπιντέ πιστώσεις». Όπου πάνου στη γκρίνια της, έρχεται ένας
          καβαλάρης τρεχάτος.
          i izabo kaθotane sto kastelo del oro, axmalotos tu kratus ke γriniaze γiati ixe tripisi
          to bide ke ðen eγrafe o proipoloγismos peri 'alaγis i kalafatiseos bide pistosis'.
          ˈopu panu sti grinia tis, erxete enas kavalaris trexatos.
          Isabeau was sitting at the Castello del Oro as a prisoner of the state, and she
          was grumbling because her bidet had a hole in it, and the budget did not include
          any measures on 'credit towards change or caulking of bidets'. ***Whereupon*** in
          the midst of her grumbling, up comes a knight running. (TsifFU 147)

The example of narrative ˈ*opu* given by Setatos (1994:135) seems to confirm the
restriction of the particle to narrative sequence:[46]

(52b)     Έτσι φώναζαν και τσακώνονταν, ***όπου*** έρχεται ο διευθυντής και τους διαλύει.
          etsi fonazan ke tsakonodan, ˈ***opu*** erxete o ðiefθidis ke tus ðialii.
          They kept yelling and arguing like that, ***whereupon*** the manager comes and
          breaks them up.

### 3.5.2. *pu*

The narrative usage of *opu* is distinct from the usage of *pu* to connect clauses,
exemplified by (53a):

(53a)     (Kimon brings to Athens from Skyros what he claims to be Theseus' skeleton)
          Και φάγανε όλοι    την παραμύθα    του Κίμωνα.  ***Που***  ποιος ξέρει
          ke faγane oli      tin paramiθa    tu kimona.   ***pu***   pios kseri
                             the big fairy tale  of K.          REL   who knows
          τίνος σκελετό      να κουβάλησε...
          tinos skeleto      na kuvalise...
          whose skeleton     he may have brought
          And they all fell for Kimon's fairy tale. ***And*** who knows whose skeleton he really
          brought over... (Literally: 'And they all fell for the fairy tale of Kimon. ***Who***
          brought over who knows whose skeleton') (TsifM 482)

Although this is an instance of written Greek, the punctuation makes it obvious
that the author considered these to be independent clauses; and these clauses
can be read quite naturally with final intonation at the end of the first clause.
But as the gloss indicates, the *pu*-clause still has a referent to which it can be an-
chored as a head: *kimona* 'Kimon'. So this *pu*-sentence is still a relative clause,
which has become separated from its matrix intonationally, though not seman-
tically. As such intonational separation is not normally possible for relative
clauses, this indicates a reanalysis underway.

   As (53b) shows, it does not take much for the head of such a separated *pu*-
clause to become clausal (cf. 6), and for the *pu*-clause to lose much of its depen-
dence on its antecedent clause:

(53b)     Μόνο που πέθανε σε κάμποσο από δηλητηρίαση... Ίσως η Ισαβέλα...
          ***Που*** δεν γίνεται, καθόσον ευγενής κυρία...

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[46]Setatos' gloss of the meaning of ˈ*opu,* φυσική συνέπεια (natural consequence), points to a resul-
tative meaning; but this is inconsistent with the present tense of the ˈ*opu*-clause.

> mono pu peθane se kaboso apo ðilitiriasi... isos i isavela...
> ***pu*** ðe ɣinete, kaθoson evɣenis kiria...
> But she died shortly afterwards, of poisoning... Isabella might have done it...
> ***Which*** is impossible, as she was a noble lady... (TsifFU 69)

(6)  Ας τα χαράξουμε [τα λόγια σου] στο νου μας, ***που*** δεν κοστίζει και παρά.
 as ta xaraksume sto nu mas, ***pu*** ðen kostizi ke para.
 Let us inscribe them [your words] onto our minds—***which*** doesn't cost any
 money, either. (PsichV¹ 120)

Relativisers are a popular means throughout the history of Greek of establishing
coherence between sentences. This is true of *pu* in Modern Greek. It is, for ex-
ample, a trademark of Greek football commentary that utterances are strung to-
gether by relativisation, of the style 'X passes the ball to Y, who kicks to Z, who
trips over W...' This phenomenon is endemic to Puristic loan *o opios,* which had
the added advantage of prestige.⁴⁷

   In hypercorrect speech, *o opios* went further; unlike *pu,* it can introduce sen-
tences, in its neuter singular form, without a referent in the preceding clause.
This phenomenon was associated with the ascendancy of Puristic, and is now no
longer heard; it was pervasive enough, however, for Kriaras (1957:193) to con-
sider it unnecessary to provide any examples of it, when comparing it to similar
usage of relativisers in Middle Greek.⁴⁸ Fortunately, Tsiforos' prose does occa-
sionally provide such examples:

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⁴⁷Frequently, the noun that *o opios* refers back to at the start of the new sentence is no longer
obvious—particularly if several possible referents are of the same gender, and the relativiser is
separated from its referent. In such instances, the noun is recapitulated after *o opios,* which now
acts as an adjective. This is a usage strongly associated with Puristic, and regarded as stylisti-
cally clumsy, so literature does not contribute any instances. It is found in officialese Greek, or
attempts in that direction (Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1997:319):

(54a)  Το υπουργείο παρουσίσασε το νομοσχέδιο στο κοινοβούλιο, *το οποίο νομοσχέδιο*
  περιείχε τρία μέρη
  to ipurɣio (NEUT) parusiase to nomosxeðio (NEUT) sto kinovulio (NEUT), ***to opio***
  ***nomosxeðio*** periixe tria meri
  The ministry presented the bill to the parliament, ***the which bill*** contained
  three parts.

(54b)  Οι μόνοι οι οποίοι παρουσοιάζονто ως λεγεωνάριοι ήταν ένας Ραπουτίκας,
  αρβανιτόβλαχος, με πέντε αρβανιτόβλαχους δικούς του κι ένας αγνώστου
  προλεύσεως κι ένας Κουρδίστας, απ' τον Αλμυρό, *ο οποίος* Κουρδίστας είχε λάβει
  μέρος στο Μακεδονικό Αγώνα υπέρ της Ελλάδος ως αντάρτης.
  i moni i opii parusiazodo os leɣeonarii itan enas raputikas, arvanitovlaxos, me pede
  arvanitovlaxus ðikus tu ki enas aɣnostu proelefseos ki enas kurðistas, ap ton
  almiro, ***o opios*** kurðistas ixe lavi meros sto makeðoniko aɣona iper tis elaðos os
  adartis.
  The only ones presented as legionaries were a Raputikas, an Albanian Vlach,
  with five Albanian Vlach relatives of his, and one person of origins unknown,
  and a Kurdistas, from Almiros, ***the which*** Kurdistas had taken part in the
  Macedonian Struggle on the Greek side as a guerilla. (Matousis, cited in
  Exarhos 1994 [1992–93]:117)

⁴⁸"Quite frequently a contemporary uneducated villager deciding to speak a 'better' language
uses in sentence connection the modern equivalent of *oper, to opion.*"

(55)    —[Τουράν Σαχ] Και σας συνελάβομεν και σκλαβάκιον.
        —[Λουδοβίκος Θ′] *Το οποίον,* σκλάβος σας είμαι μπορείτε να με φονεύσετε
        παρακαλώ πολύ.
        "ke sas sinelavomen ke sklavakion."
        *"to opion,* sklavos sas ime borite na me fonefsete parakalo poli."
        [Turan Shah:] —And we have also captured you as our slaveling.
        [Louis IX:] —***Wherefore,*** I being your slave, I would kindly request of you that
        you kill me. (TsifC 312)

This extract contains comically inappropriate use of Puristic, so that the hyper-correction of using *to opion* as a connective fits in with the prose naturally. This behaviour testifies to a general tendency in Greek to make discourse connectives out of relativisers.

## *3.6. Subjunctive marker*

Up to this point, *pu* has been considered in realis, factive contexts. In what follows, *pu* is considered in irrealis contexts. Normally, this requires it to be followed by an explicit irrealis marker—typically *na*. However, there are a number of instances where *pu* by itself can have irrealis force. The major group includes exclamatory adjuncts, and is considered in §3.8.2; in a smaller group considered here, however, bare *pu* is morphologically, as well as semantically irrealis.

As detailed in §3.0.1, the PERFS tense is restricted to appearing after a small class of subjunctive markers. The most prominent of these is *na;* others include *as* 'let', *an* 'if', *prin* 'before', *otan* 'when', *θa* 'FUTURE', *min* 'subjunctive negator', *mipos* 'whether; just in case', and the indefinite relatives, such as *opios* 'whoever' and *opote* 'whenever'. In each case, the verb expresses an irrealis situation; the non-referentiality of indefinite relatives associates them in Greek with irrealis mood.[49]

Now, *(o)pu* formerly belonged in the class of indefinite relatives as a headless relative; in this sense, it could take PERFS (56). Indeed, locative ˈ*opu* in Modern Greek still does so (3b):

(56)    *Που* ειπή το «θέλω» εις εμέ πρέπει και να ᾿ναι άξιος.
        ***pu*** ipi (PERFS) to 'θelo' is eme prepi ke na ne aksios.
        ***Whoever*** tells me 'I'm willing' must also be worthy. (Pol 72B)

(3b)    ῞Οπου βρω Ρεπουμπλικάνο, (θα) τον προσβάλλω.
        ˈ*opu* vro (PERFS) republikano, (θa) ton prosvalo.
        ***Wherever*** I find a Republican, I (will) insult him.

*pu* in CSMG is usually not associated with PERFS; if an irrealis or referentially indefinite perfective clause needs to be introduced by *pu,* the particle *na* is added on (§3.7). But there are instances where bare *pu* can be followed by PERFS. This is by no means commonplace, and seems not to be a universally accepted feature of CSMG; Hesse (1980:108) characterises it as "now almost obsolete". All the same, it marks a reanalysis of *pu,* as a result of which *pu* enters a

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[49]There are some exceptions to this for *na,* which are not considered here.

new distributional class. Referentially indefinite instances of this usage are given below:

(57a)  *Κάθε*     τι          *που*   δω              μου φέρνει ένα θέμα, μια
       ***kaθe*** ***ti***    ***pu*** δo             mu ferni ena θema, mia
       each       something   *pu*    I see (PERFS)
       τραγικότητα να εκφράσω.
       traγikotita na ekfraso.
       ***Each thing*** I see brings me a subject, a tragic situation to express. (cf. ˈoti ðo
       'whatever I see') (Mack 258; Tsatsou)

(57b)  Και *κάθε που* στο κύμα βουτήξη το κουπί, στο μέτωπο του δίνει η κόρη ένα φιλί
       ke *kaθe pu* sto kima vutiksi (PERFS) to kupi, sto metopo tu ðini i kori ena fili
       And ***every time*** he dips the oar in the water, the girl kisses him on the fore-
       head. (Tzartzanos §282 LXXXIV iii 1; Tipaldos)

In those variants of Greek where *pu* does not belong to the class of subjunctive subordinators, either PERFS has to be replaced by IMPFS, which is unmarked for mood, or *θa* has to be interpolated to license the use of PERFS. The future marker *θa* is preferred over the irrealis marker *na,* because *pu*-PERFS clauses tend to be temporally indefinite rather than irrealis outright, and so are more compatible with *θa* as a future (and thus indefinite) time marker, than with *na* as a modal marker.

   There are also instances, such as (57c) and (57d), where the *pu*-expression is simply a referentially indefinite relative clause, with a non-pronominal head.

(57c)  Θα εξαρτηθεί    από το βαθμό     *που*   υπάρξει         συνεννόηση μεταξύ τους.
       θa eksartiθi    apo to vaθmo     *pu*    iparksi         sinenoisi metaksi tus.
                       from the degree  REL     exist (PERFS)
       It will depend on the degree ***to which*** there will be an understanding between
       them. (Mack 258; *Tahidromos* magazine, 1979–8–16)[50]

(57d)                                                                          (1886)
       Κλέφτης *οπού* επιχειρήσει κ᾽ εκτελεί μ᾽ επιτηδειότητα και μ᾽ επιτυχίαν μίαν
       καλοσχεδιασμένην έκπαγλη κλεψιά, ομοιάζει στρατηγόν *οπού* σχεδιάζει και εκτελεί
       έκπαγλη μάχη.
       kleftis *opu* epixirisi (PERFS) k ekteli (IMPFS) m epitiðiotita ke m epitixian mian
       kalosxeðiasmenin expaγli klepsia, omiazi stratiγon *opu* sxeðiazi (IMPFS) ke ekteli
       (IMPFS) expaγli maxi.
       A thief ***who*** purposefully and successfully attempts and executes a well-
       planned and marvellous theft resembles a general ***who*** plans and executes a
       marvellous battle. (LaskEcce 86)

Example (57d) shows that this reanalysis is not a recent phenomenon; it is taken from a text in educated Heptanesian dialect last century. In (57d), the head *kleftis* 'thief' appears without either a definite or indefinite article; this is a device used in Greek to emphasise that a noun is generic in its reference.

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[50]Setatos (1989:24) notes that "this may have been written in *Tahidromos,* but it is not spoken [by people]." This is a narrowly prescriptive observation; it is more consistent to say that it is not acceptable to most Greek-speakers, but is acceptable to a minority (including the *Tahidromos* writer.) One suspects that *pu*-expressions equivalent to indefinites would be more widely acceptable than examples like (57c).

As already seen, indefinite expressions in Greek—including such generic nouns—are associated with irrealis mood; this justifies the usage of PERFS in (57d), although most Greek speakers would nonetheless avoid PERFS in this context.

## *3.7. In combination with* na

A large class of expressions, considered in this section, involves irrealis clauses introduced by *pu*. Because *pu* is not normally associated with irrealis mood (as discussed in §3.6), *na* is interpolated between *pu* and the clause. Thus, *pu na* introduces irrealis relative clauses (§3.7.1, §3.7.2) and adjuncts (§3.7.3, §3.7.4). It also introduces optative clauses (§3.7.5), which can be considered the irrealis counterpart of exclamatory clauses introduced by *pu* alone (§3.7.6). (Exclamatories are discussed here because of the close relationship with optatives.)

### 3.7.1. Generalising relative clauses

As seen in §3.6, certain *pu*-clauses are akin to indefinite relativisers in taking PERFS. Such *pu*-clauses are treated as irrealis because their head is not referential, but rather generic—just as indefinite relatives, which also take PERFS, make generic claims, rather than claims about specific referents (Veloudis 1983–1984).

There are also sentences which make a generic claim about a referent, rather than a specific claim:

(58)      Ο Καστάνιο δεν ήταν άνθρωπος, **που** τα δέχεται τέτοια.
          o kastanio ðen itan anθropos, **pu** ta ðexete tetia.
          Kastanio wasn't **the kind of** man **who** puts up with things like that. (Tz §282
          LXXXIV ii 3; Papantoniou, 1927)

As the gloss indicates, such relative clauses makes generalising, non-referential claim about the type of entity the head is. That is to say, the *pu*-clause is not describing *anθropos* 'man', but the *kind of* man Kastanio is.

Sentences like (58) are unusual, because they grammatically treat a claim about a generic referent as realis, rather than irrealis;[51] the tense of (58) is IMPFS, and *na* is absent, so there is no marker of irrealis mood in the sentence. Properly in CSMG, non-referential relative clauses require the presence of *na*. The relative clause is thereby analogous to indefinite relativiser clauses.[52]

(59a)     Θέλω μια δακτυλογράφο **που να** ξέρει αγγλικά
          θelo mia ðaktiloγrafo **pu na** kseri aglika
          I want a typist **who** knows English

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[51]While Kastanio is a real person, *anθropos* '[the kind of] man', a noun phrase lacking either a definite or an indefinite article, is an abstraction. As Marmaridou-Protopapa (1984) points out, leaving out the indefinite article in Greek signals the noun phrase is non-specific, whereas leaving it in is unmarked as to specificity. This process has already been seen at work with (57d).
[52]*na* can have modal force by itself, and *pu na*-relative clauses can also be analysed as bearing a modal force of expectation.

Relativised by a *pu na*-clause, the noun phrase *mia ðaktiloɣrafo* is non-specific, and non-referential. If the *pu na*-clause is replaced by a *pu*-clause, the result is perforce referential in CSMG, alluding to a specific entity:

(59b)   Θέλω μια δακτυλογράφο ***που*** ξέρει αγγλικά
        θelo mia ðaktiloɣrafo ***pu*** kseri aglika
        There's a typist I want, ***who*** knows English

That *pu na*-clauses relativise non-referential heads is confirmed by (59c), where a *pu na*-clause relativises the explicitly non-referential indefinite pronoun *kapios* 'someone'.

(59c)   Εξάλλου είναι και παρηγορητικό να ξέρεις πως κάποιος δικός σου είναι κοντά σου.
        Κάποιος ***που να*** σε καταλαβαίνει.
        eksalu ine ke pariɣoritiko na kseris pos kapios ðikos su ine koda su. kapios ***pu na***
        se katalaveni.
        And it's consoling to know that someone from your family is close by. Someone
        ***who*** understands you.

According to Hesse (1980:108), the matrix clause of generalising relative clauses is "mostly negative or virtually negative (e.g. interrogative) or expresses some kind of need; the properties of the thing wanted are then described in the relative clause." More specifically, as Veloudis (1983–1984:112) argues, generalising relative clauses occur as complements of intensional rather than extensional predicates—predicates, that is, which select not for a specific entity in the world, but for an entity in any possible world that would satisfy certain criteria. Thus, *look for (a)* and *need (a)* are intensional, whereas *buy* is typically extensional. Verb modalities which allude to possible worlds are also intensional, and allow generalising relative clauses; these include negations, as Hesse found, as well as 'virtually negative' (e.g. irrealis) moods: interrogatives, hortatives and imperatives, 'subjunctive' clauses (including purposives and resultatives), futures, conditionals, and counterfactuals (Veloudis 1983–1984:114–123). (See also discussion in §3.7.2.)[53]

With negative matrix clauses, in particular, *pu na*-clauses are emphatic; they deny, not only that the matrix is true for all plausible referents, but that it is true for any conceivable referent. Thus, compare (60a) and (60b):

(60a)   Δεν ήθελα να κάνω πράξη ***που*** δεν την έκανε δεσπότης
        ðen iθela na kano praksi ***pu*** ðen tin ekane ðespotis
        I did not wish to commit an act ***which*** a bishop had not committed

(60b)   Δεν ήθελα να κάνω πράξη ***που να*** μην την έκανε δεσπότης
        ðen iθela na kano praksi ***pu na*** min tin ekane ðespotis
        I did not wish to commit ***any*** act ***which*** a bishop ***might*** not have committed
        (Kazantzakis; cited in Hesse 1980:111)

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[53]Because of their restriction to intensional predications, Veloudis refers to such relative clauses as **intensional relatives** (διατενής αναφορική).

That the referent in such relative clauses is generic is underlined by the fact that *tetios* 'such a' can usually follow the clause head without any distortion in meaning (61c); this demonstrative has the function of stressing the *kind* of referent that would satisfy the proposition made, rather than just the specific referent:

(61c)     Θέλω μια δακτυλογράφο *τέτοια, που να* ξέρει αγγλικά
          θelo mia ðaktiloɣrafo *tetia, pu na* kseri aglika
          I want a typist *such that she* knows English
          *(Generalising interpretation:)* I want the kind of typist who knows English
          *(Resultative interpretation:)* I want a typist who is of such a calibre, that as a result she knows English[54]

Even when ostensibly the referent of the clause has been established as specific from the previous utterance, a *pu na*-relative clause still makes a statement about the kind of entity the head is, rather than the head itself:[55]

(62a)     Και διαβασμένος [ο Ονφρουά ντε Τορόν] κι' ήξερε και τ' αραβικά φαρσί κι' έκανε και
          τον διερμηνέα στις συναντήσεις με τον Σαλαντίν, αλλά μάπας! Μάπας *που να* τον
          βάζης στην Ακαδημία των λαχανικών και να τον έχουνε τ' αντίδια για θελήματα.
          ke ðiavasmenos ki iksere ke t aravika farsi ki ekane ke ton ðierminea stis sinadisis
          me ton saladin, ala mapas! mapas *pu na* ton vazis stin akaðimia ton laxanikon ke
          na ton exune t adiðia ɣia θelimata.
          And he [Honfrois de Toron] was well-read, and knew Arabic fluently, and even
          served as interpreter in meetings with Saladin—but a dolt! A dolt *such that* if
          you'd put him in the Academy of Vegetables, the endives would end up using
          him as their gopher. (TsifC 234)

The referent of *mapas* 'dolt' is ostensively Honfrois; yet there is no article before *mapas*, and *mapas* is relativised by a *pu na* clause. So the relativisation is generic ('a dolt such that you would place him…') rather than specific ('he was a dolt whom you would place…')

For most instances of *pu na*-relative clauses, it is possible to omit *pu,* leaving *na* as the sole relativising connective. This usage is rather similar to the use in languages like English of the infinitive (the functional equivalent of *na*) to qualify noun phrases rather than to act as a verb complement *(infinitival relative)*:

(62b)     Το τραίνο, ευτυχώς, δεν είναι αυτοκίνητο *να* το σταματούν όπου θέλουν και *να*
          μαγαρίζουν.
          to treno, eftixos, ðen ine aftokinito *na* to stamatun ˈopu θelun ke *na* maɣarizun.
          A train, fortunately, isn't a car, *to* be stopped wherever people please and ∅ let
          them befoul it. (Mack 291; Ioannou)

### 3.7.2. Purposive relative clauses
Generalising relative clauses are distinct from a separate class of *pu na*-relative clauses: purposives. In these clauses, the relative clause expresses the purpose

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[54]As Hesse points out, this demonstrative is also strongly associated with resultative clauses, so that generalising and resultative *pu na*-clauses (§3.7.3) are rather close to each other.
[55]This is why the head fails to be preceded by a determiner, as discussed in §3.7.1.

of the head. There is a wide range of semantic colouring relative clauses can take on—causal, temporal, contrastive, and so forth (§3.4); the difference with purposives is that, purpose being irrealis, purposive relative clauses are associated only with *pu na,* rather than *pu*. (As sentential adjuncts, purposives are headed by *na* or *ɣia na* 'for to'.)

In contrast to generalising relative clauses, purposives make no demand of intensionality on their matrix predicates; compare (63a), which has a generalising relative clause after an intensional predicate, with (63b), which is extensional (and in which the generalising relative clause is unacceptable), and (63c), where the same extensional predicate can take a purposive relative clause (examples taken from Veloudis 1983–1984):

(63a)    Έψαξα για ένα αυτοκίνητο ***που να*** κοστίζει γύρω στο εκατομμύριο
          epsaksa ɣia ena aftokinito ***pu na*** kostizi ɣiro sto ekatomirio
          I looked for a car ***which would*** cost around a million (= the kind of car)

(63b)    *Πήρα ένα αυτοκίνητο ***που να*** κοστίζει γύρω στο εκατομμύριο
          *pira ena aftokinito ***pu na*** kostizi ɣiro sto ekatomirio
          *I bought a car ***which would*** cost around a million (= the kind of car)

(63c)    Πήρα ένα αυτοκίνητο ***που να*** με εξυπηρετεί στη δουλειά μου
          pira ena aftokinito ***pu na*** me eksipireti sti ðulia mu
          I bought a car ***to*** be of service to me in my job

In its purposive sense, *pu* is omissible: one can just as easily say *pira ena aftokinito **na** me eksipireti sti ðulia mu*. This is not possible for generalising relative clauses (Veloudis 1983–1984:113): one cannot say **epsaksa ɣia ena aftokinito **na** kostizi ɣiro sto ekatomirio,* as this could only be interpreted as a purposive (*'in order for* it to cost around a million').[56]

However, Veloudis' constraint on *pu* elision holds only for sentences where the intensionality is conveyed by the predicate, as in *epsaksa* 'look for'. Where intensionality is conveyed by grammatical means, like negation, a *na*-relative clause is perfectly acceptable, as in (62b)—a clause by no means purposive.

Notwithstanding these distributional differences, purposive and intensional *pu* are semantically close to each other, which is why they are conflated in traditional grammar accounts (most recently in Gogos (1989), in which five of the six examples given of 'Relative Clauses of Purpose or Result' are in fact intensional.)

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[56]This property is consistent with the semantics: the *na*-element is dominant in the purposive, since the purposive is only incidentally a relative clause (it could just as easily function as a sentential adjunct), whereas the *pu*-element is dominant in the generalising expression, which is still a type of relative clause, anchored to a specific head. In addition, purposives can be either perfective or imperfective, whereas generalising clauses (not restrictable to a specific time frame) can only be imperfective.

### 3.7.3. Potential result clauses

In a result clause, *pu* (§3.4.3) introduces actual results, whereas *pu na* introduces potential or intended results, as illustrated by (64a).

(64a)    Θα πρέπει η κυβέρνηση να λάβει οπωσδήποτε μέτρα ***έτσι που να*** λυθεί το πρόβλημα.
         θa prepi i kivernisi na lavi oposðipote metra ***etsi pu na*** liθi to provlima.
         The government will definitely have to take measures ***such that*** the problem
         ***may*** be solved. (Mack 296)

Using the future particle *θa* instead of *na* in (64a) would assert that the problem *will* be solved; no such assertion is made with *na*.

   Most clauses of this type are similar to generalising relative clauses (§3.7.1); indeed, both Mackridge and Tzartzanos conflate them. I distinguish them because potential results have a stronger affinity still to realis results. In fact, the potential/actual distinction between *pu* and *pu na* frequently breaks down, as in the following examples:

(64b)    Γράφει ρίμες τόσο πλούσιες ***που να*** μοιάζουν με λογοπαίγνια.
         ɣrafi rimes toso plusies ***pu na*** miazun me loɣopeɣnia.
         He writes rhymes so rich ***that*** they are just like puns. (example given in Hesse
         1980:105—Hesse adds that *pu miazun* "would mean rather the same.")

(64c)    Και προς τιμήν τους [των αρχαίων ελλήνων], αργότερα τη μελετούσανε [τη σελήνη]
         «αστρονομικά και επιστημονικά» σε τέτοιο σημείο, ***που να*** την απαλλάξουνε από
         παραμύθια και ν' αφήσουνε τις παλιές μυθολογικές δοξασίες, μόνο για τους πιο
         πνευματικά καθυστερημένους.
         ke ptos timin tus, arɣotera ti meletusane "astronomika ke epistimonika" se tetio
         simio, ***pu na*** tin apalaksune apo paramiθia ke n afisune tis palies miθoloɣikes
         ðoksasies, mono ɣia tus pio pnevmatika kaθisterimenus.
         And to their [the Ancient Greeks] credit, later on they studied it [the moon] as-
         tronomically and scientifically to such a degree ***that*** they rid her of fairy tales
         and left the old mythological beliefs for the intellectually retarded. (TsifM 405)

In (64b), *na* contributes nothing to the meaning: the similarity of the rhymes to puns cannot be irrealis ('would be just like puns'), and *na* may simply be used affectively, to attenuate the remark. Similarly, there is nothing either potential or intended about Greek skepticism in (64c). In fact, according to Hesse (1980:105), *pu na*-clauses serve simply "to express *logical consequence,* whether it actually occurs (occurred) or not." So, whereas the *pu* expression is marked for realis, the *na* equivalent is unmarked, rather than marked for irrealis modality.

### 3.7.4. Unrealisable concessive clauses

In §3.4.5, we saw *pu* used as a realis concessive. The *pu na*-counterparts of these clauses introduce a condition regarded by the speaker as outlandish or unreasonable,[57] as shown by (46b) and (65)—and equivalent to English expressions like *not if you were the last man on earth!*

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[57]These are the clauses Tzartzanos classes as concessive rather than contradictory (§3.4.5).

(46b)  Δεν ξαναγυρίζω σπίτι του, *που να* τον ιδώ κρεμασμένο.
δen ksanaɣirizo sto spiti tu, *pu na* ton iδo kremasmeno.
I'm not going back to his house, ***even if*** I see him hang. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 5; Xenopoulos)

(65)

| Εγώ | δεν | τον | παίρνω | αυτόν | *που να* | με | κάνει |
|-----|-----|-----|--------|-------|----------|-----|-------|
| eɣo | δen | ton | perno | afton, | *pu na* | me | kani |
| I | not | him (CLIT) | take | him | *pu na* | me | make |

χρυσή
xrisi
golden (FEM)
I'm not marrying *him*, ***even if*** he gilds me. (Tz §282 LXXXIV iii 5; 'Fortunio', *Elefthero Vima* newspaper, 1931–09-06)

This contrasts with irrealis concessives introduced by *[ke] na* '[even] *na*', which bear no restriction as to how unreasonable the concessive may be. Thus, a *[ke] na*-concessive can be expected to be true (66a), or hypothetical (66b), as well as unfeasible like *pu na*-concessives (66c):

(66a)  *Και* οι γονείς μου *να* μη σε θέλουν, εγώ θά 'ρθω να σε πάρω.
*ke* i ɣonis mu *na* mi se θelun, eɣo θa rθo na se paro.
***Even if/though*** my parents don't want you, I'll come and get you. (MinB 436; Lithakia, Zante, Heptanesa)

(66b)  *Και να* γυρίσω τώρα στο νησί, πάλι δε θα ησυχάσω.
*ke na* ɣiriso tora sto nisi, pali δe θa isixaso.
***Even if*** I returned now to the island, I would find no peace. (Tz §253 2 b; Karkavitsas)

(66c)  Δεν τον έπαιρνα, *να* μου χαρίζανε τον ουρανό με τ' άστρα
δen ton eperna, *na* mu xarizane ton urano me t astra
I wouldn't marry him, ***even if*** they gave me the heavens and the stars. (Tz §282 LXXVII 9; Papadiamantis)

(46b) and (65) give a strong impression that the *pu*-propositions are not just concessive, but also contain an optative expression disparaging its referent. For example, (46b) can readily be interpreted as 'I'm not going back to his house—and may I see him hanged!' This association is strong in Greek, although it does not always hold—as shown by (66d) and (66e), which have no necessarily denigratory or optative component:

(66d)  ´Αμα μένεις εδώ, δεν ανεβαίνεις [στην Ακρόπολη], *που να* σου δώσουνε τρία κατοστάρικα και *να* σε παρακαλέσει από πάνου κι η γκόμενα.
ama menis eδo, δen anevenis, *pu na* su δosune tria katostarika ke *na* se parakalesi apo panu ki i gomena.
If you stay here, you're not walking up [to the citadel] ***even if*** they give you 300 drachmas AND your girlfriend begs you to. (Tsiforos (source unattributed—example cited in Hesse 1980:111))

(66e)  όλα του [του Αμαλάριχου] σου λέγανε «Παναγιά μου, τούτους είναι πρίντσηπας, δεν γίνεται αλλιώς *που να* χτυπηθήτε χάμου».
ola tu su leɣane "panaɣia mu, tutos ine printsipas, δen ɣinete alios *pu na* xtipiθite xamu."
Everything about him [Amalarich] told you "By Our Lady, this is a prince; it cannot be otherwise, ***even if*** you knock yourselves to the ground!" (TsifC 177)

Nonetheless, there is an obvious connection between unrealisable concessives and the *pu na*-optative expressions considered immediately below.

There are other irrealis adjuncts introduced not by *pu na,* but only by *na,* as detailed in Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963] §282 LXXVII); these include conditionals, hypothetical concessives, temporal and manner clauses (where, once more, the *pu*-variant is marked for realis, but the *na*-version is not necessarily marked for irrealis), and topic clauses. So *pu na* is not only an extension of *pu* (which is in competition with *na*); *pu na* is itself in competition with *na*.

### 3.7.5. Optative clauses
A major class of *pu na*-relative clauses is that which expresses a wish (67a) or, more frequently, a curse (67b, 67c) about the referent:

(67a)                                                                                              (~1610)
Βιτζέντζος είν' ο ποιητής κ' εις τη γενιά Κορνάρος,/**που να** βρεθή ακριμάτιστος, σα θα τον πάρη ο Χάρος.
vitsendzos in o piitis k is ti γenia kornaros,/**pu na** vreθi akrimatistos, sa θa ton pari o xaros.
The poet is Vincenzo, and by clan Cornaro, **whom may** God find sinless, when Death takes him. (Erotok V 1544)

(67b)     M' ας όψεται η Φρόσω! Αυτό το κολοβό το φίδι, **που να** τη δω, θε' μου, να σέρνεται στο χώμα σα φίδι!
m as opsete i froso! afto to kolovo to fiði, **pu na** ti ðo, θe mu, na sernete sto xoma sa fiði!
But it's Froso's fault! That croptailed snake, **whom may** I see, my God, crawling on the earth like a snake!
*But that Frosso was to blame for everything! That slimy snake, please God I may live to see her crawl on the ground like the snake she is!* (Tah 98)

(67c)     Βρέθηκε στην Πέμπτη Σταυροφορία, Σεπτέμβρη μήνα, συναρχηγός, λεγάτος, αντιπρόσωπος του πάπα και κουμανταδόρος, ο Ιλλουστρίσσιμο [Πελάγιος], **που να** 'δινε ο Θεός να 'πεφτε σε ασβεστόλακκο παρά τη λαχτάρα που άναψε στην χριστιανοσύνη!
vreθike stin pempti stavroforia, septemvri mina, sinarxiγos, leγatos, adiprosopos tu papa ke kumadaðoros, o ilustrisimo, **pu na** ðine o θeos na pefte se asvestolako para ti laxtara pu anapse stin xristianosini!
So in the month of September, there came to the Fifth Crusade, as co-leader, legate, representative of the pope and commander, the Illustrissimo [Pelagius]—**whom** God **should** have made fall in a pit of lime, rather than allow the suffering he unleashed on Christendom! (TsifC 272)

This is consistent with the usage of *na* in main clauses to express wishes (68a) or curses (68b): the relative clause is subjunctive (optative), and so contains *na*.

(68a)     Στερνή μου γνώση, **να** σ' είχα πρώτα!
sterni mu γnosi, **na** s ixa (PERFP) prota!
My late knowledge, **would that** I had you beforehand! (*If I knew then what I know now…*) (Proverb)

(68b)     Βαρέθηκα πια! **Να** πάρει ο διάβολος και τις γιορτές και το καλό τους
vareθika pia! **na** pari (PERFS) o ðiavolos ke tis γiortes ke to kalo tus
I'm sick of it! **May** the devil take parties and what they're worth
*I'm fed up. To hell with name-days and all the rest of the nonsense.* (Tah 20)

*pu na* is usually associated with curses, whereas bare *na* is usual with wishes, and is generally more productive than *pu na;* so (68a) would sound odd with *pu na* in CSMG. As with *na*-optatives, the tense in the *pu na*-clause determines how realisable the wish is considered: a simplex tense means the wish is merely irrealis, whereas a past tense means the wish is counterfactual, and known not to be realisable—compare counterfactual (68a) with irrealis (68b).

The examples above are syntactically still relative clauses. But frequently the optative *pu na*-clause is separated from any putative head, and is best regarded as a distinct optative sentential adjunct. A *pu na*-clause can even become a pure main clause, as in (69a) and (69b), without any dependency whatever from any other clause—something impossible for any *pu*-clause.

(69a)    *Που να*    μη    σώσει!
         ***pu na***    mi    sosi!
         OPT        not    he lasts
         Damn him! ('May he not last!')

(69b)    «*Που να* μην έσωνα και να μην έφτανα να σε γεννήσω γιε μου!» έλεγα με το νου μου.
         "***pu na*** min esona ke na min eftana na se ɣeniso ɣie mu!" eleɣa me to nu mu.
         "***Would that*** I did not last and did not get to give birth to you, my son!" I said to myself.
         *Better I'd not lived to bring you into the world, my son, I said to myself.* (Tah 122)

In other cases the *pu na*-clause is introduced by an interjection; since the interjection has no syntactic status, the *pu na*-clause is still a distinct main clause:

(70a)    Μωρέ, ***που να*** πάρη η ευχή, είπε.
         more, ***pu na*** pari i efxi, ipe.
         Oh, the blessing take it, he said. (Euphemism for *pu na pari o ðiaolos* 'the devil take [it]') (Tz §282 LXXXIV iv; folk tale from Thrace collected by Papahristodoulou)

(70b)    Μπα! ***που να*** δαγκάση τη γλώσσα του!
         ba, ***pu na*** ðaɡasi ti ɣlossa tu!
         Ha! He ***should*** bite his tongue! (Tz §282 LXXXIV iv; Karkavitsas)

And there are instances where the *pu na*-optative clause is parenthetically embedded within other main clauses, but must be considered an adjunct, rather than a relative clause. This is either because there is no candidate head nominal (71a), or because the only such candidate is a clitic, which (as already noted) cannot be the head of a relative clause in CSMG (71b):

(71a)    Κοιμήσου,    ***που να***    σε χαρή        ο νιος, που θα σε πάρει!
         kimisu,    ***pu na***    se xari        o nios, pu θa se pari!
         sleep,        OPT        rejoice in you    the young man, who will marry you
         Sleep, ***and may*** the young man who marries you rejoice in you! (Pol 153)

(71b)    Δεν ***τον*** χωνεύω, ***που να*** τον αλέση ο μύλος!
         ðen ***ton*** (CLIT) xonevo, ***pu na*** ton alesi o milos!
         I can't stand ***him***—***may*** the mill grind him up! (Tz §282 LXXXIV iv; Xenopoulos)

There is one case where *pu* is optative without a following *na;* this case is idiosyncratic, however, since the predicate it introduces is not morphologically a verb. The word *anaθema* 'anathema; damn' is a noun and an interjection in Modern Greek; but it can take clitic objects. It appears *p anaθema* has become lexicalised in CSMG:

(72)     Ξύπνα,          **π'**     ανάθεμά       σε!
         ksipna,         **p**      anaθema       se!
         Wake up         *pu*      anathema      you (ACC)
         Wake up, damn you! (Tz §282 LXXXIV iv; Papantoniou)

One can see some motivation for the emergence of *pu na* as opposed to optative *na,* in that *na* is much more functionally overloaded. Thus, if *pu* were omitted in parenthetical optative clauses like (71a) and (71b), the *na*-clause would sound more like an out-of-place purposive ('Sleep, *so that* the young man who marries you may rejoice in you!')

    The dependence of *pu na* on a matrix has given rise to a salient subclass of optative expressions: echoic optatives, in which the predicate of the *pu na*-clause echoes that of the matrix:

(73a)    Και για τούτο θα χάσω εγώ το άλογό μου, **που να** σας χάσει ο Θεός;
         ke γia tuto θa xaso eγo to aloγo mu, **pu na** sas xasi o θeos?
         And is it for this that I am to lose my horse?—**would that** God lost you!
         (= destroyed you) (Polyl 65)

(73b)    Μ' έκαψες, **που να** καής σαν το κεράκι της Λαμπρής!
         m ekapses, **pu na** kais san to keraki tis labris!
         You have burnt me—**and may** you burn like an Easter candle! (Tz §282
         LXXXIV iv; unattributed folksong)

(73c)    Ερχόταν ο Δημήτρης μου, το μικρότερο απ' τα παιδιά μου, και μούλεγε:—'Μαμάκα, μ'
         έδειρε πάλι η θεία Φρόσω!' **Που να** τη δείρει ο θεός! Και θα τη δείρει.
         erxotan o ðimitris mu, to mikrotero ap ta peðia mu, ke mu leγe:—'mamaka, m
         eðire pali i θia froso!' **pu na** ti ðiri o θeos! ke θa ti ðiri.
         My Dimitris, my youngest child, used to come to me and say: 'Mummy, Auntie
         Froso beat me again.' **May** God beat *her!* And He will.
         *Dimitris, the youngest, would come and tell me: "Mama, auntie Frosso beat*
         *me again today!". If only God would strike her like she struck my children!*
         *And He will, mark my words.* (Tah 88)

### 3.7.6. Exclamatory clauses

The cleft exclamatory is a realis counterpart to the optatives considered above. This construction involves a *pu*-clause modifying a noun (74a), adjective (74b) or adverb (74c), which has been extracted from that clause, so what is syntactically a dependent clause is semantically the matrix: it is identical to the cleft construction of §3.2.3, but lacks the copula of the latter (Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1997:424).

(74a)  Ω!  συφορά  ***που***  μ'  εύρηκε!
       o!  sifora  ***pu***  m  evrike!
       Oh  disaster  *pu*  me  found
       Oh, **what** a disaster has fallen upon me! (MinB 519; Gerakario, Zante, Heptanesa)

(74b)  Ήσυχα  ***που***  είναι τα βουνά,  ήσυχοι  ***που***  είναι οι κάμποι.
       isixa  ***pu***  ine ta vuna,  isixi  ***pu***  ine i kabi.
       peaceful  *pu*  are the mountains,  peaceful  *pu*  are the plains
       **How** at ease are the mountains, **how** at ease are the plains! (Tz §282 LXXXIV v 2; unattributed folk song)

(74c)  Ωραία  ***που***  τραγουδεί  η Μαρίκα!
       orea  ***pu***  traγuði  i marika!
       beautifully  *pu*  sings  M.
       **How** beautifully Marika sings! (Tz §282 LXXXIV v 3; invented example)

The word *ti* 'what' can be placed before the clefted element:

(74d)  ***Τι***  όμορφη  ***που***  'σαι,  μάτια μου!
       ***ti***  omorfi  ***pu***  se,  matia mu!
       what  beautiful  *pu*  you are  my eyes
       **How** beautiful you are, my darling! (Tz §282 LXXXIV v 3; Passow)

The exclamatory clause need not always display a positive attitude towards its referent; it can also be used in an ironic sense, as shown by (75):

(75)  Μέρα  ***που***  βρήκε  να ταξιδέψει.
      mera  ***pu***  vrike  na taksiðepsi.
      day  *pu*  she found  to travel
      A fine day she picked to travel! (Tz §282 LXXXIV v 1; invented example)

The *alo pu*-construction is related to the cleft exclamatories: like them, it clefts an element—*alo* 'anything else'—from a (negative) matrix clause, binding it to that matrix with *pu*. But while *alo pu*-expressions are exclamatory, the clefted element is not focussed. So in (76), the sense is not 'It was *anything else* that Peter did not want', and *alo* is not contrastively stressed.

(76)  ***Άλλο***  ***που***  δεν ήθελε  κι  ο Πέτρος!
      ***alo***  ***pu***  ðen iθele  ki  o petros!
      anything else  *pu*  not wanted  also  P.
      That's exactly what Peter wanted! (i.e. it was a pleasant surprise, or, ironically, it was the last thing he wanted.)

This presumably follows from the difficulty of focussing a non-referential expression like *alo*.

A second class of exclamatory clauses, called here 'bare exclamatory' to distinguish from cleft exclamatories, involves a bare *pu*-clause, conveying disbelief and usually contempt, and following a matrix interjection or exclamation. This kind of clause (not included in either Tzartzanos' or Mackrdige's survey) resembles (38b) from §3.4.2:

(38b)     —΄Αγιε Πελάγιε! Με τους αφορισμούς οι στόλοι δεν καταστρέφονται. Θέλουνε και
          μάχη.
          —Να χαθήτε ***που*** δεν πιστεύετε στην παντοδυναμία του Κυρίου ημών.
          —aγie pelaγie! me tus aforismus i stoli ðen katastrefode. θelune ke maxi.
          —na xaθite ***pu*** ðen pistevete stin paðoðinamia tu kiriu imon.
          ['May you become lost ***that*** you don't believe in the omnipotence of Our Lord']
          "Saint Pelagius! Fleets are not destroyed by excommunication. They need
          battle, too."
          "Get lost, ***for*** not believing in the omnipotence of Our Lord!" (TsifC 275)

As analysed there, the *pu*-clause is a justification for the matrix exclamation; it
is thus an adjunct, rather than an independent exclamation, and it remains an
adjunct semantically even if the *pu*-clause becomes an independent intonation
unit. In bare exclamatories, on the other hand, the *pu*-clause introduces not a
justification for the exclamation, but rather a new exclamation, of parallel im-
port and juxtaposed with the 'matrix' exclamation. So in the following examples,
there are two exclamatory clauses: one 'matrix' exclamation, and one intro-
duced by *pu*. Since the exclamatories appear in a paratactic relation, *pu* is here
glossed as *and*:

(77a)     «Φτου σου να χαθείς!» της φωνάζω έξαλλη. «***Που*** μας παριστάνεις και την οσία!»
          "ftu su na xaθis!" tis fonazo eksali. "***pu*** mas paristanis ke tin osia!"
          "Get the hell out of here!" I yelled at her in a fury. "***And*** you pretend to us to be
          a saint!"
          *"Aren't you ashamed of yourself, you miserable old cow," I screamed at her,*
          *"pretending to be so damn holy!"* (Tah 194)

(77b)     Μ' έχει κάνει ρεζίλι στη γειτονιά. Τον πεζεβέγκη! ***Που*** μου θέλει και παιδί! Το μάτι θα
          του βγάλω! Αύριο κιόλας θα πάω να κάνω έκτρωση…
          m exi kani rezili sti γitonia. ton pezevegi! ***pu*** mu θeli ke peðo! to mati θa tu vγalo!
          avrio kiolas θa pao na kano ektrosi…
          *He's made me the laughing stock of the whole neighbourhood, that's what he's*
          *done. The bastard!* ***And*** *then he gives me another brat of his! I'll scratch his*
          *bloody eyes out! Tomorrow first thing I'll go and get an abortion, that's what*
          *I'll do!…* (Tah 94)

(77c)     Ενώ φοβέριζαν τον κόσμο από την Πόλι,/ τους ρήμαξεν ο Καντακουζηνός, τους ρήμαξε
          ο κυρ Γιάννης./ Και ***που*** το είχε σκοπό να πάει με του κυρ Γιάννη/ το μέρος! Και θα
          τόκαμνε.
          eno foverizan ton kosmo apo tin poli,/ tus rimaksen o kadakuzinos, tus rimakse o
          kir γianis./ ke ***pu*** to ixe skopo na pai me tu kir γiani/ to meros! ke θa to kamne.
          *While they were threatening everyone from Constantinople,/ Kantakuzinos*
          *demolished them, Lord John demolished them./ And* ***to think*** *he'd planned to*
          *join/ Lord John's party! And he would have done it* (Cav 248)

Clearly, the *pu*-clause is not a justification for the matrix exclamation; it rather
describes some state of the world which the speaker holds in contempt. So while
justifying *pu*-clauses have the import 'Get lost! *I say this because* you do not be-
lieve…', as in (38b), (77a) means 'Get the hell out of here! *I have contempt for*
*the fact that* you pretend to be a saint!'. Similarly, (77b) means 'That bastard! *I*

*have contempt for the fact that* he wants a kid!'[58] And (77c) expresses incredulity and disappointment.

There is a complex taxonomy of exclamatory utterances involving *pu* in some way; most of them are outlined in §3.8. Bare exclamatories are a distinct class from the irrealis exclamations considered in §3.8.2: the *pu*-clause is being asserted (albeit contemptuously), rather than negated. In that respect, bare exclamatories resemble the uncontrolled *pu θa*-exclamatories considered immediately below.

## 3.8. *Irrealis* pu

### 3.8.1. Irrealis *pu θa*

*θa,* the CSMG future and conditional marker, also plays a part in constructing irrealis *pu*-clauses. The most obvious way it does so is through the use of *θa* with IMPFP, which gives an (irrealis) conditional tense. In such usage, *θa* corresponds to *would* rather than *will* in English. So while potential-result–clauses use *na* and IMPFS or PERFS, unrealised-result–clauses use *θa* and IMPFP, giving a conditional clause:

(78)                                                                                                          (1829–1840)
> Κι' από τόσα άρματα, κανόνια, σκουτιά κι' άλλα αναγκαία του πολέμου, **οπού θα**
> **ήταν** το ταχτικόν διπλό, δεν έμεινε τίποτας.
> ki apo tosa armata, kanonia, skutia ki ala anagea tu polemu, **opu θa itan** (IMPFP)
> to taktikon ðiplo, ðen emine tipotas.
> And from so many arms, cannons, uniforms and other necessaries of war, **that**
> **would have been** double the regular army's—not a piece remained.
> *And of all those weapons, cannon, clothing, and other warlike supplies which*
> *the regulars had in double supply, not one item was left.* (MakM 186)

But there is an entire group of constructions involving *pu θa,* which is irrealis in an unexpected way. In this group, the matrix clause is a derogatory, typically optative or imperative expression, and its *pu θa*-adjunct is a clause which the speaker explicitly intends to be understood as either true but immaterial, or outright false. The verb of these *pu θa*-clauses is not in a Past, but in a Simplex tense. That is to say, the adjunct verb does not appear in the explicitly irrealis conditional tense of (78), but in the future tense.

No study of this construction, nor of its bare *pu*-counterpart in §3.8.2, has been attempted to date. However, it is of great importance in properly describing the semantic range of *pu*. While *pu* is strongly associated with factivity, and requires the interpolation of *na* to admit irrealis clauses; the few exceptions already seen are irrealis in mood, but more indefinite than irrealis in denotation. Yet this construction can actually assert the *falsehood* of its argument. This is despite the fact that there is no explicit negator present. The irrealis nature of *θa* does not explain away this falsehood: the literal meaning of the *pu θa*-ad-

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[58]The involvement of the speaker in the *pu*-clause exclamation is underlined by the use of the ethical dative *mas* 'to us' and *mu* 'to me'.

juncts is *that I will do X,* whereas their speaker meaning is *I will not do X.* As shown in §3.8.2, there are even constructions where *θa* is absent, but the argument of *pu* is still negated; the only indication of irrealis mood left is quotative intonation. The consequence is startling: *pu* is normally factive, but in these constructions, it is **anti-factive**. Furthermore, this anti-factivity is not an incidental discourse implicature; it is conventionalised, and strongly associated with the particular collocations involved. In what follows, I list some of the more salient instances of the *pu θa* exclamatory construction.

The first such construction uses the verb *xeso* 'shit on (PERFS)'. The full construction is *na* (CLITIC)ᵢ *xeso* NPᵢ, *pu θa VP(1SG):* 'May I shit on NP(TOPIC), that I will VP'. The construction corresponds roughly to the Australian English expression *fuck that for a joke if I'm gonna VP,* or *yeah, like I'm really gonna VP:* it expresses contempt towards the NP object of *xeso,* refusal to carry out the action in the *pu θa*-clause (which in the Australian English expression is marked as irrealis by placing it in a conditional), and some implicit statement of contingency of the action on the NP. The *pu θa*-clause is thus reminiscent of the resultative (or resultative relative) function of *pu:* the *pu θa*-predicate is in some way a result of the NP, which the speaker rejects.

The following example from Makriyannis' *Memoirs* provides an excellent illustration of the construction:[59]

(79a)                                                                                          (1829–1840)

(Makriyannis accuses his comrade Gouras during the Greek Revolutionary War of abusing his position to profiteer.)

«Τέλος πάντων εσύ κι' ο Μαμούρης συ θα γίνης Μεμεταλής, εσύ, κι' αυτός Μπραΐμης· κ' εμάς θα μας πάρετε είλωτες! Να την ***χέσω*** τέτοια λευτεριά, ***οπού θα*** κάμω εγώ εσένα πασιά! »

"telos padon esi ki o mamuris si θa ɣinis memetalis, esi, ki aftos braimis k emas θa mas parete ilotes! na tin ***xeso*** tetia lefteria, ***opu θa*** kamo (PERFS) eɣo esena pasia!"

"So you're going to turn into Mehmet Ali, and your friend Mamouris is going to turn into Ibrahim Pasha [two leaders of the Ottoman army]; and you're going to make *us* your serfs! ***Fuck*** that kind of liberty, ***if*** I'm going to make *you* a pasha!"

*'And to cap that, you and Mamouris between you will be Mahomet Ali and Ibrahim and have us as your helots. I shit on such a freedom **where** I have to make a pasha of you!'* (MakM 185)

The import of Makriyannis' statement is as follows:
- In the process of the Greeks gaining their liberty, Giouras and Mamouris are gaining excessive power.
- The result of 'that kind of liberty' is that Giouras will be Makriyannis' overlord.
- Makriyannis refuses to have Giouras be his overlord.

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[59]I have been unable to find an instance of this particular construction in the often heated discussions in the *Hellas-L* corpus, although there are several instances of 'May I shit on X' by itself to express contempt.

- Ergo, fuck that kind of liberty whereby Makriyannis would have to make Giouras his overlord.

The peculiarity with the construction is that, even if the *pu* *θa*-clause is interpreted as a normal resultative connective or relativiser ('whereby'), the result is unrealised rather than potential—as far as the speaker's desires are concerned, at least. So the *pu* *θa*-clause would make more sense as a conditional (*θa*+ Past) than as a future (*θa*+ Simplex): *opu **θa** ekama* (PERFP) *eɣo esena pasia* 'whereby I ***would make*** you a pasha', rather than 'whereby I ***will make*** you a pasha'.[60]

One might explain the anti-factive as factive contingent on the fulfilment of the matrix condition; but such contingency is not normal to factive expressions—the earliest definition of factivity is indeed preservation of truth under negation of the matrix (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971). It is simpler to admit that these constructions are indeed anti-factive, and explain them as a contingent diachronic development (as I attempt in §7.8.1), than force them into a factive schema they clearly do not belong in.

A euphemism for *xeso* in this construction, and in the expression of derogation in general, is *vraso* 'boil'. This usage of *vraso* is illustrated in (80)—with an instructive difference from (79a):[61]

(80)  Θα μου πης ότι έτσι προοδεύουνε οι Άραβες! Να την **βράσουμε** μεις τέτοια πρόοδο **που θα** μας κόψη το λουφέ!
θa mu pis oti etsi prooðevune i araves! na tin ***vrasume*** (1PL) mis tetia prooðo ***pu θa*** mas kopsi to lufe!
Now, you might say, that's how the Arabs make progress. ***Stuff*** that kind of progress ***if*** it'll cut out our loot! (TsifC 290)

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[60]An element which could have been used instead of *θa* to mark the adjunct as irrealis (and undesirable) is *na*. However, the matrix clause in the *pu* *θa*-construction, being an optative, itself contains *na*. So while *na* might have been a less problematic particle than *θa,* its use would have led to confusion, in this construction at least.

The continuation of (79a) is of interest, because it contains an utterance made with similar import, but formulated quite differently:

(79b)  «—Τι κουβεντιάζεις έτζι; μου λέγει. —Έτζι κουβεντιάζω! *Όταν* τα πάρης εσύ αυτά και οι φίλοι σου, να με φτύσης!»
"ti kuvediazis etsi?" mu leɣi. "etsi kuvediazo! *otan* ta paris (PERFS) esi afta ke i fili su, na me ftisis!"
"What are you talking like that for?" he tells me. "That's the way I talk! ***When*** you and your friends get that [the 800,000 groschen Gouras has requested from the government], you can spit on me!"
*'What are you chattering about?' says he. 'Chattering about!' say I. 'When you and your friends get hold of these things you can spit on me!'* (MakM 185)

Again, the event Makriyannis wishes to prevent appears in PERFS, the subjunctive mood. But whereas in (79a) it appeared within a future tense (preceded by *θa*), here it appears after *otan* 'when'. A *when*-expression is more irrealis than a future-expression—although it still implies an expectation of fulfilment, which would be absent if instead Makriyannis had used a conditional marker, such as *an* 'if' or *ama* 'when; if'. In context, however, the *otan*-construction and the *pu* *θa*-construction are treated as equivalent.

[61]The difference here is certainly independent of the choice of the lexeme *vraso* or *xeso;* they are intersubstituable in both instances.

Example (79a) cannot be read with its literal, affirmative meaning: the speaker derogates the situation, and the speaker is the agent of the *pu θa*-event, which therefore will not take place. In (80), by contrast, the speakers have no control over the *pu θa*-event; and much as they do not wish it to take place, there is some expectation that it will. In fact, the *pu θa*-clause can be read quite literally as an affirmative relative clause: 'Let us denigrate such progress *which will* cut out our loot'. So while (79a) and (80) are identical in structure, and both express derogation, the control the speaker has over the derogated action determines the likelihood of the action. So a *pu θa*-exclamation can either be truthful or not, depending on the degree of speaker control; the former case is called here **Uncontrolled**-*pu θa,* and the latter **Controlled**.

The interpretation of such utterances is a matter of conversational implicature. The *pu θa*-clause represents an inconvenience—it is signalled as such by the derogatory matrix. Humans are assumed to wish to avoid inconvenience; so if the speaker is the agent in the *pu θa*-clause, they are presumably avoiding the action described. If the speaker, on the other hand, is an affected party in the *pu θa*-clause, as in (80), and has no control over the situation, then the clause must be read literally, as describing something that may well happen.

Instances of the construction up to this point are ambiguous with relativisations; from this point on, they are not—the matrix presents no candidate head for the *pu*-clause to relativise. So the construction cannot be considered merely an idiosyncratic relativisation: it is an autonomous connective usage of *pu*.

An anti-factive ('uncontrolled') reading of the *pu θa*-clause requires that the speaker have no control over the *pu θa*-event, and not merely that the speaker not be the agent. This is illustrated by the next group of constructions, whose matrix clause contains a derogatory utterance equivalent to 'get lost' or 'go to hell'; these expressions are usually introduced by the colloquial imperatives *a, ade* and *ai* 'go!' These occur in response to a request; their matrix expresses contempt to the interlocutor, and the *pu θa*-clause sarcastically echoes the interlocutor's request. So in these utterances, too, *pu θa* superficially looks like asserting its argument, but in actuality denies it. This is illustrated well by (81a), where the speaker is still the subject of the *pu θa*-clause:

(81a)    Ο Κονράδος του Μομφερά ξύνισε τα μούτρα.
         —Τι ζητείτε, περικαλώ;
         —Την Τύρο, απάντησε ο Γκυ. [...]
         Ο Κονράδος σηκώθηκε απάνω.
         —*Α πάγαινε* ρε, λέει, ***που θα*** σου δώσω την Τύρο. Εγώ πολέμησα ρε κοκονιόρκο να την
         κρατήσω και θα στην δώσω εσένα του κιοτή; Α πάγαινε.
         o konraðos tu momfera ksinise ta mutra.
         "ti zitite, perikalo?"
         "tin tiro," apaðise o gi. [...]
         o konraðos sikoθike apano.
         "*a paγene* re," lei, "***pu θa*** su ðoso tin tiro. eγo polemisa re kokonioriko na tin
         kratiso ke θa stin ðoso esena tu kioti? a paγene."
         ["'***Be going***, you," he says, "***that*** I will give you Tyre.'"]
         Conrad of Montferrat scowled.

"And what would you be after?"
"Tyre", Guy replied. […]
Conrad got up.
*"**Get lost!**"* he said. *"**As if** I'm **going** to give you Tyre! I fought to hold on to it, you great big girl's blouse, and you want me to give it to you now, you coward? Get lost."* (TsifC 228)

In (81b), the *pu θa*-clause is also denied though superficially asserted—even though grammatically the speakers do *not* have control over the *pu θa*-proposition.

(81b)    —Περικαλώ κάντε πέρα καθόσο περί τα Κορωνομεθώνη ενδιαφέρεται ο μπαμπάς
         [δόγης της Βενετίας].
         —*Α πάαινε* ρε, έκαναν οι Φράγκοι, *που θα* μας φας τον τόπο.
         "perikalo kante pera kaθoso peri ta koronomeθoni enðiaferete o babas."
         *"a paene* re," ekanan i fragi, *"pu θa* mas fas ton topo."
         [*"**Be going**, you," said the Franks, "**that** you will devour the land from us."*]
         "Do kindly step aside, as Daddy [the doge of Venice] is interested in Coron and
         Modon."
         *"**Get lost!**"* the French said. *"**As if** you're **going** to gobble up our land from
         under us!"* (TsifFU 35)

This is because, although grammatically the Venetians are doing the gobbling (and are the agents of the *pu θa*-clause), pragmatically the French are in control of the situation, because they still own the forts of Coron and Modon. In actuality, the French are saying *'as if we're going to let you* gobble up our land from under us.'* So controllability is a pragmatic rather than syntactic property.

In (82a) and (82b), on the other hand, the *pu θa*-events are not under the control of the speaker:

(82a)    (Baldwin III's army unsuccessfully attacks Nur-en-Din's)
         Ο Νουρ εν Ντιν καταυχαριστήθηκε.
         —Τους εκάναμε νοικοκυραίους. *Άει στο διάολο* παλιόπαιδο [Βαλδουίνος Γ´] *που θα*
         πολεμήσεις εσύ εμένα.
         o nur en din katafxaristiθike.
         —tus ekaname nikokireus. *ai sto ðiaolo* paliopeðo *pu θa* polemisis esi emena.
         [*'**Go to hell** bad child, **that** you **will** fight me.'*]
         Nur-en-Din was ecstatic.
         "We've made proper householders of them. ***Piss off*** you pipsqueak [Baldwin
         III]! ***As if*** you were ***going*** to fight with me!" (TsifC 170)

(82b)    (Poseidon expresses surprise to Zeus that Hermes has embarked on a career of
         thieving by stealing his brother Apollo's cattle. Zeus responds:)
         Ο καλός κλέφτης τον αδερφό του κλέβει πρώτα. *Ας στο διάολο, που θα* μου πης εμένα
         περί κλεψιά. Εγώ είμαι κηδεμόνας σας, ρε. Την τέχνη θα μου μάθετε;
         o kalos kleftis ton aðerfo tu klevi prota. *as sto ðiaolo, pu θa* mu pis emena peri
         klepsia. eγo ime kiðemonas sas, re. tin texni θa mu maθete?
         [*'**Go to hell, that** you **will** tell me about theft.'*]
         A good thief robs his brother first of all. Talk to me about theft? Get stuffed! I'm
         your bloody guardian. Are you going to try and teach me how to suck eggs?
         (TsifM 208)

Baldwin III has indeed fought with Nur-en-Din, and Poseidon has indeed talked about theft to Zeus. So the truth of the *pu θa*-clauses cannot be denied: these are

uncontrolled exclamatories. The effect of the *pu θa*-clause here is rather to be-little its referent. Baldwin may indeed have fought with Nur-en-Din, but the battle was disastrous, and Nur-en-Din is satisfied that Baldwin is no match for him. Poseidon may indeed have talked to Zeus about theft, but Zeus pulls rank on him, and declares him unfit to lecture him on morality. Yet even with factive denotation, uncontrolled-*pu θa* is grammatically odd by Greek standards: a conditional would still be more consistent with such utterances than a future. A conditional gloss into English displays this: 'Piss off you pipsqueak, *who would* fight with me'; 'You *would* talk to me about theft! Get stuffed!'[62]

The final example of a *pu θa*-construction is straightforwardly anti-factive: the speakers are in control of the *pu θa*-event, and the constructions express their unwillingness to carry out the events, and the contempt in which they are held. In (83) the speakers respond with ridicule to a suggestion made; they echo the suggestion sarcastically, much as was the case with the 'get lost'-responses in (81a) and (81b):

(83)    —Καλέ *τι λέτε που θ'* αφήσουμε τους άντρες μας για τρία παλιόκαστρα;
        kale ***ti lete pu θ*** afisume tus adres mas γia tria paliokastra?
        ['Why, ***what are you saying, that*** we ***will*** leave our husbands for three lousy castles?']
        "Whatever are you talking about? Us, abandon our husbands for three lousy castles?" (TsifFU 96)

Although the choice between factive and anti-factive readings of *pu θa* (con-trolled/uncontrolled) is still a matter of conversational implicature, the fact that the negative reading results in a denial is semantically conventionalised. Under no circumstances can a *pu θa* clause with an invective matrix communicate grudging acquiescence. If the *pu θa*-clause is preventable by the speaker, the *pu θa*-construction signifies that it will in fact be prevented, and is not subject to defeasibility:

(84)    Αει στο διάολο, *(∅/??και/\*που)* θα σου δώσω την Τύρο!
        ai sto ðiaolo, *(∅/??ke/\*pu)* θa su ðoso tin tiro!
        To hell with it, I'll hand Tyre over to you!

This requirement of prevention—that a Controlled *pu θa*-clause is necessarily false—does not follow from conversational implicature. So it represents a *conventional* implicature—the first step towards the lexicalisation of this anti-fac-tive sense.

### 3.8.2. Irrealis bare *pu*
The previous section considered expressions using *pu θa* to introduce irrealis propositions—typically because, from context, the speaker both denigrates the

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[62]Although English does not use the same kind of modal machinery in its equivalent expres-sions, expressions like *you can't possibly do that!* (when someone just has) or *like you can really do that!* point to a similar conflict between rhetorical and real-world modality. (My thanks to Christina Eira for this observation.)

eventuality and expresses refusal to carry the event out, or to allow it. There is another group of expressions, in which the speaker clearly intends the *pu*-clause to be understood as false. These clauses describe not actions, but facts. The clauses are denied in the absence of any explicit marker of either negation or irrealis mood; the only such marker appears to be quotative intonation. This group of constructions, like the *pu θa*-group, involves an imperative or exclamatory matrix clause and a *pu*-adjunct.

The first such construction involves 'na, a 'deictic' particle. 'na is frequently used in collocation with *pu* (Nicholas 1998a), with *pu* indexing the proposition it was introducing, acting as a complement of 'na:

(85)    (Discussion of the origin of the Amazonian river deity Yuxubal in the practice of Orinoco ferries 'sacrificing' livestock to the river's piranhas.)
        *Νά,* λοιπόν, ***που*** πολλούς θεούς και αγίους τους γεννάει και τους συντηρεί η ανάγκη.
        'na, lipon, **pu** polus θeus ke aγius tus γenai ke tus sidiri i anagi.
        So, ***as you can see***, ('behold that') many gods and saints are born and maintained by necessity. (TsifM 301)

Here, however, 'na indexes not a clause, but an expression of contempt or, paralinguistically, an insulting gesture (typically the *mudza,* the spread-palm equivalent of the Anglo 'finger'), and corresponds to 'take that!' The ensuing *pu*-clause is not a complement of 'na, but rather provides justification for the insult—in a way analogous to the justifying circumstances discussed in §3.4.2 (cf. 38b). A factive instance of a paralinguistic justification along these lines is given in (86a).

(38b)   —Ἅγιε Πελάγιε! Με τους αφορισμούς οι στόλοι δεν καταστρέφονται. Θέλουνε και μάχη.
        —Να χαθήτε ***που*** δεν πιστεύετε στην παντοδυναμία του Κυρίου ημών.
        —aγie pelaγie! me tus aforismus i stoli ðen katastrefode. θelune ke maxi.
        —na xaθite **pu** ðen pistevete stin padoðinamia tu kiriu imon.
        ['May you become lost ***that*** you don't believe in the omnipotence of Our Lord']
        "Saint Pelagius! Fleets are not destroyed by excommunication. They need battle, too."
        "Get lost,***for*** not believing in the omnipotence of Our Lord!" (TsifC 275)

(86a)   Φρύαξε η Δήμητρα. Πάει στον Ὄλυμπο και τους κατάφτυσε.
        friakse i ðimitra. pai ston olibo ke tus kataftise.
        —*Νά* ρε,              *που*    κάνετε το μεσάζων με την δικιά μου την κόρη.
        'na    re,              **pu**    kanete to mesazon me tin ðikia mu tin kori.
        lo!    DISRESPECT    *pu*    act as intermediary with my own daughter
        Demeter was livid. She went to Olympus and spat on the gods.
        "Take that, damn you,***for*** playing pimp with my own daughter." (TsifM 370)

There is no semantic difference in *pu* between (86a) and (38b): in both cases, the matrix is an expression of derogation, and the *pu*-clause is a justification for the derogation, which happens to hold true—consistent with the factivity of *pu*. But there are also utterances, like (86b), where the *pu*-justification cannot possibly be considered true:

(86b)    Μπήκανε οι άνθρωποι στα καράβια τους, τους φασκελώσανε «*νά που* είσαστε σεις
        για προκοπή», ανοιχτήκανε και πάνε πίσω.
        bikane i anθropi sta karavia tus, tus faskelosane "'*na pu* isaste sis γia prokopi",
        anixtikane ke pane piso.
        ['*lo! that* you are for progress']
        The guys got into their boats, they gave them the *mudza*—"*Take that! As if*
        any good *will* ever come of you lot"—they went out to sea and headed home.
        (TsifC 202)

The Byzantine sailors don't give the Crusaders the *mudza* because they think
some good *will* come of them—but precisely because they do *not* think so. So
the justification here is anti-factive, rather than factive; and the hearer needs
recourse to conversational implicature in order to work out whether the speaker
is being serious (factive) or ironic (anti-factive).

   A broader class of such utterances has as its matrix clause the interjection *ade*
'go on!', already encountered with *pu θa*-exclamatories. In that instance, *ade* in-
troduced a *pu θa*-exclamatory, so that whether the *pu θa*-clause was denied or
not depended on speaker control. When *ade* is used to introduce bare *pu*-
clauses, however, the argument of the *pu*-clause is denied whether or not the
speaker has any control over it, and whether or not the *pu*-proposition has the
speaker as a subject. This is because what is being denied by the speaker is not
an action, but a fact: there is no refusal being expressed by the speaker, which
might be contingent on speaker control, but only disbelief—as shown in (87a):

(87a)    —« ´Αντε, βρε κυρα-Εκάβη,» της λέω, «*που* πιστεύεις σε τέτοιες προλήψεις!»—«Και
        βέβαια πιστεύω…».
        "*ade,* vre kira ekavi," tis leo, "*pu* pistevis se teties prolipsis!" "ke vevea pistevo…".
        ['"*Go on,* hey Mrs Hecuba," I tell her, "*that* you believe in such supersti-
        tions!"']
        ""Oh *come on*, Mrs Hecuba," I told her, "*As if* you believe in such supersti-
        tions!" "Of course I do…".
        *"Go on with you, Hecuba,' I said, 'surely you don't believe that old wives'*
        *tale!'—'Of course I believe it…'* (Tah 261)

This disbelief is also illustrated by (87b)—with the added advantage that this *pu*-
clause has its verb in PERFP, the Modern Greek tense least associated with ir-
realis mood (§3.0.1). This confirms that there is nothing irrealis about the sur-
face form of this construction:

(87b)    (Discussion of the similarity between Poseidon in Greek mythology and St
        Nicholas in Greek Orthodox tradition.)
        Τι αλλάξαμε, λοιπόν; ´Αντε, ρε, *που* αλλάξαμε…
        ti alaksame, lipon? *ade,* re, *pu* alaksame (PERFP)…
        ['*Go on,* hey, *that* we have changed…']
        So how have we changed, then? Yeah, *sure* we've changed… (TsifM 302)

While *ade*-expressions constitute the most prominent grouping of such quota-
tive expressions of disbelief, there are other possible expressions in the matrix
clause. In (88a), the matrix clause consists of the interjection *ba* 'bah!'—strongly
implying that the *pu*-clause that follows is indeed 'humbug':

(88a)    Φύγανε τα κορίτσια, άδειασε το σπίτι, γκρίνιαζε ο Αντώνης.
         —Τι κατάλαβες τώρα που μείναμε δυο κούκοι;
         —Καλύτερα και να 'χω το κεφάλι μου ήσυχο.
         ***Μπα που*** το 'χε. Ο δούκας ξανάπεσε στο μεσοφούστανο και τάραξε την Αττική και το
         ῾Αργος...
         fiɣane ta koritsia, aðiase to spiti, ɡriniaze o adonis.
         —ti katalaves tora pu miname ðio kuki?
         —kalitera ke na xo to kefali mu isixo.
         ***ba pu*** to xe. o ðukas ksanapese sto mesofustano ke tarakse tin atiki ke to arɣos...
         The girls left, the house was emptied, and Antonio grumbled.
         —Are you satisfied, now that we're left all alone like two cuckoos?
         —All the better! This way, I can sleep easy. ['That I may have my head
         peaceful.']
         Oh no she didn't! [***Bah! that*** she had it.'] The duke started messing around
         with petticoats again, and struck at the whole of Attica and Argos... (TsifFU
         352)

In (88b), the matrix clause is *ti les kale* 'what are you talking about?' We have
already seen this clause as matrix to a *pu θa*-clause in (83). In this case, the *pu*-
clause explicitly (and disparagingly) echoes the interlocutor's utterance—al-
though the person of the verb has been adjusted accordingly, from `argises`
(2SG) to `arghsa` (1SG), so that this is not properly quotation.

(88b)    > argises pantws na apantiseis:-)kapoion rwtas fainetai:-)
         —῾Αργησες πάντως να απαντήσεις :-) Κάποιον ρωτάς φαίνεται :-)
         —arɣises pados na apadisis [smiley] kapion rotas fenete [smiley]

|   | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Ti les*** | ***kale*** | | ***pou*** | arghsa¿¿¿¿ | Molis dieukrinhses |
| *Τι λες* | *καλέ* | | *που* | άργησα;;;; | Μόλις διευκρίνησες |
| —*ti les* | *kale* | | *pu* | arɣisa???? | molis ðiefkrinises |
| what you.say | good.man (VOC) | | *pu* | I.was.late | |

         thn erwthsh (ka0ws thn prwth fora pou thn esteiles htan mpourdelo kai
         την ερώτηση (καθώς την πρώτη φορά που την έστειλες ήταν μπουρδέλο και
         tin erotisi (kaθos tin proti fora pu tin estiles itan burðelo ke
         den eixa katalabei ti rwtouses), apanthsa entos oligwn leptwn. :)
         δεν είχα καταλάβει τι ρωτούσες), απάντησα εντός ολίγων λεπτών. :)
         ðen ixa katalavi ti rotuses), apadisa edos oliɣon lepton. [smiley]
         —But you were late answering. :-) You must be asking someone else. :-)
         —Mate, what do you mean, 'late'? As soon as you clarified the question (because
         the first time you'd sent it, it was a shemmozle, and I hadn't understood what
         you were asking), I answered within a few minutes. :) (Charalambos P.
         Karaolides (response to Ioannis Iliopoulos): `Re: O nonos...¿` Hellas-L, 1995–
         09–04)

The final example of an irrealis bare-*pu* exclamatory adjunct comes from a dra-
matic play, and had baffled Tzartzanos when he was writing his *Syntax:*

(88c)    ῎Ανοιξέ το, να ιδούμε. Α! ντροπή είναι, καημένη. Καλέ, άνοιξέ το, ***που*** είναι ντροπή! Τα
         σεντούκια των υπηρετριών είναι γιανά τα ψάχνουν οι κυρίες!
         anikse to, na iðume. a! dropi ine, kaimeni. kale, anikse to, ***pu*** ine dropi! ta seðukia
         ton ipiretrion ine ɣia na ta psaxnun i kiries!
         ['"Why, open it up, ***that*** it is a shame!"']
         Open it up, so we can have a look. Oh, it's shameful, you poor dear! Why, open

it up—shameful indeed! Maids' chests are there for ladies to search through! (Tz §282 LXXXIV v; Xenopoulos)[63]

For this utterance to make sense, the second and third sentences need to be spoken ironically, in quotative intonation (the sentence is taken from a play): 'Oh, "it's shameful", you poor dear! Why, open it up—"Shameful" indeed!' In this case, the matrix clause *kale anikse to* 'why, open it' is not an expression of disbelief or contempt at all—unlike the preceding instances. The disbelief has rather been supplied by the use of quotative intonation in this and the preceding clause.[64]

In all, we have seen seven types of exclamatory usages of *pu,* summarised in Table 7.

| Section | Name | Form | Assertion | Value Judgement |
|---------|------|------|-----------|-----------------|
| §3.4.2 | Justify-*pu* | *pu* | Affirmative | Neutral |
| §3.7.5 | Optative | *pu na* | Optative | Mostly Negative |
| §3.7.6 | Cleft Exclamatory | *(ti)... pu* | Affirmative | Mostly Positive |
| §3.7.6 | Bare Exclamatory | *pu* | Affirmative | Negative |
| §3.8.1 | Uncontrolled-*pu θa* | *pu θa* | Affirmative | Negative |
| §3.8.1 | Controlled-*pu θa* | *pu θa* | Negative | Negative |
| §3.8.2 | Irrealis-*pu* | *pu* | Negative | Negative |

Table 7. Exclamatory usages of *pu*

## 3.9. *Definite article* + **pu**

This final class of usages of *pu* does not in itself constitute a novel function. Rather, as with the 'subjunctive' usage of *pu* considered in §3.6, it is a morphological innovation involving *pu*.

*pu* cannot be preceded by a definite article in CSMG. This is in constrast with *oti: to oti* is a common though formal complementiser, as described in §3.3.5. The other two major complementisers of Greek also have a long history of association with the definite article. In Early Modern Greek, the complementiser *pos* was almost obligatorily preceded by the definite article *to* (89a) (see Nicholas 1996), although the use of *to pos* as a counterpart to *to oti* is marginal in CSMG, and its acceptability is a matter of idiolectal variation.

(89a)                                                                      (1370~1388)

Μισίρ Αρίγο ντε ῍Ανδουλος, δούκας της Βενετίας/ απόκρισιν τους έδοκεν, ούτως τους αποκρίθη,/ *το πως* το πράγμα όπου ζητούν αρέσει της Βενετίας.

misir ariɣo de adulos, ðukas tis venetias,/ apokrisin tus eðoken, utos tus apokriθi,/

---

[63]Tzartzanos includes this example in Note iv at the conclusion of his discussion of *pu*—alongside other instances of *pu* where "the precise definition is difficult to determine." It is the final example given, and his comment is limited to "(*pu*= ? The meaning is: 'it is not shameful at all')." This comment is the only mention I am aware of of irrealis *pu*-exclamatories in the literature.

[64]This utterance comes the closest to the bare *pu*-exclamatories considered in §3.7.6; but the *pu*-clause here is still clearly subordinate semantically—even if the matrix 'open it up!' is not particularly germane to the *pu*-adjunct; and the *pu*-clause is anti-factive, whereas bare *pu*-exclamatories are paratactic rather than subordinate, and factive. Nevertheless, the boundary between the two constructions is obviously not rigid.

**to pos** to praɣma ˈopu zitun aresi tis venetias.
*Sir Enrico Dandolo, Doge of Venice, gave them an answer, thus he answered them: **that** the thing which they sought was pleasing to Venice. (Mor^H 361–363)*

And *to na*-clauses are the most productive (although not the most unmarked) way of nominalising actions, corresponding to both the English gerund and the nominal use of the infinitive. The article is present (though not mandatory) only when the *na*-clause is a subject (89b), but not when it is a preposed object—unlike *to oti* (89c) (Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:21):

(89b)  *To να*     *δείρεις*       έναν Ιταλό    στην εποχή εκείνη, όχι μόνο
       ***to na***    ***ðiris***       enan italo    stin epoxi ekini, oxi mono
       the *na*    you beat up (PERFS)  an Italian
       δεν επέφερε στίγμα, αλλ᾽ ήταν πράξη ηρωισμού
       ðen epefere stiɣma, al itan praksi iroismu
       ***Beating up*** *an Italian in those days wasn't a disgrace; on the contrary, it was an act of heroism. (Tah 262)*

(89c)  *(\*To)*   *να*   πάμε    μαζί     θέλω
       *(\*to)*   ***na***   pame    mazi     θelo
       the      *na*   we go   together  I want
       To go together is what I want us to do.

Finally, the CSMG relativiser in competition with *pu, o opios,* incorporates the definite article. So members of the same paradigms as *pu* frequently take determiners. Instances of *pu* taking a definite article, however, are extremely rare—and would be unacceptable to most CSMG speakers. To account for this fact, both Roussou (1992:131) and Varlokosta (1994:83) predict it is impossible for *pu*-clauses to be preceded by a determiner, as the syntactic slot for a determiner in a *pu*-clause is normally occupied by an empty element—for Roussou a clausal determiner, for Varlokosta an empty nominal complement to the *pu*-matrix.[65]

There are two classes of definite article + *pu* combinations which turn up in Modern Greek. Those involving *pu* as a relativiser or adjunct connective seem restricted to what Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963] §282 LXXXIV ii 1) calls "poetic speech"—specifically, syntactic experimentation on the part of poets. For example, the following verse in the poetry of Calvo, written in the 1820s, uses the feminine plural article before *pu:*[66]

(90a)  Ψυχαί, *αἱ ποὺ* ἐδοξάσατε τὸν Ἀσωπὸν καὶ τ᾽ ἄλσος τοῦ Μαραθῶνος.
       psixe (FEM.PL), ***e pu*** eðoksasate ton asopon ke t alsos tu maraθonos.
       *O souls, **that** ('the that') have glorified the Asopus river and the copse of Marathon. (Tz §282 LXXXIV ii 1; Calvo)*

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[65]Wiedenmeyer (1995) has another formulation: both *to* and *pu* are clausal determiners, but *to* appears instead of *pu* where the clausal determiner needs to bear inflection.
[66]The feminine plural article *e* (*hai*) is an archaism.

Calvo wrote in an eclectic mix of archaic and vernacular Greek; and this example seems to be an experimental attempt to bring *pu* in line with *o opios*. In example (90b), on the other hand, the experiment seems to involve interpolating a relative clause between the determiner and the noun, after the pattern of German and Classical Greek:

(90b)  Ξεχνώ    το    ***που***   με    τρώει   σαράκι
       ksexno   to    ***pu***   me    troi    saraki.
       I forget  the   REL    me    eats    sorrow
       I forget the sorrow ***which*** gnaws at me.
       Cf. German *Ich vergesse den mich beiß**enden** Schmerz* 'I forget the me bit***ing*** pain';
       Classical Greek Λανθάνομαι τὸν ὄν τρώγει με πόνον lant^hánomai tòn ***hòn*** tróːgei me pónon 'I forget the ***which*** gnaws at me pain'

A few speakers (although probably not enough to call this a feature of CSMG)[67] seem to accept *to pu*-complement clauses for subject complements; Varlokosta (1994:84) provides the following illustrations:

(91a)  Μου      αρκεί      ***το***   ***που***   ήρθες
       mu       arki       ***to***   ***pu***    irθes
       to.me    suffices   the    that    you.came
       It is enough for me ***that*** you came

(91b)  ***Το***   ***που***   ήρθες,      μου     αρκεί
       ***to***   ***pu***    irθes,      mu      arki
       the    that    you.came    to.me   suffices
       It is enough for me ***that*** you came

One infrequently also finds such examples in print:

(91c)  Βέβαια, θα πρέπει να ληφθεί σοβαρά υπ' όψη, ***το που*** εδόθη η συνέντευξη και ***ότι*** και στο παρελθόν, ο κ. Πάγκαλος έχει "αιφνιδιάσει" την κοινή γνώμη με παρόμοιες δηλώσεις
       vevea, θa prepi na lifθi sovara ip opsi, ***to pu*** eðoθi i sinedefksi ke ***oti*** ke sto parelθon, o kirios pagalos exi "efniðiasi" tin kini ɣnomi me paromies ðilosis
       Of course, ***the fact that*** the interview was given must be taken seriously under consideration, as well as ***the fact that*** Mr Pangalos has caught public opinion by surprise before with similar statements (*Νέος Κόσμος* (Melbourne), 1998–4–16, p. 2)

Roussou (1992) predicts such sentences should be unacceptable, since *pu*-complements are not true subjects but only internal arguments. Varlokosta (1994:85), on the other hand, argues that subjecthood is irrelevant here, since these *pu*-clauses are probably in some type of topic position instead—although she still cannot explain why (91b) is marginal but its *to oti*-equivalent *(to oti irθes)* is completely acceptable.

   The other group of instances of definite article preceding *pu* involves the *to pu*-phrase as the object of a preposition. There are three contexts in which this

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[67]This feature is unacceptable in my idiolect, and as I report in §7.9, is also absent from the 8-million word corpus of *Hellas-L*.

can occur. The first is where a preposition precedes a normal relativiser, as exemplified by (92a):

(92a)  Ω εσύ θεέ του αναπαμού, *για τον οπού* η τρυγόνα σμίγει πιστά στου τρύγονα το άσμα τη φωνή της.
  o esi θee tu anapamu, *yia ton opu* i triɣona smiɣi pista stu triɣona to asma ti foni tis.
  O thou god of rest, *for whom* ('for the that') the female cricket faithfully blends her voice to the male cricket's song. (Tz §282 LXXXIV ii 1; Skipis)

This instance once again seems to be an experimental imitation of *o opios: yia ton opio* is entirely acceptable, while *yia ton [o]pu* is not. Although the failure of *pu* in CSMG to take prepositions may seem to motivate constructions like (92a), such constructions have not caught on, given the availability of *o opios*.

The second context involves headless relatives, and is illustrated by (92b):

(92b)  Χαρά *στον οπού* γλύτωσε, χαρά *στον π'* όχει φύγει.
  xara *ston opu* ɣlitose, xara *ston p* oxi fiɣi.
  Joy *to him who* ('to the that') escaped, joy *to him who* ('to the that') has fled. (Tz §282 LXXXIV ii 1; Gryparis)

This kind of usage is encountered occasionally in EMG texts, when the headless relative *opu* was still extant.

The final context involves *pu*-clauses as clausal objects of prepositions or preposition-like constructions. While they are absent from formal Greek (which uses *to oti* for this purpose), they can be seen from time to time in more informal discourse, such as Tsiforos' texts:

(92c)  Κάτι είχε [ο Ναπολέοντας], *εκτός* δηλαδή, *το που* ήτανε στρατηγός-θαύμα.
  kati ixe, *ektos* ðilaði, *to pu* itane stratiɣos θavma.
  There was something to him [Napoleon]—*apart*, that is, *from the fact that* he was a wonder-general. (TsifHF 297)

(92d)  Ο Σαμπλίτ έπιασε τους Έλληνες να τα 'χη και καλά μαζί τους.
  —Ρε παιδιά. Έξω δηλαδή *από το που* θα σας αλλάξουμε τα σώβρακα, δεν πρόκειται να σας πειράξουμε.
  o sablit epiase tus elines na ta xi kala mazi tus.
  re peðia. ekso ðiladi *apo to pu* θa sas alaksume ta sovraka, ðen prokite na sas piraksume.
  Champlitte started talking to the Greeks to get them on side.
  "Now lads! *Apart from the fact that* we will force on you a change of underwear, we aren't going to harm you." (TsifFU 36)

(92e)  Μιλημένα πράματα, συμφωνημένα πράματα, *απάνω στο που* ήτανε να δώσουνε κάπαρο, τι του καπνίζει του άγιου Πελάγιου και μπαίνει στη μέση.
  milimena pramata, simfonimena pramata, *apano sto pu* itane na ðosune kaparo, ti tu kapnizi tu aɣiu pelaɣiu ke beni sti mesi.
  Everything had been discussed, everything had been agreed, and *just as* they were about to shake hands, who-knows-what got into Saint Pelagius, and he intervened. (TsifC 274)

There are already several prepositional collocations using *pu* without the determiner; the last example in particular, (92e), is an expanded instance of the

*pano pu* collocation extant in CSMG (Nicholas 1998a). In order to form the preposition 'on' in CSMG, the adverb *[a]pano* 'above' takes the preposition *s[e]* 'to'; e.g. *pano s to ɣrafio* 'above to the desk = on the desk'. Normally, *pu* cannot be the argument of a preposition, so *se* has to be dropped if *pano se* 'on' is to be adjoined to *pu: pano (*se) pu* 'above (to) that = on (the event) that = when'. The utterance in (92e) shows that, at least in Tsiforos' linguistic intuition, *pano pu* is equivalent to *pano s to pu,* and the definite article is consistent with the collocation: while *se* cannot precede *pu,* it can precede a determiner, which may thus be regarded as a sort of buffer. So other such collocations may involve the *pu*-clause as a nominalised clausal object.

There is a split between the two types of definite article collocation. That which involves relative clauses or adjuncts is restricted to poetic language, and involves the analogical extension of a use of the determiner before small clauses already restricted to the *Kunstsprache*. Prepositional instances, on the other hand, are a part of CSMG—albeit marginally so; this seems to result from the frequent collocation of prepositions and determiners in their normal, nominal use.

## 3.10. "Too-hard basket"

The classification outlined in this chapter is more comprehensive than that given by either Tzartzanos or Mackridge; therefore, it covers more of the functions *pu* holds in Greek. In addition, the categories are necessarily 'fuzzy', and overlap. So the majority of examples Tzartzanos (1991 [1946, 1963] §282 LXXXIV v Note iv) gives as problematic can be dealt with within this framework as representing either ambiguous cases, where two distinct interpretations are possible, or vague cases, which lie in some intermediate position in a fuzzy cline between two prototypical meanings of *pu*.

There remain the following two instances in Tzartzanos' list where no discernable function can be attributed to *pu*. Those instances of *pu,* where Tzartzanos describes *pu* as "redundant", may well be evidence of its grammaticalisation beyond the range of semantic classification, to the point where it is merely an extremely loose textual connective.

(93a)    Ἔφτασε με τα πολλά ψηλά στο σπίτι ενού βοσκού. «Μ' αφήνετε, λέει,
         eftase me ta pola psila sto spiti enu vosku. "m afinete, lei,
         να κοιμηθώ απόψε εδώ; Είμαι θαλασσοπνιμένη.»
         na kimiθo apopse eðo? ime θalasopnimeni."

| Το λοιπό | τόσο πολύ | ***που*** | τη | συμπάθησε | ο βοσκός | ***που*** |
|----------|-----------|-----------|-----|-----------|----------|-----------|
| to lipo | toso poli | ***pu*** | ti | sibaθise | o voskos, | ***pu*** |
| so | so much | *pu* | her | liked | the shepherd | *that* |

         την εκράτησε.
         tin ekratise.
         he kept her
         After climbing a great height, she ended up at a shepherd's house. "Would you let me sleep here tonight?" she said. "I've been shipwrecked." So, the shepherd liked her so much, that he kept her. (MinA 424; Volimes, Zante, Heptanesa)

(93b)    Ἄκουσε, μπρέ γυναίκα, και μένα. Εχτρός του δεν ήμουνα, σε είπα και ***που*** σε λέγω.
         akuse, bre ɣineka, ke mena. extros tu ðen imuna, se ipa ke ***pu*** se leɣo.
         Now, wife, will you listen to me! I was no enemy of his—I've told you so and I
         am telling you so. ('and ***pu*** I am telling you') (Tz §282 LXXXIV v; folk tale from
         Thrace collected by Papahristodoulou)

Both these examples are from folk tales; they seem to point to some regional development of *pu,* since such usage is unknown in CSMG. In (93a), we may simply be dealing with a speech error, with the first, redundant *pu* anticipating the second, resultative instance.[68] No similar explanation suggests itself for (93b), however, and I am unable to explain it.

## *3.11. Summary*

It is worth taking stock of the functionality of *pu* described in this lengthy exposition.

The primary function of *pu* in CSMG is to introduce embedded clauses, and *pu* is in evidence wherever embedded clauses are in use in Greek: relative clauses, adjuncts, complements, prepositional collocations. It is not the only particle with such a function in Greek; and in structuralist fashion, *pu* can be defined with respect to the other members of its paradigm. In complementation, *pu* competes with *pos, oti,* and *na;* the semantics underlying this competition are looked at more thoroughly in §4. In introducing adjuncts and collocations, *pu* is predominantly in competition with *na*.

The overriding semantic factor involved in determining the distribution of *pu* is its realis character. In adjuncts (and collocations such as *mexri pu* versus *mexri na* for 'until'), *na* denotes an irrealis clause, and *pu* a realis clause; the *pu na* combination denotes irrealis counterparts to *pu*-clauses. In complementation, the conditioning can be expressed more strongly as factivity—presupposition of truth of the complement: *na*-complements are irrealis, *pos*- and *oti*-complements realis but non-factive, and *pu*-complements factive. There are some questions about how closely the notion of factivity actually applies to complementiser-*pu*; these are considered in §4.

There are some secondary functions of *pu* not encompassed by the summary just given:

1  *pu* is not restricted to embedded clauses, but can introduce matrix clauses as a discourse connective—as a narrative discourse marker in its own right (typically in the guise of its etymon, ʹ*opu* 'where'); in collocation with various forms of the verb *leo* 'say' as a discourse marker (Nicholas 1998a); or in collocation with *na,* introducing optatives.

2  *pu* is not factive or realis throughout its functions; as an adjunct to various exclamatory clauses, it can actually be anti-factive. Although this function is marginal in the overall scheme, it nonetheless needs to be taken into account.

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[68]As has been suggested by Brian Joseph (pers. comm.), the first *pu* may be clefting the resultative.

3   There is some variability about the morphological behaviour of *pu* in CSMG.
    Its status as a 'subjunctive' subordinator (able to be followed by PERFS
    verbs), and the possibility of preceding it with a determiner after a preposi-
    tion, vary idiolectally; so too does its admissibility after verbs of saying.
    Complementation is even more variable in Greek dialect; several Greek dia-
    lects appear to have made *pu* a generic realis complementiser, displacing *pos*
    and *oti*.

The result of these developments is detailed in Figure 1; the shaded areas are
those which lie outside the normal functional range of CSMG *pu,* either because
they have become independent of a matrix, or because *pu* has become non-fac-
tive. (The directionality of these changes, indicated by the arrows in Figure 1, is
discussed further in §7.)



Figure 1. Developments in functionality of *pu*

So the story of *pu* is complex. A full account of its development needs to include
a prodigious amount of data, from Early Modern Greek and Modern Greek dia-
lect, as well as various registers of CSMG. The task of expounding on at least
some of that data, and attempting to integrate it within one coherent whole, is
what ensues in the next few chapters. Before that can be attempted, I outline in
§4 our current understanding of the most involved semantic problem involving
*pu*—that of the semantics of CSMG complementation. Given a better under-
standing of complementation, a fuller summary of the functionality of *pu* can be
attempted.